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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the ways that moneyed Philadelphians 
invented corporate power in America during the first fou r decades of the federal 
republic, specifically focusing on business corporations, such as canal 
companies and banks, and on a public corporation, Philadelphia’s municipal 
government. Through evidence from company and municipal records and 
publications, the private papers and correspondence of corporate officers, 
newspapers, pamphlets, and legislative acts and proceedings, this study 
identifies the people and the technological and financial processes that 
contributed to the establishment and entrenchment of corporate economic and 
political power.
From the 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphia-area residents demanded 
cheaper transportation, a better water supply, and more adequate credit facilities 
and financial institutions. The technical, legal, and monetary requirements of 
corporations that administered these projects served to increase their leverage in 
political and economic relations with other individuals and groups, allowing the 
few who controlled those institutions to exert power over space in unprecedented 
ways. The men who dominated those corporations justified this increased 
influence by successfully casting their own interests as being synonymous with 
those of the public a t large. In addition, by the 181 Os, a small group of 
Philadelphians recognized the centrality of transportation and banking to 
economic growth and coupled them to the corporate form to establish a forum at 
once withdrawn from public input yet able to exert power in public politics: the 
meeting-rooms of corporations run by men with close business and family ties.
Most significantly, this study argues that the creation of such a domain 
held serious consequences fo r the legacy of the American Revolution. 
Philadelphia corporations provided broader political and economic independence 
for more people than before the Revolution; indeed, these companies grew 
because of the great demand fo r their services and the freedoms they fostered. 
However, as corporate associates consolidated their hold over institutions they 
gained increasing command over what direction growth could take and how its 
rewards would be distributed. These phenomena contributed greatly to the 
transformation of America from a gentry-dominated society in the eighteenth 
century to the corporate-dominated one of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
vii
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Introduction
In the 1790s, Philadelphians referred to their city as the “Metropolis of 
America," and for good reason. At over 50,000 people and growing, its 
population easily surpassed that of any other city in the new nation. No 
American city hosted as many prominent cultural institutions, including the 
American Philosophical Society, the Library Company, the College of 
Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Hospital. Its wharves on the Delaware 
River were among the busiest on the Atlantic seaboard, as thickets of tall ships 
loaded grain farmed in its lush hinterland and flour milled along the eastern 
seaboard to trade for sugar from the West Indies and a plethora of goods from 
Europe and beyond. Nonetheless, Philadelphians worried about a host of 
problems. With Britain having been their source of commercial credit they were 
apprehensive about locating the capital necessary to finance economic 
development. The rising cost o f fuel also bothered them as they ransacked the 
surrounding countryside fo r firewood. They had further concerns about the 
continued viability of their competitiveness. Despite the difference in population, 
New York had usurped Philadelphia’s position as the primary commercial city in 
the nation and Baltimore threatened to displace it to third. Both of these cities 
had more extensive natural inland navigation networks that portended for 
continued growth at Philadelphia’s expense. But their most pressing problem 
was the water—it was terrible. They did not have enough to drink and 
complained about the poor quality of what little they got. Many blamed the bad 
water for the terrible yellow fever plagues that swept the city almost every year.
2
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3Searching fo r solutions, Philadelphians primarily turned to Britain for 
technologies, organizational and legal structures, and financial methods not yet 
implemented in the United States. The city government built the first large 
municipal waterworks in America, originally steam-powered and later harnessing 
the power of the Schuylkill, a feat previously thought to be impossible. To 
compete with their metropolitan rivals fo r interior trade, Philadelphians 
constructed artificial navigations along the Lehigh and Schuylkill rivers and built 
canals to connect other waterways. They discovered how to burn anthracite coal 
and how to mine and transport it to the city affordably. They founded new 
financial institutions— banks and insurance companies— and experimented with 
novel forms of investment. They invented new ways to explain and justify these 
new technologies and institutions. To adm inister all these activities, 
Philadelphians recast a British legal and administrative structure that provided a 
platform for power, the corporation.
This dissertation is an examination of how Philadelphians used British- 
inspired projects and methods such as waterworks, banks, canals, and 
insurance companies to confront the city’s challenges from the 1790s to the 
early 1830s. I argue that Philadelphians, borrowing from British precedent, 
constructed these technologies and the institutions that administered them in 
such a way as to create and entrench economic and political corporate power, to 
extend it ever farther throughout the region, and to consolidate it in a handful of 
institutions controlled by a dwindling number of moneyed men. Indeed, they 
forged a new corporate sector of society that in some ways stood aloof from 
traditional politics and economic relations. Although certainly a subject of public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4discussion, corporate consolidation did not take place over the violent objections 
of the citizenry nor secretly in closed drawing-rooms. Rather, the men who 
owned or controlled large projects responded to and manipulated the demands 
of a growing city. Farmers, manufacturers, and merchants alike in the city and 
the region called for better transportation, more extensive public services, and 
access to credit, but often balked at paying fo r them in taxes or subscriptions. 
Ambitious investors were only too happy to enter into the vacuum, and they 
profited from the region’s economic needs in two ways: not only through financial 
returns but also by controlling crucial technologies on which great numbers of 
people depended. Furthermore, through interlocking directorates, a small group 
of men was able to coordinate consolidating efforts across technologies and 
institutions. By the early 1830s, public corporations such as the City of 
Philadelphia and private ones such as the Schuylkill Navigation Company had 
obtained legal, political, and economic leverage by those methods. By doing so, 
corporate insiders increasingly reserved fo r themselves control over wide areas 
of the economy previously left to sovereign governments— including money 
supply, transportation policy, and credit issues. The age of corporate power 
began in early republican Philadelphia. This dissertation explains how and why, 
and in so doing addresses one of the great unanswered questions of American 
history: the genesis of corporate power in America.
Previous historians who have considered the role of corporations and the 
technologies they administered in America during this period have largely done 
so from either a legal or an economic standpoint. Economic historians 
conducted a cluster of case studies toward the end of the 1970s identifying
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5regional development and transportation improvements as central to city 
expansion. Most of these monographs chiefly address the years from 1810 to 
1840, previously pinpointed by economic historians as the take-off period for the 
growth associated with the beginning of America’s industrial revolution.1 
Generally these works emphasize geographic and economic approaches to 
urban growth, comparing intra-regional economic development with inter-regional 
trade. While noting the importance of infrastructure in the young nation’s growth, 
business historians in particular have discounted the influence of corporations 
before the 1830s. Certainly compared to the railroads and industrial giants that 
became national in scope during the second half o f the nineteenth century, the 
projects in the 1810s or 1820s seem pitifully small in terms of money and 
number of employees. Economists have mostly explained corporate growth as a 
function of greater efficiency—a quantifiable measure— rather than analyzing the 
more qualitative characteristics of political or economic influence.2
Legal scholars have debated the role of the state in the development of 
the corporation and the extent to which the state encouraged or involved itself in
’For case studies of urban growth, see Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia 
Region. 1810-1845 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), which focused on the development of a 
regional trade; Gary Browne’s Baltimore in the Nation. 1789-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980), emphasized the development of capital, coupled with immigration and improvements in 
transportation; Francis X. Blouin, Jr., in The Boston Region 1810-1850: A Study of Regionalization (Ann 
Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980) described the growth of the Boston region as the result of increased 
efficiencies of regional economic and industrial integration; John G. Clark argues in New Orleans: An 
Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1970) that this city was the beneficiary of a 
huge hinterland, its growth eventually guaranteed by the proliferation of steamboats; Carville Earle provided 
a summary of a relevant geographic description of urban growth as a function of hinterland staple crops in 
“Why Tobacco Stunted the Growth of Towns and Wheat Built Them into Small Cities,” in Carville Earle, 
Geographical Inouirv and American Historical Problems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
See George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), Alfred 
Chandler, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1977), Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States. 1790-1860. Thomas C. Cochran, 
“The Business Revolution,” American Historical Review79 (Dec. 1974) 1449-66, Diane Lindstrom, 
“American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions" Journal of Economic History 
39 (March 1979), 289-301, Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals and American Economic Development (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961).
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6economic activity, usually considering corporate behavior through the use of 
sources such as legislative debates and pronouncements or juridical rulings. 
They have not, however, adequately considered the reverse: how corporate 
insiders strove to influence or exploit the political process, a phenomenon best 
understood through the analysis o f corporate records.3 Historical economic 
sociology offers valuable insights by addressing all these issues fo r later periods, 
but because it draws on existing legal and economic historiography rather than 
primary sources for the early national era, it is laden with the assumptions of 
those disciplines: that corporations were small-scale, quasi-public institutions.4 
None of the aforementioned scholars has properly explored the ways the men 
who ran corporations manipulated their technologies for clearly political and 
economic considerations, nor the  extent to which owners linked the new 
technologies, legal structures, and financial methods.
Although historians of technology have elaborated upon the great debts 
that American technological development owed to British engineers and 
engineering, legal and economic historians have seriously underestimated the 
profound influence of British corporate organizational, legal, and financial
3See Guy S. Callender, “The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the 
Growth of Corporations" Quarterly Journal o f Economics 17 (Nov., 1902), 111-162; Oscar Handlin and Mary 
F. Handlin, “Origins of the American Business Corporation" Journal of Economic History. 5 (May 1945). 1- 
23: Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin. Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the 
American Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and 
Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge, 1948); James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the 
Business Corporation in the Law of the United States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1970); Morton J. Horwitz. The Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation. 1784-1855: 
Broadening the Concept of Public Service During Industrialization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), L. 
Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political Development in New York. 1800- 
1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), and Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the 
American Corporation,” WMQ, 3d Ser., 50 (1993) 51-84.
4See William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, The Powers of Theory: 
Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Neil Fligstein, 
The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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7techniques upon American efforts in the same areas.5 For the most part, 
scholars remain strangely mute on the subject. The few who do address British 
influence have even gone so far as to label the origins of American business 
corporations a “mystery,” or to argue that in the United States, “corporation law 
was a homemade product.”6 As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, 
nothing could be further from the truth. American corporate boosters mimicked 
British predecessors in nearly every conceivable arena, from the ways that they 
presented their goals to the public and their general administrative structure to 
particular money-raising schemes and identical language in corporate by-laws 
and charters.
This study combines the scholarship of legal history, economic history, 
and the history of technology to posit insights that no one of those historiographic 
traditions alone has made. By examining legal, economic, and technological 
developments with the  understanding of their interconnection, this study 
illuminates the ways in which economic behavior and manipulation o f technology 
translated into power. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Americans 
would have found foreign the classical liberal distinction between politics and 
economy posited and academically institutionalized in the second half of the 
nineteenth century; even the patron saint of liberalism, Adam Smith, understood 
such issues to be inextricable. In pamphlets, newspapers, petitions, and
sDarwin Stapleton has written several pieces about Benjamin Henry Latrobe—the designer of the first
Philadelphia waterworks— regarding his role as the primary agent of transfer in both steam technology and 
inland navigation technology; the best summary of that work is “Benjamin Henry Latrobe and the Transfer of 
Technology,” in Pursell, Carroll, ed., Technology in America: A History of Individuals and Ideas (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1982), 34-44 while his more broad treatment of the subject in general is The Transfer of Early 
Industrial Technologies to America (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987). 
bPauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3d. Ser. 
50 (1993), 52; James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United 
States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 1.
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8speeches the first generation of United States citizens used the term “political 
economy,” inherited from the Enlightenment, to describe the field of thought that 
addressed the social and political consequences o f economic activity and vice 
versa.7 Especially during the early republic, before the weight of precedent 
pressed so heavily upon legislators to separate the “political” from the 
“economic,” Americans struggled in word and deed to define the limits of 
governmental and non-governmental activity, individual and collective privileges, 
and moneyed and mass influence.
Because o f the unique range of large-scale technologies its residents 
pursued from 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphia provides an excellent site to 
examine all of the relevant issues. Philadelphians pioneered river navigations, 
canals, a steam-powered waterworks, a water-powered waterworks, banking, 
insurance, and various kinds of municipal finance. They administered these 
projects through a  public corporation, the City of Philadelphia, and through 
private corporations such as the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, the 
Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, and the 
Union Canal Company. Despite many false starts, Philadelphians discovered 
how to use anthracite coal and founded the Schuylkill Navigation Company and 
the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company to bring it to market. By 1830, 
Philadelphia’s corporations had gained control both over major local resources 
and over the allocation of capital in the region.
7 Perhaps Drew McCoy has best defined the meaning of “political economy” in the early republic; he 
described it as the “characteristically republican idea of a dynamic interdependence among polity, 
economy, and society.” Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 6.
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9This study emphasizes the extent to which corporate consolidation 
involved at least the implicit and often the explicit cooperation of many disparate 
groups.8 Previous studies have focused primarily upon the men who proposed 
and ran corporations, ascribing all agency to them. However, these men were 
not acting in a vacuum: they were actors in an environment in which farmers, 
merchants, and manufacturers continually petitioned the state legislature for 
public improvements and greater access to credit. Despite the political pressure 
for such technologies and services, most Pennsylvanians were not willing to pay 
for them through increased taxes and were wary of government administration of 
financial services and large construction projects. Thus, the people who 
demanded better transportation, paper money, and access to credit cooperated 
with companies in their efforts to secure charters and other favorable legislation. 
At the same time, many small investors—widows, middling tradesmen and 
merchants, executors of estates for orphans— were eager for safe ways to invest 
that would provide a steady income without requiring the time and expertise to 
devote the money to their own business pursuits; corporate stocks and municipal 
bonds often provided the perfect investment vehicle. These people were willing 
to supply the money for corporate projects that others would administer.
Together, the cooperation of corporate officers, small investors, and the great 
number of people who demanded canals, banks, and waterworks made 
corporate power possible.
8ln surveying literature on the interaction of various groups with different kinds of technologies, Thomas J. 
Misa has pointed out that historians have found agency at every level of interaction from designer to 
producer to administrator to user. Each kind of agency is different in that various parts of a technology are 
determined by the different groups. See Thomas J. Misa, “Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from 
Technological Determinism,” in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The 
Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 115-141.
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Nonetheless, because a small community o f insiders worked most actively 
to establish and adm inister corporations, those individuals must be near the 
center of any analysis of corporate power in the early republic. In this sense, 
then, this study fo llows in the footsteps of others that examined particular groups 
of “associates” in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Atlantic 
world.9 Just as in those works, “associates” here does not refer to membership 
in a formal organization, nor to shareholders in one particular venture. Many 
were long-term partners of various firms or served together on corporate boards, 
but overall they had no single business or line of work that united them. They did 
not necessarily have family ties, although many were related either by birth or by 
marriage. Boundaries remained fluid; as individual men became more prominent 
in Philadelphia’s business circles, they could buy large blocks of stock or gain 
election to corporate boards and thus earn acceptance into corporate insider 
circles. The terms “associates” and “insiders” will be used in this study to 
describe a group o f men in a particular time and place who shared many 
business dealings, class interests, and a common vision of economic 
development and their role in that development.10 Because the group had no
9See Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: 
Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1986); David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the 
British Atlantic Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Naomi Lamoreaux, 
Insider Lending: Banks. Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Cathy Matson, Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial 
New York (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Anthony F. C. Wallace, Rockdale: 
The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1978).
10For a particularly explicit definition of “associates,” see Hancock, 11-12. The definition I have given of 
associates mostly mirrors Hancock’s. However, my use of the term for research resembles that of Wallace 
and Dalzell in one crucial sense, which is that Hancock’s group was circumscribed by the number of 
merchants whose lives he examined, a number necessary limited by research requirements including 
extant records and a depth not reached in this study; rather, the Philadelphia associates constitute the 
entire community of men active in Philadelphia corporations during the first three decades of the nineteenth 
century.
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formal membership rites or titles, those men did not explicitly label themselves as 
associates. Nonetheless, they could clearly identify others in their network as 
men who were active in Philadelphia corporations.
While associates and others influenced the development of corporations 
in ways small and large, the sum of those contributions cannot be described fully 
by the actions of any particular individual or small group. The interaction of 
many people and interests on a grand scale also shaped these institutions and 
affected their economic and political roles. Thus, this study addresses both the 
words and actions of the individuals involved and the greater process of 
corporate growth that exhibited similar patterns and results across the range of 
corporations in the Philadelphia area. In almost every case, corporations gained 
what historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes has labeled “institutional 
momentum.”11 That is, as technologies are first deployed, many individuals or 
groups can have great influence over their design and implementation; however, 
once a technology is established, owners, administrators, and users will often 
have an interest in keeping it unchanged as well as discouraging competing 
versions of the technology. Beyond the actions of individuals, Philadelphia 
corporations did take on institutional momentum in the 1810s and 1820s as they 
matured and gained more customers and represented increasingly entrenched 
interests.
This work is also guided by the recognition that certain kinds of 
technologies and activities were integral to the workings of an entire local or even
11Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Merritt Roe, and Marx, Leo, eds. Smith, Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 
101-115.
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regional economy, such that their designers and administrators could manipulate 
them for great power.12 Although many observers of technology have analyzed 
systems— most prominently electrical networks, telephone networks, and railroad 
systems—they have not adequately conceptualized the ways in which certain 
kinds of technologies can be deployed to gain economic leverage.13 Those 
scholars considering these issues have sharply disagreed over the possibility 
that large technological systems may have inherent political or social 
consequences. Observers with a more philosophical bent have tended to 
portray some large technologies as necessarily entailing certain centralizing or 
authoritarian effects. On the other side of the fence, most historians of 
technology have argued that, like any technology, large technological systems 
are culturally defined and open to literal and figurative construction by 
administrators, designers, builders, users, and legislators. This study bridges the 
two views by pointing out that both arguments apply in part to canals, river 
navigations, and waterworks. Like any technology, they could be designed and
12ln this study, “local” will be used to describe one municipality and its immediate surroundings, for example 
Philadelphia and its contiguous suburbs, the town of Reading, or the town of Mauch Chunk and its local 
mines. “Regional” will be used to describe the geographic area of which Philadelphia was the economic 
hub, so including much of the Delaware, Schuylkill, and eventually Lehigh River valleys.
13For a discussion of the use of railroad routing and financing to establish economic power, see John 
Lauritz Larson, Bonds of Enterprise: John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's Railway 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); David E. Nye does the same for electricity in Electrifying 
America: Social Meanings of a New Technology (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990); also see Thomas P. 
Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society. 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983). For a summary of the historiographic debates on technological determinism, 
especially in terms of large technologies, see Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American 
Culture,” in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 2-35.
Lewis Mumford, in “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics,” Technology and Culture 5 (Winter 1964), 1-8, 
postulated that large technological systems engendered themselves to centralized control, and thus 
contributed to the consolidation of bureaucratic power.
Thomas Hughes, in Networks of Power Electrification in Western Society. 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), argued just the opposite: that national engineering cultures and 
local economic and political decisions determined the deployment and administration of large technological 
systems. For insightful discussions on the political nature of technology, see Langdon Winner, The Whale 
and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: The University of Chicago
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administered in a nearly infinite number of ways. Nonetheless, more so than 
most technologies, som e large technological systems cost great sums to build 
and became central to  a city’s or region’s economic life, making them particularly 
attractive targets fo r am bitious men with access to capital who saw opportunities 
fo r profit and for gaining a large say in the direction of economic growth.14
Banks and insurance companies were the financial equivalents to such 
large technologies in the early republic.15 The Philadelphia waterworks gathered 
a precious resource to be distributed at a controlled flow through predetermined 
conduits from a reservoir to particular places, all the while decreasing the 
responsibility and burden to individuals of gathering their own water. Banks and 
insurance companies essentially performed the same centralization and 
distribution functions, again relieving individuals of certain encumbrances and 
liabilities. Rather than water, the latter institutions each gathered and spread 
more abstract yet equally crucial commodities: banks did so with capital and 
insurance companies did so with risk, though their functions often overlapped. 
Those who administered the companies overseeing such operations— often the 
same men or in league with those who ran river navigations, turnpikes, and
Press, 1986), 19-58 and Jacques Ellul, The Technological System. Joachim Neugroshel, trans. (New York: 
Continuum, 1980).
’“Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitling argued that “which technological possibilities are in fact realized 
depend crucially on the distribution of power and wealth in society: those who control the disposition of 
resources and the returns from investments choose from among the available applications of technology 
the one most favorable to their interests as they define them.” Charles Zable and Jonathan Zeitling, 
“Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century 
Industrialization,” Past and Present (August 1985), 161. Historians of technology have attacked this general 
assertion for many technologies, especially those at the “consumption junction”: mass consumer 
technologies. However, Sabel’s and Zeitlin’s contention remains particularly apt for technologies requiring 
vast resources.
,sThe question of whether a bank or an insurance company itself is a technology is open to debate. While 
many historians have limited their definition of technology to artifacts—machines, roads, circuits, cloth, 
tools, and so forth—others have widened the definition. For instance, an alphabet does not necessarily 
have a physical component, nor does calculus; however, each are humanly constructed tools representing 
some facet of the physical world. Other tools are trickier; for example, paper money is clearly a technology
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canals—could and did use them to extend their influence over the direction and 
distribution of Philadelphia’s economic growth.
The chapters to follow will address the ways that corporate insiders, in 
cooperation and conflict with legislators, investors, and the general public, 
shaped these technologies and institutions. Chapter Two begins with an 
analysis of the transatlantic financial and mercantile community. Although post- 
Revolutionary Philadelphia remained peripheral to the British metropole, the city 
became more integrated with Britain institutions following the Revolution than it 
had before the start of the conflict. Philadelphia’s commercial leaders looked to 
the mother country for the economic and technological tools that would bring 
stability to their businesses and to the greater economy. They turned to new 
solutions, ones that had profound consequences fo r the projection o f power 
across space. This chapter also outlines the consolidating and diffusing 
characteristics of corporations that led to changes not only in the economy but 
also in the construction of power in the early republic.
The following three chapters investigate in closer detail the phenomena 
identified in Chapter Two. Chapter Three addresses the new technologies 
Philadelphians adopted, specifically the Philadelphia waterworks, the Schuylkill 
and Lehigh navigations, and, to a lesser extent, various canals in the 
Philadelphia region. The designers and owners o f these technologies planned 
and built such technologies in ways that ensured centralized control over their 
administration. Once these projects had been constructed, their administrators 
manipulated the dependence of others upon the technology to enlist their help in
according to the widely accepted definition, but a bank may not be. For the purposes of this study, banks
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securing legislation that gave the organizations that ran them advantages over 
other actors in the economy. For example, the city gained power over issues of 
rate collection for water delivery in Philadelphia’s suburbs, and internal 
navigation companies acquired advantages in suits concerning property damage. 
These new technologies proved more effective than previous ones for the men 
who wanted to extend power over more people and greater space.
Chapter Four examines the role that the exploitation of finance played in 
Philadelphia’s expansion, concentrating on banks, insurance companies, and the 
methods they and the controllers of physical-technology projects used to raise 
money. In Pennsylvania, the widespread desire for credit and for better 
transportation facilities, in combination with the resistance to taxation, played into 
the hands of those who had the money to invest in such activities. In addition, 
the administrators of the technology exploited the desire of most investors to 
avoid active participation in the venture. Corporate insiders were thus able to 
gather vast amounts of capital over which the public and eventually even most 
investors would have little control.
Just as physical technology and financial institutions were powerful 
consolidating tools, so too was the use of ideology to legitimate, justify, extend, 
and protect the gains of administrators and large investors. Chapter Five will 
examine how those who ran corporations manipulated terms and ideas 
concerning concepts of private interest, public service, and city, state, and 
patriotism in their efforts to promote and defend their projects and institutions.
By championing the interests o f those who would benefit from their projects,
and insurance companies will not be defined as technologies.
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corporate insiders were able to associate their own interest with the public 
interest.
Although each o f the institutions under study was owned and 
administered separately, corporate insiders ran them in sim ilar ways and to 
defend similar interests. Corporate boosters did their best to gain as much 
independence as possible from state authorities in terms of their own 
administration while keeping lines of communication open with the statehouse to 
gain legislative favors. Chapter Six details the effort to keep public officials out 
of the boardroom and to  resist governmental regulation, giving special attention 
to the composition of corporate boards of directors, the extent to which corporate 
boards interlocked and the way they worked in concert. Such activities 
necessitated coordination among and between corporations; Chapter Six also 
investigates how the corporate community coordinated its de facto control of 
state money policy and directed Philadelphia’s economic growth.
As Chapter Seven shows, companies used technology, ideology, and 
finance together to create a corporate sphere. This developments held profound 
consequences for the ordering of American society in the half-century after the 
Revolution. Corporations brought Philadelphians greater access to credit, 
efficiency of transportation, availability of water, circulation of cash, and supply of 
coal, and in doing so helped bring about the end of the old, patron-client 
economic order. They allowed the diffusion of economic— and thus political—  
independence for the many. At the same time, corporate insiders gained and 
retained control over these processes. Chapter Seven will also place 
Philadelphia’s changes in the context of Jacksonian America, showing how an
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acknowledgment o f the early nineteenth-century creation of a new, corporate 
sphere allows the synthesis of the two seemingly antithetical interpretations of 
changes in the distribution of political and economic power in the early republic.
By the 1830s, Philadelphians could no longer call their city the “Metropolis 
o f America” ; clearly, New York had taken that honor, never to relinquish it. 
Philadelphia was poised to move in another direction, toward its nineteenth- 
century self-designation as the “workshop of Am erica.” It was in a position to be 
a center of heavy industry, especially the manufacture of steam engines, through 
a heritage of steam engine use fostered by the first waterworks and access to 
cheap anthracite coal. Building from  their experience with canals, Philadelphians 
would help found and run the Pennsylvania Railroad, the largest and most 
powerful corporation in America fo r most of the nineteenth century.
Philadelphia’s Fairmount waterworks would become a model for municipal 
waterworks across the country, as would the city's administration and finance of 
such projects. The big city corporation and the big business corporation had 
their origins in early nineteenth-century Philadelphia. The following chapters will 
explain how and why.
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British Precedents, American Conditions, and Philadelphian Consequences
In the decades following the Revolution, the United States attempted to 
achieve economic independence from Britain. Part o f that effort involved the 
creation of the physical, financial, and institutional structures denied them under 
British rule. Philadelphia led the way in many of those areas by developing the 
new mechanisms necessary for independent economic growth. Ironically, the 
men most responsible fo r establishing this infrastructure borrowed heavily from 
British precedent.
As Philadelphia recovered from the British occupation, it quickly reclaimed 
its place as the largest and most culturally sophisticated city on North America’s 
Atlantic seaboard. In the mid-1780s, about 40,000 people lived in Philadelphia 
or its suburbs, still ahead of close rival New York City. Although in 1682 William 
Penn had planned the city to span a one-mile wide, two-mile long stretch of land 
between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers, a century later it remained mostly 
hunched along the western bank of the Delaware. The Delaware not only was 
deeper and less likely to freeze than the Schuylkill, but also was navigable for 
many miles above the growing commercial capital, well into New York State. By 
the 1780s, city habitations reached less than a mile inland, a densely settled six 
or seven blocks beyond the busy wharves. Nonetheless, residents boasted 
about Philadelphia’s rational plan, its copious markets, and its broad, paved 
avenues with their brick sidewalks and gutters.
The city’s wide streets and grand buildings drew compliments from many
travelers, too, as did its lively cultural and social scene. “Philadelphia may be
considered the metropolis of the United States,” observed an impressed French
18
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traveler, J.P. Brlssot de Warville, in 1788, long enough after the Revolution for 
the repainting of facades, the replacement of windows, and the mending of 
streets to have taken place. “It certainly is the finest town, and the best built; it is 
the most wealthy, though not the most luxurious. You find here more men of 
information, more political and literary knowledge, and more learned societies.”1 
He was referring to well-grounded institutions including the American 
Philosophical Society, founded there in 1743, the Pennsylvania Hospital, opened 
in 1752, the College of Philadelphia, chartered in 1755, and the Library 
Company of Philadelphia—America’s first lending library—organized in 1731. 
Philadelphia’s cultural wealth reflected its commercial wealth, manifested in the 
grand, three-story brick mansions built by the city’s richest men. Commerce was 
the lifeblood of all waterfront cities in the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century, 
and the Quaker City was no exception.
Philadelphia merchants tried their best to amass fortunes amid the 
instability and uncertainty of the Atlantic economy. In order to gain some 
modicum, or perhaps some illusion, of control over their businesses, Philadelphia 
merchants tended to specialize in one of two particular modes of commerce, the 
provisioning trade or the dry goods trade.2 Provisions consisted of all the goods 
exported from Philadelphia. Drawing from hundreds of square miles of 
hinterland in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, Philadelphia 
provisioning merchants annually shipped hundreds of thousands of barrels of
1J.P. Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America. Performed in the Year 1788 (Dublin: 
W. Corbet, 1792).
2See Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in 
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, 1986) for a complete analysis of Philadelphia merchants and their business 
methods during this period.
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flour. By the end of the colonial period, they began searching ever farther for 
supply, acting as an entrepot to export grain farmed as fa r afield as upstate New 
York and much of the Chesapeake Bay region. Southern Europe increasingly 
became the destination o f choice, as prices there rose because of poor harvests 
and continental conflicts.3 Philadelphians continued to  send great quantities of 
flour, beef, and wood to the W est Indies, the first two to  feed Caribbean slaves 
and the last for the barrels in which to store and ship the products the slaves 
made, sugar and molasses. Philadelphia merchants also transported large 
quantities of flax to Ireland for its linen manufactories and a variety of other 
goods to other selected destinations. These businessmen bought locally and 
sold globally. Wherever they did business, their long-term success depended 
upon the cultivation of reliable contacts in distant ports as well as a considerable 
amount of luck on the high seas.
Dry goods merchants did exactly the opposite, importing mostly finished 
goods to be distributed in the Delaware Valley and beyond. Isaac Weld, an 
Englishman who visited in 1795, wrote that Philadelphia “has evidently been 
raised to [its] state of pre-eminence by her extensive inland commerce.”4 The 
dry goods business consisted of receiving manufactured wares on credit from 
Britain, then selling them by offering credit either at the merchants’ own stores in 
town, to smaller local merchants in the interior, or to shallopmasters and 
teamsters who would carry the goods many miles afield. Thus, while dry goods 
merchants traded directly within a radius of perhaps a  hundred miles, Weld
3See John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British America. 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1987).
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pointed out that Philadelphia was the center of a vast distribution network.
Goods sent from Philadelphia traveled to Harrisburg in central Pennsylvania and 
from there up both branches of the Susquehanna, and “by land carriage 
Philadelphia also trades with the western parts of Pennsylvania, as far as 
Pittsburgh itself, which is on the Ohio, with the back of Virginia, and, strange to 
tell, with Kentucky, seven hundred miles distant.”5 Philadelphia merchants 
connected the middle states to the Atlantic world. Although the dangers of 
Atlantic shipping affected provisioners more than dry goods merchants, the latter 
had their own problems. Should their ultimate customers not be able to pay bills 
because of bad harvests or lack of hard money, a dry goods business could 
collapse under the weight of unpaid bills to London creditors.
By the 1770s and 1780s, the dry goods and provisioning businesses had 
become so complex— and so profitable— that they each became split and 
spawned another mercantile layer between producer and customer. This new 
group of middlemen concentrated either on inland distribution of the 
merchandise that dry goods merchants imported or on engrossing large enough 
cargoes of grain or lumber for the provisioners to fill ships’ bottoms. They 
cultivated contacts inland, established local credit networks, and worked out the 
details of intra-regional transportation. Levi Hollingsworth, for instance, built a 
fortune in the late eighteenth century as a flour merchant, buying from millers in 
the Delaware River valley and selling to provisioners fo r overseas shipment.
Such specialization allowed dry goods and provisioning merchants to
4lsaac Weld, Travels Through the United States and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. During the
Years 1795.1796. and 1797 (London: John Stockdale, 1799), 34. 
slbid., 34.
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concentrate on the details o f Atlantic shipping while the middlemen labored over 
the vagaries of inland commerce. Still, those middlemen depended upon good 
grain prices to make a living, and Atlantic grain prices spiked and plummeted in 
unfathomable patterns.
Regardless of the specialization of individual Philadelphia merchants, they 
all operated in an extremely uncertain business environment. The increased 
concentration on smaller niches of commercial activity made Philadelphia 
merchants even more acutely aware of the greater need fo r better inland 
transportation networks, better credit facilities, and easier access to cash. Those 
common concerns far outweighed any sense of internal competition between 
firms, leading to a spirit of cohesion that often crossed political, ethnic, and 
religious lines. Eighteenth-century Atlantic-world commerce entailed high risks 
and high rewards that led merchants in the same city to pool resources rather 
than fight over them. Despite the thousands of vessels criss-crossing the 
Atlantic on a regular basis, captains had not found ways to eliminate the dangers 
of wind and storm or to avoid the predations of privateers and hostile navies in 
wartime. Merchants shared cargoes and insured each other’s ships and 
merchandise in order to reduce their exposure on any one voyage while retaining 
their potential for large net profits. Quite literally, several merchants’ fortunes 
would ride in the same boat. The uncertainty did not end when a ship reached 
port, for prices changed quickly, often going from good to bad in the time of a 
single voyage. Merchants needed to know the quality and quantity of agricultural 
and manufacturing production at home and abroad, the latest international 
political conditions, the variations in exchange rates, and the fluctuating value of
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the financial instruments they used to conduct their business. Because market 
information traveled at the same rate as cargo, local conditions and prices in 
distant ports— and thus the profitability o f a given voyage— shifted faster than 
merchants could adapt, putting a premium on gathering as much data as 
possible, data tha t affected all merchants because it affected local commodity 
prices, too. Again, the benefits o f sharing far outweighed any slight advantage to 
be gained from simply knowing more overall than another merchant down the 
block, for the other man might possess that essential more recent or reliable 
tidbit. The pooling of all available information proved especially crucial given that 
choosing the right destination and the proper mix of cargo could mean the 
difference between big profits and selling entire shiploads at a loss. Just as 
merchants spent long hours poring over their own account books, they spent 
much time exchanging information and making deals in Philadelphia 
coffeehouses.6 Their general willingness to cooperate would be a hallmark of 
their corporate activity in the coming decades.
In addition to sharing a spirit of community, Philadelphia merchants nearly 
universally agreed on the necessity of establishing more stable economic 
exchange. To be successful in any mercantile business required possessing a 
healthy preoccupation with questions of credit and money supply, two separate 
but related issues. In the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, silver and gold, or 
specie, formed the universally accepted media of exchange but had the liabilities 
of being bulky and risky to send in large quantities. Even if specie had been
6See Richard D. Brown, Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America. 1700-1865 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 110-121 for the ways that merchants received and exchanged 
information.
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more physically practical fo r long-distance commerce, merchants still would have 
needed other ways to convey money. Also, the specie supply could not keep up 
with the increases in population and productivity, that is, the increased need for 
circulating currency. Specie was so hard to come by that a merchant who could 
merely get his hands on some to import it to Philadelphia could make a fortune.7 
Compounding matters fo r Philadelphia merchants, the colonies and later the 
United States always imported a higher value of goods than they exported, 
consistently draining whatever specie made its way there back out of the country 
quickly. Instead, merchants, tradesmen, and farmers alike found ingenious ways 
to cope with the literal and figurative shortcomings of specie. For long-distance 
commerce, they used instruments called bills of exchange. These were 
essentially checks written on accounts with British-based commercial houses.
To pay fo r goods in Charleston, for example, a Philadelphia merchant could write 
a bill of exchange promising that his British agent would pay a certain amount 
upon demand. Both the Philadelphia merchant and the London house would be 
liable for the bill. The receiving Charleston merchant could then either send the 
bill to London for payment or sign it and use it to pay someone else, in which 
case the Charleston merchant could also be held responsible for payment. In 
each major Atlantic port, merchants traded bills of exchange, making them both 
a convenient form of specialized payment as well as a kind of currency. This 
system generally served Atlantic commerce well, but the lack of a strong local 
institution able to issue notes accepted locally or in distant ports still plagued 
Philadelphia merchants
7Ralph Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work.
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Furthermore, the brisk generation of and trade in bills o f exchange could 
not operate as a viable money supply for the small, everyday transactions of 
most people. Bills of exchange were cumbersome, difficult to understand, and 
usually involved large sums. Parliament had never chartered any banks in the 
colonies, so colonial governments had tried all sorts of alternate methods to 
increase local credit and money supply. These efforts, usually either fiat money 
or land banks, met with mixed success.8 Fiat money referred to paper currency 
issued by a government to be used as legal tender; unlike notes generally issued 
by eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century banks, fia t money could not be 
redeemed for specie by the issuing agency. Rather, the institution that printed 
the bills arbitrarily declared what each note would be valued, thus “fiat.” Fiat 
money had the potential to depreciate quickly, depending upon the confidence of 
the general population in the solvency of the government. The other popular 
solution to inadequate levels of cash was the land bank. Land banks were 
agencies run by colonial governments that printed money to be loaned in 
exchange for interest on the principal and a lien on the debtor’s property. Their 
notes tended to be more solid than fiat currency as long as confidence held that 
the colonial officials would enforce the seizure of mortgaged property should the 
bank’s debtors default. For better or worse, colonial legislatures did not always 
have the discipline to resist passing laws that relaxed debt collection, resulting in 
decreased public confidence in the value of land bank notes. As successors to
1763-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 20
“See Richard Sylla, “Monetary Innovation in America” Journal of Economic History 42 (March 1982), 21-30, 
especially 23-26.
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the colonial governments, state legislatures searched fo r more successful ways 
to create stable currencies and establish an adequate money supply.
To compensate fo r the paucity of cash, Americans generally operated in a 
book-credit economy that had serious liabilities. Most farmers and tradesmen 
kept two sets of books, a daybook and a ledger. W hen buying or selling goods, 
they entered the transactions in chronological o rder in the daybook—what goods 
were exchanged and the ir market price— without exchanging cash. They also 
entered each transaction in a ledger that had a separate page for every 
customer. When the customer finally had the  cash to pay, the tradesman could 
simply go to that person’s page in the ledger to find how much the customer 
owed. The web of credit could get quite com plicated: often, customers paid 
debits by crediting w hat the tradesman owed yet another person. The 
universality of these practices was reinforced by laws that made entries in 
daybooks and ledgers legally binding, and the heavy dockets of local courts 
testified to the difficulties in collecting book debts. W ithout the ability to extend 
or receive credit, farmers and tradesmen had trouble keeping afloat, and as the 
basis of the American economy they had the potential to take most merchants 
down with them in a whirlpool of insolvency.
Credit proved to be an especially volatile issue because it was the key to 
power in the transatlantic economy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. The ability to get credit offered the chance either to expand business 
or to ride out economic storms. Everybody wanted credit, from farmers, 
craftsmen, and small merchants, to manufacturers and big city merchants, and in 
the early republic, there was not enough to go around. Thus, the ability to
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extend credit, sometimes by direct loans and more commonly by selling goods 
for future payment, gave anyone with the wherewithal to  use it wisely great 
leverage in business dealings. By selling merchandise on credit or by extending 
credit on speculation of sales, merchants cultivated dependencies among their 
clients. Samuel Gist, an American-born, London-based tobacco merchant 
engaged in a typical use of the leverage of credit in 1767 when he insisted that 
his American debtors “consign their tobacco to him... o r pay their balances at 
once or face a suit for debt.”9 Philadelphia merchants did the same with their 
clients in the Delaware and Schuylkill valleys. Links of credit formed the chain of 
dependency and power in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world.
Credit also formed the cornerstone of the relations between what John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, British pamphleteers popular in the colonies, 
called those between “Patron and Client,” the most typical mode of economic 
and political power in America.10 Usually the patrons, either planters or 
merchants, created influence based upon their ability to  make loans to farmers 
and tradesmen and to provide a  conduit through which these clients could 
market their surplus goods. Patrons provided legal advice, political 
representation, and cultural leadership; in short, they controlled the terms of 
activity between their clients, whose orientation remained parochial, and the 
outside world. They also performed the task of local arbiter either in an official 
capacity, such as alderman or justice of the peace, or informally by settling local 
arguments and claims. At the same time, the power o f patrons was limited by
9Charles Royster, Fabulous History of the Dismal Swamp Company: A Story of George Washington’s 
Times (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 137.
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the amount of capital and effort they were able to use— often a t a  financial loss—  
to cultivate such relationships. For merchants and planters, extending power 
cost money. Furthermore, the fragility of mercantile partnerships and the risk 
inherent in eighteenth-century commerce mitigated against the establishment of 
family dynasties, making the economic basis of patron-client power frustratingiy 
impermanent. Also, life in trade did not provide for a stable living: markets rose 
and fell, and wars could disrupt trade for years. Furthermore, while a merchant 
could train his sons to take over the business, he could have great difficulty 
providing for daughters and widows as well as sons who had a different aptitude 
or disposition. Meanwhile, patron-client relationships required constant 
reinforcement through face-to-face encounters in churches, on court days, at 
militia musters, during election campaigns, and any number of other public 
occasions in addition to more private individual business and legal transactions 
with clients. This personal touch made patron-client power difficult to project 
over space or to a great number of people.11 Like the technologies it supported, 
patron-client power would have difficulty sustaining itself in the expansion of the 
early republic.
Just as Philadelphia merchants still took their fashion, reading, and social 
cues from Britain, they did so in mercantile matters. Scholar David Hancock has 
noted how the most successful London merchants diversified the ir portfolios
10Quoted from Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books,
1992), 57.
11See for example Wood, 57-77; Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the 
Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 229-255. For the most insightful 
discussions of patron-client relationships in their purest form, see Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of 
Virginia. 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American 
History and Culture, 1982), and Charles Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices 
in Washington's Virginia (originally Gentlemen Freeholders) (New York: The Free Press, 1952).
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once they had made their fortune in Atlantic commerce. Although a few  
continued some o f the commercial activities, all bought sugar plantations, British 
estates, or both. These new investments held distinct advantages over the 
merchant business. First, they tended to be extremely stable in that they 
produced roughly the same income year after year. This was in marked contrast 
to the high stakes world of Atlantic commerce with its cycles of price fluctuations, 
its uncertainties o f war and weather, its long periods of waiting punctuated by 
bursts of activity when ships loaded or landed, and its nearly annual potential to 
bring ruins or riches. Second, plantations and estates virtually ran themselves: 
owners hired supervisors to administer them. The merchants could then devote 
more of their own time to other endeavors such as philanthropy and art 
collecting. Best yet, the combination of stability and ease of management 
allowed these men to provide long-term financial security for their fam ilies .12 
Rather than spending all their days in counting houses and coffee houses, their 
children could devote their careers to more prestigious cultural and political 
pursuits. Those London merchants provided a powerful example. If 
Philadelphia merchants could find stable, easily managed investments close to 
home, they too could retire and ensure their families' continued prominence.
In addition to the more personal challenge of building dynasties, the 
founding and growth of the new nation entailed novel sets of problems for the 
Philadelphia merchant community. From the 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphians 
faced a new series of challenges that established technologies and the old 
systems of paying for and organizing them could not resolve. The chronic
12David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic
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shortage of money fo r the growing economy remained a  source of complaint 
throughout the period. Like specie, flexible credit could be difficult to acquire. 
Grander Philadelphia merchants worked together to pool their capital in 
partnerships, and often traded on credit from their British counterparts, and 
smaller merchants, tradesmen, and manufacturers, in turn, had to rely on the 
rich merchants for credit, thus forging the chain of credit dependence that gave 
economic force to patron-client relations. However, a fter the Revolution, with an 
economy growing in both relative and absolute terms, cash and credit were short 
for merchants and the ir clients. A tradesman was certainly not alone when he 
grumbled in the newspaper that “the mechanic labors under the... difficulty of the 
impracticability of obtaining money to carry on his business.”13 In a new nation 
with seemingly limitless possibilities, Philadelphians would turn to a tried-and- 
true device, the corporation, to solve their credit and money supply problems.
As they did in so many other arenas, Americans decided to try a British 
solution: banks. Philadelphians founded the nation’s first bank, the Bank of 
North America, controlled the first and second Banks o f the United States, and 
established seven other banks in the area. As one proponent explained, these 
new financial institutions “provide[d] a means for putting industry and capital into 
activity, which would have otherwise remained wholly unproductive and wholly 
useless— this is done by the operation of credit.”14 Not only did the banks loan 
money, but also they issued currency, thereby alleviating both the cash and the
Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Freeman’s Journal, December 13, 1786, as quoted from Russell F. Weigley, ed., Philadelphia: A 300- 
Year History (New York: W .W . Norton & Company, 1982).
William Duane, Observations on the Principles and Operation of Banking: with Strictures on the 
Opposition to the Bank of Philadelphia (Philadelphia. 1804), 10.
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credit crunch. Still, they could never seem to supply enough money to meet the 
ever-growing demand.
Philadelphians also faced the typical early nineteenth-century urban 
challenge of gaining access to a hinterland exploding in population and 
productivity. Eighteenth-century colonists had mostly stayed within fifty miles of 
the ocean, or at least within a day’s ride of the fall lines of major rivers, partly for 
safety but also because prevailing transportation technologies could not support 
extensive market activities. Beyond that range, poor road quality and the 
bulkiness of most agricultural products rendered the cost of transportation to 
market prohibitive and made potentially productive farmland not worth settling. If 
getting a farmer’s grain to Philadelphia cost more than the sale price, growing a 
surplus— or, for that matter, planting anything in the first place— would not 
provide the income to pay taxes and to buy necessary finished goods. Exactly 
that kind o f reasoning led many western Pennsylvania farmers to distill grain into 
whiskey to reduce the volume and weight of their product to make transport to 
market economically feasible. Land travel, as opposed to water transport, 
remained highly expensive for bulky goods: the cost o f shipping grain all the way 
across the Atlantic was lower than sending it 30 miles overland by wagon—and 
that was on a good road. Finished goods bore the high cost of transport from 
Philadelphia inland, but grain produced as close as 100 miles west of the Quaker 
City was shipped down the Monongahela or the Ohio to the Mississippi and all 
the way to New Orleans. Turnpikes, especially the Lancaster Philadelphia 
Turnpike, did lower transportation costs greatly, but few were well built or well 
maintained, and teamster costs remained high. Merely constructing more and
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longer roads would not sufficiently reduce the price of sending produce from 
Pennsylvania’s rich farms to Philadelphia. Both farmers and city merchants 
started to demand new technologies that, in the words of canal booster Charles 
Paleske, would “secure the grand objects of conveying the products of the 
interior country to the metropolis, and returning with the imports or manufactures 
of the latter.”15
The W ar of 1812 greatly exacerbated another of Philadelphia’s problems: 
an insatiable hunger for cheap energy.16 Like most urban and even many rural 
Americans, by the turn of the nineteenth century Philadelphians cast far and 
wide for power sources. The Delaware and the Schuylkill rivers both seemed too 
broad and too powerful to be dammed, so the City of Philadelphia had evaded 
the dearth of harnessable waterpower near the highly populated parts of town by 
using coal- and charcoal-fired steam engines in the design for the Philadelphia 
waterworks. It was an expensive example that some industrial concerns, 
especially ironworks, soon followed, but steam engines were still too costly or 
impractical for other purposes. Furthermore, the cost of fuel for work, for 
heating, and for cooking skyrocketed during the W ar of 1812. Philadelphians 
had long supplemented their supply of firewood and charcoal that had been 
floated down the Schuylkill or Delaware with bituminous or “soft” coal shipped 
from Britain and Virginia because its use as ballast kept it affordable. However,
15Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application for a Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal 
Company" Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 7.
sFor a general discussion of America’s energy needs during this period, see David E. Nye, Consuming 
Power: A Social History of American Enemies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998); for Philadelphia’s 
particular need for fuel in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, see H. Benjamin Powell, 
Philadelphia's First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania Anthracite 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).
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with the British blockading the coast, coal from either the old country or the Old 
Dominion became unavailable. Although the cost of fuel dropped when the war 
ended, the demand fo r energy grew faster than the population. As one city 
resident observed, “the rapid disappearance of wood from all the streams 
connected with Philadelphia” continued apace, resulting in ever-rising fuel 
prices.17 Philadelphians continued to cast about for new, cheaper form s of 
physical power.
Philadelphians considered all o f these challenges during a period of 
increasing economic transformation, the 1790s to the 1830s. Transportation 
improvements on the local, regional, and sectional scale helped accelerate 
growth. Changes within the region, much more than links with other domestic 
markets or international trade, drove this grand economic expansion.18 With the 
notable exception of the trade embargo in 1807 and 1808, high profits from 
shipping during the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent British flooding of 
American markets with a backlog of cheap finished goods forestalled large-scale 
domestic investment in manufacturing and internal transportation. Nonetheless, 
beginning in the 1810s, the economic landscape of Philadelphia and its 
surrounding hinterlands— western and southern New Jersey, eastern 
Pennsylvania, and most of Delaware— began to change considerably. Towns 
sprouted on the Schuylkill and the Lehigh Rivers when the mining o f anthracite 
began in earnest. The use of the new coal laid the foundation for the 
development of the United States’ prem ier center of heavy industry, the
17[SamueI Mifflin], Observations on the Importance of Improving the Navigation of the River Schuylkill, for 
the Purpose of Connecting it with the Susquehanna, and Through that River Extending Our Communication 
to the Genesee Lakes and the Ohio (Philadelphia?!. 1818), 3.
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manufacture of high-pressure stationary steam engines, in the Philadelphia area 
during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.19 C loser to the city, 
Manayunk and Spring Gardens became manufacturing centers whose 
production rivaled their more famous cousins such as Lowell, Lynn, and 
Paterson. Meanwhile, farmers in the surrounding countryside began to 
specialize in particular crops fo r sale to the growing population of the city, 
deviating from their past practices of sending surpluses o f general farm produce 
to more local markets. Philadelphia slowly shifted from an emphasis on foreign 
commerce to manufacturing products that it could sell in exchange for its 
hinterlands’ growing bounty, and so began to look as much inland as it had 
toward the Atlantic in the previous century. Exploiting the increasing productivity 
of the countryside looked like the way to prosperity in the early nineteenth 
century, and Philadelphians desperately wanted their share of the loot.
This process of regional integration was but one play in the larger theater 
of what historians increasingly have identified as the central defining process of 
the United States during this period, the market revolution. Both producers and 
consumers began to concentrate more intensely upon products for sale in the 
nearest metropolis and to use the new income to buy even more factory-made 
goods.20 Internal improvements were the way to prosperity by more tightly linking
18See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978).
19See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. “Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the United 
States,” Business History Review46 (Summer, 1972), 141-181.
Z0Forthe most sophisticated quantitative analysis of intensified market behavior, see Winifred Barr 
Rothenberg, From Market-Places to a Market Economy: The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts. 1750- 
1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Richard L. Brooke’s The Heart of the Commonwealth: 
Society and Political Culture in Worcester County. Massachusetts. 1713-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989) provides a more qualitative assessment, and Christopher Clark’s The Roots of 
Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts. 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), falls 
somewhere in between. For historiographic treatments of the market revolution, see Michael Merrill,
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hinterland and metropolitan production. A group of farmers in Bucks County, for 
instance, were “fully convinced of their utillity by so greatly facillitating the 
conveyance of the produce of their Farms to Market, and being desirous that a 
participation of those Benefits, may be further extended.”21 Credit, too, helped to 
bring producers and consumers together. One set of petitioners pointed to “the 
loaning of money upon reasonable terms... the object and operations of which 
are calculated to advance the interests of agriculture, manufactures, and the 
mechanical arts to produce benefits to trade and industry in general."22 In a time 
when the great optimism fo r general improvement was matched only by the fear 
of being left behind, Philadelphians nearly fell over themselves in their rush to 
accept improvements on almost any terms.23
In addition to such a climate of change, the American Revolution signaled 
a shift in the makeup of the Philadelphia merchant community. Most noticeably, 
Quakers figured much less prominently in Philadelphia’s political and mercantile 
circles. Many Quaker merchants, because of the sect’s pacifist tenets, had 
either been Loyalists or at least fallen under suspicion of being so, leading to a 
decline in their business opportunities and political influence. After the 
Revolution, a new generation of merchants gained prominence, a cohort that did 
not have the same power bases as the old. The imperial administration and the
“Putting ‘Capitalism’ in Its Place: A Review of Recent Literature," William and Mary Quarterly 52 (April
1995), 315-326; Paul A. Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic." in Paul A. Gilje, ed.. Wages of 
Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1997); and Sean 
Wiientz, “Society, Politics, and the Market Revolution,” in Eric Foner, ed., The New American History. 
Revised and Expanded Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 61-84.
■‘ ‘“Petition to Pennsylvania General Assembly, Read January 23, 1804, From Citizens in Bucks County," 
Folder January 23,1804, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania 
^Pennsylvania House of Representatives Bill Number 74, January 28,1808, Historical Records, Box 1, 
1807-1820, Folder Farmers and Mechanics Bank, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
23For a work that captures the optimism of the period, see Daniel Feller, The Jacksonian Promise:
America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
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proprietary Penns were gone, and many attachments to them were swept away. 
Ironically, Philadelphia’s merchant community became even more closely 
enmeshed with the British economy and merchant community during the 1780s 
than it had been before the Revolution.24 During the war, a number of 
disaffected and loyalist Philadelphia merchants fled to Britain, where they 
continued their mercantile pursuits by conducting business with old associates 
who remained. Quakers figured prominently in this group.25 Many emigrated to 
Britain because of their loyalist leanings or ties to the Penn family— even long 
after the Penns’ conversion to Anglicanism— while others left to avoid the 
harassment that any pacifist group endures during conflicts in which allegiances 
are open to question. Typical o f cohesive, commercially vigorous religious 
minorities, Quakers kept especially close ties with their relatives and partners in 
the New World while resettling in the Old 26 Uprooted merchants who had 
started their careers in Philadelphia proved perhaps greater assets for the city’s 
merchant community in Britain than they had been at home.
Just as some Americans initiated mercantile operations in the Old World, 
immigrants from Europe did so in Philadelphia. From 1774 to 1785, the number 
of merchants operating out o f Philadelphia increased by 60%; most of the new 
merchants hailed from Britain, Holland, and France 27 These men brought not 
only capital but also connections to business associates all over the Atlantic 
world, and they came not only to Philadelphia but also to all the major American
24Thomas M Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in 
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 245.
"Doerflinger, 222.
26Another group that did much the same in terms of cultivating trade and contacts among coreligionists was 
the Huguenot community. See John Garretson Clark, La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy During the 
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
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port cities.28 While native Philadelphia merchants were well informed of 
European cultural, political, and technological developments, the newcomers 
brought first-hand insight and knowledge of the latest business practices and 
opportunities.
Both Philadelphia and British merchant firms also saw the end of 
hostilities between the two nations as an opportunity to reopen old trading ties or 
to create new ones. British merchants sent sons, nephews, trusted clerks, or 
junior partners westward to drum up business in American port cities. Almost 
immediately after news of the Peace of Paris reached Philadelphia, Robert 
Morris wrote to S ir Francis Baring, head of a London merchant house, to strike 
up a trade relationship. Through Morris, prominent Philadelphia merchants 
Thomas Willing and W illiam Bingham soon opened accounts with the House of
, O Q
Baring. In 1795, in order to work out a proposed Maine land deal with New 
Yorker Henry Knox, Baring sent Alexander, his second-oldest son, to help close 
the deal and to establish closer relations with other American clients. He 
succeeded so well that he married one of Bingham's daughters in 1798, and his 
brother married another Bingham daughter in 1802.30 Morris, Willing, Bingham, 
and the Barings were among the most aggressive and most successful 
merchants in Philadelphia and London, respectively, but their connections 
typified the reintegration and even intensification of Anglo-American trade 
connections after the Revolution.
27Doerflinger, 244.
For example, Alexander Brown, founder of the nineteenth-century Brown family transatlantic empire,
emigrated from Ireland to Baltimore in the 1790s. Edwin J. Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade: The 
House of Brown. 1800-1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 19.
Ralph Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work. 
1763-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 22.
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The strengthened business ties between merchant communities on 
opposite sides of the north Atlantic meant more than strengthened economic 
ties; they fostered a greater exchange of information on all sorts of business 
opportunities. Some of that information traveled east, resulting in a flow of 
European capital to invest in American land speculation deals, government 
securities, and eventually bank shares. Both British and continental European 
merchant firms looked fo r American partners to help purchase western lands, a 
process facilitated by the willingness of the national and state governments to 
auction off large tracts in their haste to pay off Revolutionary W ar debts. Foreign 
investors also snapped up shares in the Bank of North America and the Bank of 
the United States immediately after their founding and bought state and federal 
debt certificates. The United States provided opportunity and Europeans had 
the money; Philadelphia merchants connected the two by offering services and 
information.
Even more news and data regarding business flowed westward across the 
Atlantic than eastward. Throughout the eighteenth century, Americans had been 
kept abreast of business developments in Britain through a variety of channels. 
Some future merchants and planters had traveled to England as young men to 
be educated; others made the trip to defend or further their business or political 
careers by lobbying proprietors, Parliament, or the Board of Trade. While such 
travel may have declined after the Revolution, the men who had made those 
trips usually kept up their contacts with those they had met. Most merchants, 
especially those in the dry goods trade, corresponded with one or more trading
^Hidy, 29-30.
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houses in London, Bristol, or Liverpool on a regular basis. Thomas Willing, one 
of the central figures in the founding o f the Bank of North America and the Bank 
of the United States, exemplified these connections: Pennsylvania-born, he was 
educated at Watts Academy and the Inner Temple during the 1740s and 
engaged in the mercantile business upon his return, often corresponding with 
London merchants including his uncle, Thomas W illing.31 Philadelphia 
merchants depended on these houses to supply goods for trade, for financial 
services including credit and insurance, and to purchase special luxury items that 
could not be obtained in America. They also relied upon British merchants’ 
assessments of political and economic developments that could affect trade.
Scholars have puzzled over the roots of the business corporation in the 
United States and have come to a consensus that such enterprises did not play 
an important role in Great Britain.32 Legal historians have noted the paucity of 
new common law addressing business corporations— as opposed to other 
corporations such as municipalities and colleges— in eighteenth-century Britain. 
They have argued that because the corporate form fo r business did not evolve in 
a legal sense during that period, it was not widely used.33 Similarly, economic 
and business historians, whose concerns with corporations has mostly been their 
use in relation to the industrial revolution, have cited the dearth of British 
manufacturing corporations in particular during the eighteenth century. Both
31 Robert E. Wright, “Thomas Willing (1731-1832): Philadelphia Financier and Forgotten Family Founder,” 
Pennsylvania History 63 (Autumn 1996), 527-531.
32 Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, in their seminal article “Origins of the American Business 
Corporation" Journal of Economic History, 5 (May 1945), 1-23, downplayed any British precedents of 
American business corporations, as did Pauline Maier in “The Revolutionary Origins of the American 
Corporation,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 50 (1993) 51-84.
33 See for example James W . Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United 
States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 3-6.
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legal and economic scholars have also stressed the low number of eighteenth- 
century British business corporations compared to the proliferation of American 
business corporations. Hence, they argue as a corollary of these conclusions 
tha t the British use of corporations did not influence Americans in their embrace 
o f corporate organizational structure.
However, a closer look at the logic and evidence of these arguments 
reveals their shortcomings. In sum, these assertions are based on negations, 
tha t is, on what was not occurring in eighteenth-century Britain. While 
Blackstone and others found little development in the common law treatment of 
British business corporations, a lack of drastic change does not necessarily 
denote an absence of use or importance. True, few  British used the corporation 
to  administer manufacturing businesses, but then very few early United States 
corporations were manufacturing concerns. Not until the 1810s and 1820s 
would a group of Boston merchants use the corporate form to organize their 
highly capitalized textile mills, and such operations remained the exception 
rather than the rule until mid-century at least. By 1800, Parliament had chartered 
a t least 92 business corporations in banking, insurance, and inland navigation.34 
In the United States, fourteen state legislatures had by then chartered 335 
corporations.35 However, the vast majority of the latter were formed to build and 
operate turnpike roads, an activity that was relatively uncommon in Britain. By 
contrast, Parliament incorporated far more canal and river navigation companies
34 This number is calculated by combining data compiled from Joseph Priestley, Historical Account of the 
Navigable Rivers. Canals and Railways throughout Great Britain (London, 1831) and adding known banking 
and insurance firms.
35 Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1917), 26.
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during the 1790s than did American state legislatures.36 In the  eighteenth 
century, the British used corporations for business purposes fa r more frequently 
than previous American historians have acknowledged; furthermore, most of that 
activity was concentrated in the same kinds of ventures— financial services and 
transportation development— as most early American business corporations.
British and American businessmen sought corporate charters for the 
same reasons. The most common business organizations a t the time were 
merchant partnerships. Partnerships had the advantage of being easily formed 
and served well for businesses run on a limited scale and involving small 
amounts of capital. They also had severe limitations. They could only last as 
long as the members agreed to stay together; once one died or left, the whole 
partnership had to be dissolved or at least reorganized, assuming the survivor 
remained solvent. “A copartner in trade is frequently interested to a large 
amount in the duration of his associate’s life,” reminded a typical insurance 
company pamphlet, “and we recollect one instance in which a  merchant had 
30,000 dollars dependent upon the safe return of another from a distant 
voyage.”37 Every member of the partnership was personally fu lly liable for any 
debts the partnership might incur, meaning a potential loss o f property and 
debtors’ prison for group failure. Partnerships, then, implied a great degree of 
trust: commonplace was the ruination of merchants through the bad luck or
36 Parliament chartered at least 55 internal navigation companies during the 1790s, compared with 15 
chartered by American state legislatures during the same period. British statistics compiled from Priestley; 
American statistics compiled from correspondence solicited by Albert Gallatin for his report on roads and 
canals for the United States Senate, American State Papers. Vol 1.. Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and 
Seaton, 1834), 724-921.
37 “An Address from the President and Directors of the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities, to the Inhabitants of the United States, upon the subject of the beneficial objects of that 
institution." Typescript copy of original publication. Folder “History of the Pennsylvania Company for
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malfeasance of erstwhile partners. Incorporation provided a way fo r a group of 
people whose membership changed constantly to own property and buildings, 
and unlike partnerships, the corporation did not have to start over when old 
members left or new ones joined. Furthermore, corporations greatly limited 
liability of their members: if a canal company borrowed money to construct new 
locks, for example, the members were only liable up to the value of their 
investment. Because of these features, corporations could attract fa r more 
capital than partnerships, and therefore could undertake large ventures beyond 
the resources of a few  individuals. In America, where all but the largest fortunes 
paled next to those of British grandees, the ability to pool capital made 
corporations an especially useful form of business organization.
Philadelphians read and heard about a range of British corporate 
business activities. Some Americans decried English manufactories and the 
slums around them and remained suspicious of corporations such as the Bank of 
England. Nevertheless, to the Philadelphia merchant community many British 
business corporations seemed at least as well suited for the United States as for 
Britain if not more so— perhaps the Bank of England most of all. Incorporated in 
1694, the Bank of England provided credit services primarily to the Crown by 
buying large blocks of government securities at comparatively low interest rates; 
that is, lower than could be gotten from financial houses either at home or on the 
Continent. Even more so than other large banking enterprises, it could only have 
worked as a corporation because of the great amount of capital necessary to 
absorb the huge amounts of money the Crown needed at its disposal. Having a
Insurance, 1895,“ Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession 1476,
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willing purchaser for seemingly infinite sum s of public debt allowed the Crown 
great flexibility in its spending. For the ir part, stockholders could be assured of 
steady dividends as long as the governm ent kept on paying interest, a fairly sure 
thing given that the government was sovereign and many members of 
Parliament or their families would have a t least small holdings of stock in the 
bank. Thus, people active in the governm ent had an interest in making sure that 
the state paid its debts. The Bank o f England provided stability on several 
levels: for government budgeting especially in wartime, fo r a financial community 
wary of high government debt, for investors, and even fo r those concerned about 
political disloyalty. W ith those same considerations in mind fo r the United 
States, many prominent Philadelphia merchants strongly supported the 
incorporation of the Bank of North Am erica, the Bank of the United States, and 
eventually a number o f state banks as well.
Philadelphia merchants were also familiar with Scottish banking practices. 
Praised by David Hume, John Law, and Adam Smith, the Scottish example was 
powerful to Philadelphia merchants because the Scottish banks had been central 
to Scotland’s rapid economic development during the eighteenth century. For 
much of that period, Scotland had faced some of the same problems that United 
States did after independence: a lack o f local currency, a  negative balance of 
trade, and inadequate credit facilities. The Bank of Scotland, chartered a year 
after the Bank of England, performed the same functions as its English 
counterpart. Unlike the Bank of England, however, the Bank o f Scotland was not 
granted a monopoly, so other banks— the  Royal Bank of Scotland and the British
Hagley Museum and Library.
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Linen Company— also obtained banking privileges, assuring that different groups 
could have access to the benefits o f banking. The Bank of England only 
operated out o f its central office in London, issuing notes of £10 or more— a 
denomination fa r too large for everyday transactions and only intended for the 
use of governments and large commercial houses. By contrast, Scottish banks 
opened branches and issued notes as low as shillings and pence, thereby
38greatly supplementing the general money supply. The Scottish system, much 
more stable than the colonial American financial institutions, looked very 
attractive to Philadelphia merchants and served as prototypes for Pennsylvania- 
chartered banks. State banks, just like the Bank of North America and the Bank 
of the United States, resulted more from the enlightened mimicry o f British
39organizations than from American innovation.
The Scottish banking system proved especially attractive given the poor 
currency management record of colonial and state governments. Merchants 
could conclude that land banks and fia t money had proven insufficient, but not 
necessarily because the underlying premises were unsound. Those measures 
had often been approved with the backing of the merchant community in the 
colonies that undertook them. Merchants could reasonably argue tha t these 
measures were ultimately unsuccessful partly because of the refusal of imperial 
officers to force British merchants to honor the notes, but mostly because of the 
unreliability of colonial legislatures that lacked the political backbone to retire 
notes on schedule and foreclose on debtors. If anything, the latter problem
^See Richard Saville, Bank of Scotland: A History. 1695-1995 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1996), 1-278; and Charles W. Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies. 1747-1864 (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publishers, 1981).
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would become exacerbated after the Revolution. In 1786 and 1787, 
Revolutionary W ar veteran Daniel Shays and hundreds of other central 
Massachusetts farmers protested high taxes and the state enforcement of debt 
collection and land foreclosure. A fter Massachusetts merchants funded a 
successful military expedition to restore order, the disgruntled farmers went to 
the polls in great numbers, electing Thomas Hancock as governor with a 
mandate to pass laws relieving the tax burden and protecting debtors.40 
Although merchants, too, involved themselves in webs of debts and credits, as 
overall creditors they could draw two conclusions from the incident. First, the 
dearth of cash and credit could spark not only economic dislocation but also 
social unrest, and second, state governments could not be trusted to keep 
promises to creditors or to follow a consistent currency policy. From any 
merchant's point o f view, the Shays affair showed the dangers of the existing 
currency system, or lack thereof. The danger in Pennsylvania could be 
particularly acute because its constitution guaranteed universal suffrage, 
meaning that Philadelphia merchants could not rely on the statehouse to enforce 
unpopular measures limiting money supply.
Consequently, the Scottish system of incorporated banks that allowed the 
mercantile community to control and regulate currency and credit constituted an 
exemplary model fo r Philadelphia merchants. In scheduled meetings, Scottish 
bank representatives gathered to exchange the notes they had issued and had 
been brought to each other’s counters. By doing so on a regular basis, they
39Although the Bank of North America had a Pennsylvania charter, it clearly was originally intended as an 
institution of national scope.
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collectively insured that each of their members had the ability to meet its 
obligations, and so acted as a clearing-house mechanism to ensure that banks 
and the notes they issued remained on firm  ground.41 In their efforts to keep 
note issues at conservative levels, they also prevented general inflation, always 
the bane of those who are net creditors. Furthermore, these meetings allowed 
bank officials, rather than public authorities, to decide how much money would 
be issued and when.
In name, in form, and in operation, Philadelphia-based banks closely 
followed British precedent, beginning with remarkable similarities in their 
charters. In terms of corporate governance, British bank charters dictated that a 
majority of electors was required to amend company by-laws, that the 
companies’ governor, lieutenant governor, and directors were to be elected 
annually during a specified one-month time-frame, that the directors must be 
English (or, in the case of Scotland banks, Scottish) subjects, and that a majority 
of directors constituted a quorum for official business 42 The Bank of North 
America and the Bank of Pennsylvania’s charters, too, stipulated that by-laws be 
amended by a majority of electors, that the president and directors be elected 
annually on a specific date, that directors be citizens of the United States— or in 
the case of the Bank of Pennsylvania, residents of the state— and that a majority
40For a variety of historical viewpoints on Daniel Shays and his eponymous "rebellion," see Robert Gross, 
ed., In Debt to Shavs: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1993).
41 Randall Kroszner, "Free Banking: The Scottish Experience as a Model for Emerging Economies,” 
presented at World Bank Seminar Financial History: Lessons of the Past for Reformers of the Present, IQ- 
14.
42 Joseph Hume Francis. History of the Bank of England (Chicago: Euclid Publishing Company, 1888), 
58-63; William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English. Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock 
Companies to 1720. Vol. Ill: Water Supply. Postal. Street-Lighting. Manufacturing. Banking. Finance and 
Insurance Companies: Also Statements Relating to the Crown Rnances (New York: Peter Smith, 1951), 
253-256.
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of directors were required fo r a quorum.43 They raised capital in sim ilar ways, as 
well; both British and American banks issued a limited umber of shares, set a 
maximum for individuals’ initial investment, and collected their capital through 
subscription. They even operated under sim ilar limitations, including charter- 
mandated capital ceilings, the condition tha t dividends were to be issued only out 
of profits while preserving the paid-in capital, and prohibitions against engaging 
in any other trade. And once Philadelphia was home to several banks, company 
officers met to coordinate money policy in much the same way the Scottish 
banks did.44 Philadelphia bankers clearly mimicked British bankers through their 
adoption of such sim ilar methods and structures.
Philadelphians could also look eastward across the Atlantic and admire 
British transportation improvements corporations, especially in the field of 
internal navigation. Between 1760 and 1790, Parliament had chartered 28 river 
navigation and canal companies. Although waterpower would provide m ost of 
the energy for America’s factories in the first half of the nineteenth century,
Britain had not been equally blessed with so many fast-flowing rivers.
Furthermore, by the early eighteenth century the British had depleted their 
countryside of sufficient firewood to meet their domestic heating and industrial 
demands. Accordingly, they relied upon a different source of fuel, bituminous 
coal. To transport the bulky and heavy stone across great distances, they began 
building inland navigations from mining regions to the coast or to regional 
population centers. The construction of canals accelerated in the 1760s, as 
more inland manufacturing and mercantile centers strove to be better connected
^ Charters. Laws, and By-l aws, of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Clark & Raser, 1830), 2-21.
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to what was quickly becoming a national market. However, that gentle increase 
did not compare to the canal frenzy of the early 1790s. In 1793 and 1794, 32 
inland navigation companies secured charters from Parliament. Americans 
watched the British canal boom with great interest, fo r such projects inspired 
them to sim ilar actions in the United States.
W hat the Philadelphians saw, read, and heard about in Britain were a 
host of institutions and technologies that integrated a national economy while 
providing for regional development. Furthermore, they had witnessed how 
sponsoring the British corporations that administered banks and navigations 
could be personally profitable. Not only had British agents promoted these 
investments, but many Americans also read the popular, London-based 
Gentleman’s Magazine that displayed the prices of British corporate stocks. 
Philadelphia merchants could not afford to buy Caribbean sugar plantations or 
British estates, and American land speculation was a notoriously tricky 
enterprise. However, they could observe tha t over the long term banks and 
sometimes internal navigation company stocks rose gradually and issued regular 
dividends w ithout demanding any input of tim e on the part of the majority of 
investors.
The American Revolution, the economic and political stability of the 
Constitution, and eventually the economic recovery of the early 1790s provided 
Philadelphia merchants with the opportunity to develop the kinds of projects that 
had been undertaken in Britain. Pennsylvania chartered the Delaware and 
Schuylkill Canal Company and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal and
44 See Chapter Six for an analysis of the cooperation between Philadelphia banks.
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Navigation Company in late 1791, and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal 
Company petitioned the Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania assemblies in 
1792. America’s transportation needs were even more pressing than Britain’s; 
hence the timing of the first canal boom in the United States strongly suggests 
that it was an extension of the British craze. American corporate founders took 
their cues from Britain, whose successful transportation projects served as a 
model for developing America to emulate.
Municipal charters, although having the same roots in medieval law, 
operated differently than business corporations in the eighteenth-century British 
Atlantic world. Municipal charters granted privileges far beyond those of 
business corporations: a monopoly over local civil authority as well as eminent 
domain and right-of-way, two oft-confused but technically different legal 
constructs. Eminent domain endows the right to seize property permanently—  
with compensation— in order to use it for public purposes. For example, the 
town corporation would pay a landowner a sum of money, either agreed upon or, 
if necessary, a fair price determined by the courts, and come to possess the 
property on which to build a courthouse. Although the owner had no right to 
refuse, at least she or he would get paid for the loss. Right-of-way gives one 
entity the right to travel or even build a passage through others’ property, but the 
property stays in possession of the original owner. In this case, the town could 
build a road right through a farmer's wheat field and not necessarily have to 
compensate for the lost crop, although technically the farmer would still own the 
land. Because of their duty to enforce the law and because of the necessity of 
eminent domain and right-of-way in building and maintaining streets and
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municipal property, city officials considered a charter to be essential fo r 
continued municipal development.
While investing merchants saw the practical benefits o f incorporation, 
corporate charters were controversial precisely because o f the nature of their 
British origins in terms of special privileges for elites. Americans hotly debated 
who should administer and control these various chartered organizations. A 
concern of many citizens was the potential for a few rich men to control private 
corporations: in 1794, one group o f angry petitioners referred to the issuing of 
charters as "the most dangerous policy in this infant republic, to combine the 
wealthy in order to make them powerful.1,45 To combat such powerful 
combinations, the Pennsylvania legislature inserted charter provisions designed 
to curtail the influence of large investors seeking to dominate corporations.
Some charters contained clauses requiring stock offerings to be held in several 
places at once, limiting the num ber of stocks any individual could purchase and 
scaling down the number of votes of individual stockholders. Nonetheless, in 
company after company, a small number of investors eventually owned enough 
stock to gain control of the board o f managers. The body of stockholders in 
other companies deferred to the Board’s wisdom, assuming that directors would 
act in the stockholders’ best interest: the whole point of investment for a great 
many of the small contributors was to have their money grow without having to 
work at it.46 The result was tha t the men who put themselves in a position to run 
such corporations could control crucial technologies and great amounts of capital
45 Petition, House File, 17th Session-1, 1793-94 Records of the General Assembly, Group 7, Pennsylvania 
State Archives.
46See Chapter 4 for a discussion of investor motivation and behavior.
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fa r exceeding w hat they could have amassed on their own or in small 
partnerships. Despite the best efforts of careful legislators— and through the 
willing acquiescence of the majority o f investors— fewer and fewer men 
controlled individual corporations. Furthermore, some men managed to get 
themselves on the boards of several corporations, further concentrating 
corporate power.
The ideological viewpoint o f observers had a great deal to do with the way 
they regarded these projects. Characterizations of corporations fell everywhere 
along the spectrum from great promoters of national wealth to unnatural 
monopolies tha t were nearly governments unto themselves. Both extremes 
reflected a republican ethos that predated the Revolution. While republicanism 
had nearly as many definitions as it did definers, most Americans in public life 
agreed on its main tenets: that private property and checks on government 
formed the basis for freedom, that private interest must never override the public 
interest, and tha t the struggle against tyranny required constant vigilance. Still, 
those basic ideas left a good deal o f room to negotiate, raising difficult questions 
to be considered by politicians, editors, pamphleteers, and their audiences. How 
broadly or evenly should property be distributed? Which was more important, 
broader access to economic opportunity or the unfettered ability to pursue large 
concentrations o f wealth? To what extent should or do private and public 
interest coincide? Boosters of banks, insurance companies, and canal 
companies answered these questions in ingenious ways. They argued that by 
making credit more available, by decreasing American dependence on foreign 
insurance, and by promoting domestic commerce, they would bring prosperity to
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more people. In doing so, they allowed fo r more people to gain personal 
economic dependence, thus strengthening the nation. Boosters asserted that 
banks, insurance companies, and internal improvement companies contributed 
to the greater society by empowering individuals. Corporate boosters took the 
next step to claim that the ir interest coincided with the public interest, especially, 
they pointed out, when the state owned stock in these ventures.
Philadelphians debated the ideological implications as well as the physical 
components and the financial aspects of canals and banks, knowing that such 
projects were somehow fundamentally different from previous forms of business 
practice. Many of their debates about these new ways of doing business 
centered on corporate charters.47 The charter as a legal construct had 
originated as a perpetual grant from the sovereign to a group of people, 
extending them certain rights or privileges; examples included guilds, 
universities, and city governments, and commercial entities such as the Virginia 
Company. Soon, colonial governments themselves began granting charters to 
cities or counties and eventually churches and social organizations. After the 
Revolution, canal, turnpike, bridge, insurance, and bank companies sought 
charters for many of the same reasons as towns and congregations in that, in 
the words of one applicant, "capital, concert, and duration [were] all necessary." 
That is, such a large-scale enterprise was a “concern in which many must be
47For insightful discussion of the role of and debates over corporations in Pennsylvania, see Louis Hartz, 
Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge. 1948); Oscar and Mary 
Flug Handlin considered the Massachusetts case in Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in 
the American Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947). Among the more recent 
considerations of the historiography regarding the relationship between corporations and the state in the 
early republic are Harry N. Scheiber, “Government and the Economy: Studies of the ‘Commonwealth’ Policy 
in Nineteenth-Century America.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (summer 1972): 135-151 and William 
G. Shade, “Louis Hartz and the Myth of Laissez Faire” Pennsylvania History 59 3 (July 1992): 256-273.
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united, which requires a capital tthat must be furnished by many hands, and a 
concert which must endure for a considerable period.”48 Big projects potentially 
requiring hundreds or even thousands of participants were impracticable in a 
partnership structure.
In addition to the ability to* provide a structure for many investors, the 
corporate form offered the a ttractions of limited liability and sometimes even 
special privileges or m onopolies. The limitation o f liability was nearly a  sine qua 
non for attracting investors: “the-y require an act o f Incorporation,” a group of 
petitioners pointed out, “to p ro tect them from further liability; — without the last, 
numbers will not engage, — w ithou t numbers, the necessary capital w ill not be 
raised, — and w ithout large capitsal, no great undertaking can succeed.”49 Both 
banks and insurance companies; took risks— on loans or property, respectively—  
larger in aggregate than most individuals either could or would take. Indeed, that 
was their purpose. Without limitaed liability, investors might as well have 
continued with private lending a n d  self-insurance, the latter often being a 
euphemism for having no insurance at all. Public improvement companies, too, 
required limited liability: many of them either borrowed or entered into 
construction contracts beyond thieir current means. Furthermore, corporations 
remained liable fo r damages to priva te  property incurred during construction. By 
obtaining limited liability, the m e n  whose fortunes heretofore had been at the 
mercy of partners, creditors, andl the sea could enter into large ventures knowing 
even the greatest failure would n o t  ruin them. Corporate power, then, was much
^Remarks and Observations Showing the Justice and Policy of Incorporation “The Schuylkill Coal 
Company." Respectfully Addressed to the Public, and Particularly to the Members of the Legislature 
([Philadelphia], 1823), 6.
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less risky to personal and family fortunes than the merchant activities upon which 
patron-client power had been based.
Corporations offered more than stability of return: many companies 
sought a virtual monopoly through the chartering process, thus offering security 
from competition. Banks lobbied for guarantees that the state government would 
deposit funds in them or that they would be the only chartered banks in a given 
city. Bridge companies, fo r which profits were unlikely even without 
competition, often desired monopoly assurances that others would not be able to 
run a ferry within a certain distance. R iver navigation companies tended to be 
concerned about another monopoly, one that they were often reluctant to 
mention: the exclusive possession of water in the river, that they could then 
“rent” to mill owners fo r tidy sums. Public improvements also needed a right that 
banks did not: the right o f eminent domain. Turnpikes, canals, and bridges all 
went through land already under private ownership, and so could not exist 
without some way o f gaining access to private (and sometimes public) property. 
Monopoly privileges, as contemporaries knew all too well, further insulated 
corporate power in a way that merchants, with their strenuously competitive 
environment, could well appreciate.
While the chartering of municipalities, congregations, and charitable 
organizations tended to go smoothly through even the most contentious of 
legislatures, bills to incorporate banks, insurance companies, canals, and 
turnpikes nearly always ignited lively and sometimes acrimonious debates. 
Certainly the fact that the latter category of charters involved potential profit for
49Petition to House, March 11,1825, House File, 49th Session-1, 1824-25, Folder 5, Pennsylvania General
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private citizens, whereas the form er did not, figured significantly in the differing 
levels of controversy. Many people perceived banks as mysterious 
moneymaking machines for the ir owners, believing those profits were made from 
the work of the commonfolk.
Private profit, though, clearly was not always the primary consideration for 
charter opponents. Canal and turnpike company boosters usually found the 
chartering process to be a political challenge, and although some of these 
improvements turned out to be profitable, the large majority proved unable to 
break even. Many investors, as well as the public at large, never expected some 
projects to turn a profit, yet even the least promising ones, from an investment 
standpoint, rarely went through the legislature without rancor. In this case, 
corporations from which no one would profit found the chartering process 
difficult. On the other hand, the later chartering of manufacturing companies, 
which clearly would profit, rarely encountered the sort of heated opposition that 
nearly all prospective banking and public improvement companies learned to 
expect as a matter of course. W hile the possibility of the state officially 
sanctioning the ability of some citizens to make money from a publicly granted 
privilege certainly played a role in these debates, clearly more was at stake.
For example, the supply of fresh water to Philadelphia involved 
technological, financial, and administrative issues with far-reaching 
consequences for the city corporation. W ater supply lent itself to several 
fundamentally different solutions, each of which could have various advantages 
and disadvantages reflecting both physical and social parameters: feasibility,
Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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time of construction, cost of construction, availability of skills and labor, reliability, 
durability, expandability, maintenance costs, repair costs, and maximum 
operating capacity. For example, the Philadelphia City Councils o f the late 
1790s began to investigate ways to provide the city with adequate supplies of 
fresh water. At first, their only option was a proposed canal; later, British-born 
and -trained engineer B. Henry Latrobe suggested a steam-powered pumping 
system. A canal might have greater water capacity, was a  fairly proven 
technology, but would require expensive repairs. Pumping systems could be 
constructed more quickly, worked all year round, and could be more easily 
expanded, but steam engines would incur high fuel costs and were unfamiliar in 
the United States. The City Councils weighed the characteristics of both 
systems before making their decision. Their choice of the waterworks and their 
further development and extension of the system held both intended and 
unintended consequences for the administration of the city and its suburbs. The 
Watering Committee, a subcommittee of the city’s governing Select and 
Common Councils, supervised the waterworks, and eventually became the most 
powerful group in the city government by controlling a large portion of the city’s 
revenue and budget and by securing its own revenue streams and tax collectors. 
The regulations necessary for the maintenance, protection, and distribution of 
water entailed inspectors to enforce them. Moreover, the city parlayed the 
extension of the system to the suburbs into regulatory and financial leverage 
over suburban government. All of these developments combined to one effect: 
the consolidation of the city corporation’s power over its own citizens and its 
suburbs.
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The new institutions and technologies provoked such intense controversy 
because people recognized them to be central to  the region’s economy and thus 
to the relationships, politics, and power that its economic structure fostered. 
Indeed, the ir adoption signaled a profound reordering of power in the 
Philadelphia region. So many people clamored fo r better transportation, more 
access to credit, and a larger money supply because they saw such 
developments not only as necessary for their economic success but also as 
perhaps a fatal blow to the patron-client system that Trenchard and Gordon 
described and that so dominated social, political, and economic relations in 
eighteenth-century America. Credit, transportation, and available currency each 
gave more people the opportunity to participate more freely in a cash economy 
rather than the book-credit economy under which they had been operating. They 
saw the taking of these opportunities as their opening to the economic 
independence that would free them from patrons. The two most influential 
recent works on the political transformation of the early republic, Gordon W ood’s 
Radicalism of the American Revolution and Alan Taylor’s W illiam Cooper’s Town 
both describe the decline of deference between patrons and clients, each 
attributing revolutionary, egalitarian ideology as the underlying cause.50 Certainly 
the spread of nearly universal white male suffrage in concert with the use of the 
secret ballot contributed as well. However, the political independence that W ood 
and Taylor described would not have been possible without the economic
^See Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) and 
Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
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independence that bank notes and river navigations offered: they were opposite 
sides of the same coin.
Nonetheless, freedom from patrons did not come without a price. On the 
one hand, internal improvements were necessary to spur economic 
development. On the other, when a corporation was granted the right-of-way of 
a river, had the privilege of eminent domain around its banks, and owned the 
rights to the river’s water, it essentially controlled the economy along a twenty- 
mile wide swath on e ither side of the waterway and even to its tributaries. The 
company decided w hat tolls to charge, influencing the final price of every product 
shipped on the river and affecting just about everyone in the region. Anyone 
who owned property on the riverbank essentially did so at the pleasure of the 
company, which had the legal authority to dam up the river and thus flood 
adjoining lands if it deemed closing the river necessary for the navigation. The 
company also influenced the cost and degree of industrial development by 
setting terms for the purchase of the river’s waterpower and by deciding where 
and how much water could be used. Naturally, any change in price or policy by a 
canal company inevitably involved the interests of many people, interests that 
company officials were only too willing to exploit. Everyone understood the 
potential conflicts involved, and that was why canal companies became such 
lightning rods of public controversy.
As controversial as inland navigation companies could be, transportation 
debates never reached the furor of those over financial institutions because of 
the consensus that the men who ran financial institutions, too, wielded great 
influence over the growing economy. By deciding how much money to loan and
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when, bank managers determined the region’s money supply, with its attendant 
effects upon inflation. Lending policy, of course, carried with it great power over 
politics and economic development: if, as John Marshall so famously stated 
about opponents to the Bank of the United States, “the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy,” then the ability to make credit available only to political 
friends, members of particular groups or certain kinds of businesses also 
provided great opportunities fo r power. And through their selection of 
investments, either in government loans or corporate stock, both banks and 
insurance companies had opportunities to decide the projects that would be 
funded and those that would not. For organizations not run by the public at 
large, these were considerable powers indeed.
In addition, corporate administration had social components, parts of its 
design that explicitly or implicitly reinforced the greater economic agenda of the 
owners, designers, or both.51 In the early republic, politicians, editors, and 
petitioners all expressed varying opinions on many facets of financial institutions. 
‘Though some people represent the Bank [of North America] as injurious and 
dangerous, while others consider it as salutary and beneficial, to the community,” 
one pamphleteer pointed out, “all view it as an object of high importance; 
deserving and demanding the public attention.”52 The face value of banknotes 
became particularly controversial. Certainly many merchants had a point when
51 For an historiographic view of the growing “externalist” school of the history of technology, that is, those 
who consider technology socially constructed, as opposed to the “internalist” school, which is more 
concerned with intrinsic changes in technologies, see John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers: 
Reweavina the Human Fabric (Cambridge: The Society for the History of Technology and the MIT Press, 
1985); also see Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1987).
52James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North-America (Philadelphia: Hall and Sellers, 1785), 3.
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they contended that the issuance of small-denomination bills might lead to 
increased speculation, thus triggering inflation that could hurt everyone in the 
economy. But critics argued that, like beauty, the value of inflation was in the 
eye of the beholder: it helped debtors, who could pay their obligations with 
dollars that were now easier to  earn and worth less— or even worthless— and 
thus hurt creditors. Money supply was a two-edged sword. The trick was to 
have enough to make liquidity possible so people could pay debts, but not so 
much that demand would decrease for their credit business or that inflation 
would ensue. Furthermore, the issuance of bank bills was the method by which 
the country’s money supply grew; those who only dealt in small denominations 
would thus be dealing with a much less elastic money supply than those with 
greater access to  large denominations. In a confidential meeting in 1820, 
officials from seven of the largest Philadelphia banks made an agreement not to 
accept any notes lower than five dollars.53 In so doing, they instantly depreciated 
the value of any lesser notes issued by the city's Mechanics’ Bank, catering to a 
broader clientele, and those issued by almost all the country banks. The larger 
city banks essentially devalued all of the other banks' notes because, by not 
accepting country banks' smaller notes, they undermined public confidence in 
the country banks' practices. A  bank’s use of small denominations made all its 
issuances now seem that much less solid. The men on the boards of the larger 
Philadelphia banks could thus use their control over financial institutions to 
solidify their influence over a crucial sector of the economy, the credit market, 
both in the city and in the rest o f the state.
“ Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820. Folder: Farmers and Mechanics Bank 1820, Accession1658,
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Administration o f  the new technologies also severely limited the traditional 
role of patron as arb ite r o f local disputes, instead substituting the authority o f the 
state to be invoked at the desire of corporate officials. Quarrels between local 
property holders, w h ile  often going to court, had frequently been settled by 
neighborhood patrons either unofficially or in their official capacity as justice of 
the peace. Such arbitration held obvious advantages fo r those lacking legal 
expertise or wanting to  avoid the fees and annoyance o f legal proceedings; it 
also reified the patron’ s local authority. However, disputes that involved 
corporations were settled almost exclusively by courts. Corporate officers in 
Philadelphia did not tru s t local patrons, who might have had their own axes to 
grind against a canal o r  navigation, and possibly had political motivations for 
siding with a local aga inst a distant corporation. Moreover, because corporations 
could afford expensive lawsuits and experienced lawyers, corporate officers had 
additional motivation to  go to court where they could put those advantages in 
play. In some cases, control over a community resource meant that a 
corporation decided loca l disputes. In the spring of 1817, some Philadelphia 
residents petitioned to  have a public hydrant at the northeast corner of Front 
Street and Chestnut S treet removed; a counter petition from residents of the 
“vicinity of Chestnut and  Front St.” protested that “such removal would be 
attended with serious Inconveniences... in as much as the Pump is the most 
central, and useful in th e  neighborhood.” They further argued that “we would not 
wish to injure one of o u r neighbours by its continuance, and we presume it will
Hagley Museum and Library.
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not in the present instance.”54 In this instance, the city corporation’s Watering 
Committee, rather than a prom inent neighborhood merchant, decided the 
outcome. Another pillar o f patron-client power had fallen, to be replaced by a 
much stronger and durable corporate one.
Besides having profound local effects, the new projects catered to many 
people over a wide area. In the late 1820s, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company lobbied fo r the right to build a navigation along the Delaware River 
from where it met the Lehigh down to Philadelphia. The company’s Board of 
Managers did not exaggerate much when it pointed out to the Pennsylvania 
legislators that its proposed “improvement of the Delaware must be a matter of 
deep interest to nearly one half of the population of this state and of New- 
York.”55 When the residents of such a large area depended upon one canal or 
river navigation to provide the ir connection to the market, those who controlled 
the project held substantial power over a great number o f residents. Canal 
company boards of directors decided upon routes, regulated traffic volume, and 
determined toll rates for different commodities, thereby shaping economic 
development in the entire region through which their navigations passed.
Banks also cast long shadows: their managers had to set policies 
regarding the honoring and discounting of other banks’ notes. For example, a 
Philadelphia bank might only pay eighty cents for every dollar of a note drawn 
from a bank in western Pennsylvania, both because of the cost of travel to 
redeem the note and because of the risk that the rural bank might not be fully
^ “Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company Board of Managers to Pennsylvania House of Representatives,
March 24,1825,“ House File, 49th Session-1,1824-25, Pennsylvania Canal Folder, Records of the General 
Assembly, Record Group 7, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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solvent. Thus, the large Philadelphia banks had great influence over rural b a n ks , 
and therefore, by proxy, over many of same issues as they did locally: money* 
supply and lending policy. This practice of discounting the notes of the rural 
banks also had a much more insidious effect: in essence the big city banks wrere 
also setting up an exchange. Those holding a strong currency could buy gooKfs 
in other areas at a low price, but their own goods became more expensive to  
sell. Thus, cityfolk could buy country goods cheaply, but country people had 
trouble affording goods manufactured in or imported through Philadelphia. 
Corporations and the services they provided helped a  small group of 
Philadelphians to extend economic and political influence well beyond the 
possibilities of traditional patron-client relations.
That extension of power could only be possible through the amassing cof 
large amounts of capital and the ability to employ that money as corporate 
insiders saw fit. Leaders of proposed projects needed to raise capital far 
exceeding the capacity of partnerships to do so, and consequently found new* 
ways to raise money from a w ider range of the population while still contro lling  
the use of the money. Corporate boosters found all sorts of methods to tap th ie  
resources of private citizens, and the amount of money demanded up front 
tended to be inversely proportional to the riskiness of the venture. Bank sharees 
cost anywhere from $50 for the smaller institutions to $400 for the Bank of Noorth 
America. As safe investments, banks— and to a lesser extent insurance 
companies— attracted a great deal of investment from widows, from trusts fo r 
orphans, and from charitable institutions, all of which were looking for ways to*
5Slbid.
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guarantee steady income in an uncertain economy. Because transportation 
projects were much less likely to succeed, they usually issued subscriptions for 
stock in which investors in itia lly paid five or ten dollars and assessed further 
amounts whenever com pany reserves got low. Canals solicited subscriptions 
from anyone who owned land or who conducted business within about twenty 
miles of the proposed route. In all of these projects, investors created a 
relationship with the men w ho ran the corporations in which the former provided 
capital in exchange for the services of the latter. The men on the boards thus 
commanded far larger sum s of money than they could have raised by 
themselves. They then proceeded to use that money in many of the same ways 
that patrons had: loaning it to themselves, their friends, and political allies; 
distributing jobs and construction contracts; and rallying the support of those who 
depended upon these services.
The growing extension of corporate power into the economy matched the 
concentration of corporate control in fewer hands, as m any men served on the 
boards of several institutions across different technologies. John Bohlen sat on 
the boards of the Union Insurance Company, the second Bank of the United 
States, the Schuylkill Navigation Company, the Pennsylvania Company for 
Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, the Germantown Turnpike, and the Bank 
of Philadelphia; his brother Bohl was a director of the Delaware Insurance 
Company of Pennsylvania. Because they had members in common, corporate 
boards often worked together to the companies’ mutual benefit. Boardmembers 
also served in the city councils and the state and federal legislatures. By serving
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on multiple boards and by having associates and family members on still more, a 
coterie of insiders coordinated corporate growth.56
Corporations also used their technologies to protect and insulate their 
corporate status. W hether it was the city o f Philadelphia watching water use, 
canal companies controlling traffic, or banks manipulating the money supply, 
corporations increasingly used their position in the economy to cajole the 
legislature into providing them with special protections far beyond the wildest 
dreams of individuals or partnerships. Their ability to do so signaled the 
culmination of the genesis of corporate power.
In the early 1830s, Philadelphians certainly remained proud of their city. 
They noted that the ir Fairmount Waterworks had become the wonder of 
residents, visitors, and lithographers alike. They counted the tons of coal and 
grain coming down a network of canal and river navigations to their busy 
wharves and they listed the banks, insurance companies, and their respective 
capitals proudly in their newspapers and city directories. Already, new railroads 
promised even greater efficiency and riches. Such projects and institutions 
evidenced the city’s prosperity and the energy of its citizens and transformed the 
structure of the local and even the state economy. For better or worse, the men 
who ran large corporations had found answers to the area’s needs and in return 
exacted a price of profits and power. In constructing and administering river 
navigations, water distribution systems, a banking system, and insurance 
operations, they replaced the old ways of building and keeping power with new,
55For analyses of consolidation of control of finances and manufacturing, respectively, in Boston, see 
Naomi Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks. Personal Connections, and Economic Development in
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more permanent, and more far-reaching methods of projecting power in the 
economy and the polity. They had invented corporate power.
Industrial New England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Robert Dalzell, Enterprising 
Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (New York: Norton, 1993).
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The New Power of Nexus Technologies
The water taunted them. Living in the western parts of Philadelphia in the 
late eighteenth century, one could always hear the Schuylkill River, rushing over 
the Falls several m iles northwest of the city. The fresh, cool water flowing by 
Philadelphia seemed heavenly compared to the sometimes fetid and possibly 
deadly well water city residents forced themselves to drink. The Falls also 
constantly reminded Philadelphians of the existence of a potential waterway into 
its hinterland and perhaps to the west, if only it could be navigated. In the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, Philadelphians used various technologies to 
conquer the Schuylkill in order to supply the c ity with water and to make a cheap, 
fast form of transportation to the coal counties upstream. More significantly, the 
use of these technologies changed the structure of public power in the city and 
the region.
The motivations behind Philadelphia’s desire fo r a water supply system 
were for the most part practical, beginning with public health. Yellow fever 
attacked almost every American city, some repeatedly: Baltimore in 1794, 1795, 
and 1797; New York in 1795 and 1799; Norfolk in 1795 and 1797; Charleston in 
1796 and 1799; Boston in 1796; New Haven in 1794; Providence in 1797.1 
Philadelphia suffered far worse than any other. During the summer and early 
autumn of 1793, yellow fever ravaged Philadelphia, claiming 4,000 lives. In 1797 
yellow fever claimed over 1,200 in the City of Brotherly Love; in 1798 3,500; in 
1799 1,000. By all accounts, the poor suffered the most, but no part of society
1 Nelson Manfred Blake, Water for the Cities: A History of the Urban Water Supply Problem in the United 
States (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1956), 6.
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remained unscathed: “ten of the doctors, ten of the ministers, even more 
lawyers, even more merchants, these of the city's great” were listed in a best­
selling necrology in 1793.2 As many as 23,000 people temporarily left the city 
during the plague months in 1793, and 40,000 evacuated in 1798. In 1797 and 
1798, a  combination o f city officials and private citizens helped set up two huge 
camps north and west o f Philadelphia for the indigent who could not afford to flee 
anywhere else.
These yellow fever epidemics threatened Philadelphia’s future as a 
political and commercial center during a period when its collective psyche was 
already reeling from its impending loss of political eminence: both Pennsylvania 
and the United States were in the process of relocating their seats of government 
away from the Quaker City. Anyone with relatives outside the city or enough 
money— including the Pennsylvania State Assembly— fled the plague during the 
summer, and the United States Congress moved temporarily to Trenton.3 ‘T he  
opulence of our metropolis,” bemoaned Pennsylvania governor Thomas Mifflin, 
“sustained an incalculable loss, by the suspension of its commerce and its arts; 
the obstruction of public business, and the derangement of moneyed 
institutions.” He further warned that “the general prosperity of our state will be 
immediately endangered” unless all could work “to avert, as far as human 
agency can avail, the recurrence of so awful a visitation.”4 The governor's words
2J.H. Powell, Bring Out Your Dead: The Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Philadelphia in 1793 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 281.
3George Edward Reed, ed. Papers of the Governors, vol. 4 of Pennsylvania Archives, no. 4 (Harrisburg: 
State of Pennsylvania, 1900), 267.
4 Reed, Papers of the Governors. 406.
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reflected those of his constituents, who thought that “the reputation & salvation of 
the City [was] at stake.”5
After so much tragedy, controversy remained over what would prevent 
further “awful visitations”: no one knew the cause of yellow fever. Some blamed 
the influx of immigrants from the French West Indies, where yellow fever and 
slave revolts made refugees out of rich and poor alike. Two thousand Haitians 
crowded into the poorer sections of Philadelphia, a city of about 50,000 before 
the plagues hit.6 Accordingly, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia both enacted law 
after law to quarantine and eventually prevent immigration during plague years.7 
But the plague continued. Others, including the famous Dr. Benjamin Rush, 
blamed organisms in the muggy Philadelphia air, creatures that he insisted for 
years came from the foul-smelling garbage in the streets of the city.8 Just about 
everyone agreed that the foul drinking water and filthy streets, whether or not the 
cause of the plague, exacerbated its effects. Fire companies vainly tried their 
best to clean the streets. In 1796, the city council set aside funds for five carts to 
clean and water the streets; in 1798, the city ordered the gutters washed and the 
streets wetted three times a week.9 But washing streets intermittently with dirty 
water, Philadelphians discovered, did not make them clean.
5Thomas P. Cope, Philadelphia Merchant: The Dfarv of Thomas P. Cope. (South Bend: Gateway Editions, 
1978), 31.
6Powell, Bring Out Your Dead. 5.
7Reed, Papers of the Governors. 264, 267, 384, 397, 407, 426.
8The Journals of Beniamin Henry Latrobe 1799-1820: From Philadelphia to New Orleans, vol. 3 of 
Journals. Edward C. Carter II, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe, no. 1(New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980), 9.
9Report of a Committee of the Select Committee of Philadelphia. Read November 10th. 1796 (Philadelphia: 
Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1796), 8-9 and William Currie, Memoirs of the Yellow Fever. Which Prevailed in 
Philadelphia, and Other Parts of the United States of America in 1798 (Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1798), 3.
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Although Philadelphia's encounters w ith yellow fever were more frequent 
and severe than those of other eighteenth-century American cities, its water 
supply problems were typical. First, there was barely enough water to go 
around: citizens petitioned for about fifteen new public hand pumps and wells a 
year. Even so, the three hundred or so pumps and wells did not always meet the 
need, especially during the winter, and the quality o f the city’s water was uneven 
at best. Philadelphia had no sewer system, and so homeowners dug deep privy 
holes under their houses. Many of these were dug so deep as to contaminate 
the underground supply of water from which many Philadelphians drew their 
wells.10 A few of the  city’s wells were near cemeteries, and after rains the water 
had a ghastly taste.11 In October 1798, Philadelphia’s Board of Managers of 
Marine and City Hospitals suggested working the pumps more often, in the hope 
that the “extremely offensive and unwholesome” water would be pumped out by 
clean water underneath.12 A newspaper reported that the pungent smell of 
standing water assaulted the nose of anyone who dared travel in the city, and 
even Governor M ifflin admitted that current water sources were “far from 
affording, either in quality or quantity, what health and cleanliness demand.”13 
W ith each new wave of yellow fever, the demand for water grew until “the [city] 
Councils were bored by petitions... & the members were perpetually dinned with 
the cry of ‘Water, water; no matter as to expense, the citizens will support
10The Virginia Journals of Beniamin Henry Latrobe 1795-1798. vol. 2 of Journals. Edward C. Carter II, ed., 
The Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe, no. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) 379-380.
11 Kenneth Roberts and Anna M. Roberts, eds., Moreau de St. Mery's American Journey. 1793- 
1798(Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1947), 262-263.
12Currie, Memoirs of the Yellow Fever. 108.
13Blake, Water for the Cities. 8; Reed, Papers of the Governors. 412.
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you.’”14 Mifflin certainly did not hurt his popularity when he claimed that the 
single best way to prevent more epidemics was the “introduction of good and 
wholesome water.”15 Clean water seemed the best way to douse the hellish fire 
of yellow fever.
Of course, yellow fever was not the only fire that needed dousing in 
eighteenth-century American cities, built largely of wood. Another motivation for 
a more reliable, frost-free water supply was fire prevention. Nearly a quarter of 
New York City's houses burned to the ground in 1776. Philadelphia, where 
Franklin had founded the first fire company in the colonies, was equally sensitive 
to fire ’s danger. In 1791, widespread reports o f arson prompted Philadelphia’s 
city officials to post round-the-clock fire patrols and to offer a $1,000 reward for 
the arrest of offenders.16 Four years later, the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
allowed Philadelphia to prohibit the construction of wooden buildings in the main 
parts o f the city, legislation applauded by both insurance companies and 
stonemasons.17 Searching for a well with enough water to put out a  blaze in 
Philadelphia provided a constant challenge for local firefighting companies.
Israel Israel, an innkeeper, stable-keeper and local politician, provided the 
city's ruling Federalists with a third motivation fo r solving the city's water woes. A 
local Revolutionary hero, Israel had worked selflessly for the city during the 1793 
yellow fever plague, serving on the Orphan Committee and helping run the
14Cope, Philadelphia Merchant. 31.
15Reed, Papers of the Governors. 412.
16Thomas J. Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia. 1609-1884 (Philadelphia, L. H.
Everts & Co., 1884), 1:467.
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impromptu Bush Hill hospital.18 He lost bids fo r a seat in the state legislature in 
1793 and 1795, both times running on a solidly Anti-Federalist platform— causing 
Richard Peters to wonder why so many were “not fond of stable men and stable 
measures.”19 The third time appeared to be the charm for Israel when he finally 
beat opponent Benjamin Morgan in a close election in August of 1797, but 
Morgan cried foul. Israel had eked out an overall victory by garnering a huge 
majority of the poor vote while the more prosperous (read: Federalist) voters had 
fled the plague-ravaged city.20 After petitioning the General Assembly on a 
technicality, Morgan won a run-off the following February. The Philadelphia 
councils at the time were predominantly Federalist. Although no council 
members made any public admissions to the effect, thoughts of yellow fever- 
skewed voting demographics may have given them pressing political reasons to 
do whatever possible to end Philadelphia’s blight.21
Prompted by the request of a growing number of petitioners, in 1798 the 
City Councils formed a “Joint Committee on the Subject of Bringing Water to the
^Gertrude MacKinney, ed., Executive Minutes of the Governors, vol. 2 of Pennsylvania Archives, no. 9 
(Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1931), 967 and James Hosmer Penniman, Philadelphia in the Early 
Eighteen Hundreds (Philadelphia: St. Stephen's Church, 1923), 35.
18Powell. Bring Out Your Dead. 164.
19Samuel Breck, "Witty Sayings of the late Richard Peters, District Judge of the United States for Eastern 
Penna.Died in August 1828, aged 83.Collected, set down and arranged by Sami. Breck, who was his friend 
and neighbour in Blockley township, Belmont District for Thirty Years," (mss.,), Breck Papers, Case 25, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
20John K. Alexander, "Poverty, Fear, and Continuity: An Analysis of the Poor in Late Eighteenth-Century 
Philadelphia," in The Peoples of Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic and Lower-Class Life. 1790 - 1940. ed. 
Allen F. Davis and Mark H. Haller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 23.Federalist candidates 
and their followers tended to be much more wealthy than their opponents, and election turnout was 
unusually low in the plague years of 1793 and 1797; see Table 5, “Distribution of Wealth by Party 
Candidates, 1800” in Richard G. Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics. 1789- 
1801 (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1976),15, and Figure 3, “Voter Participation in Philadelphia; 
Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City. 150.
21 For a full discussion of the connections between Philadelphia politics and the yellow fever epidemics, 
see Martin S. Pemick, “Politics, Parties, and Pestilence: Epidemic Yellow Fever in Philadelphia and the 
Rise of the First Party System,” WMQ 3d. Ser., 29 (October 1972), 559-586.
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City” to investigate various options fo r supplying Philadelphia with fresh water. 
This Joint Committee was organized strictly for the temporary purpose of 
deciding what would be the best way to solve the water problem, and it explored 
three possible methods: the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal, which was an 
unfinished predecessor of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and two plans for 
steam-engine powered waterworks, one from local inventor Oliver Evans and the 
other from British-trained architect and engineer Benjamin Henry Latrobe.
The Joint Committee settled on the last proposal, despite their wariness 
over steam engines. In some ways, Latrobe’s was the most technically dubious 
of the three plans; a canal booster derided it as “aerial castles."22 But after 
months of exasperating negotiations with the recalcitrant directors of the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, committee opined that the poorly 
managed canal company appeared to be more concerned with “the profits to be 
made by supplying the city with water” than its obligations to the city, suspicions 
reinforced by the company’s exorbitant demands 23 Moreover, the patrician 
Committee members may have been somewhat suspicious of Evans, a man 
fiercely proud of his artisanal background. More likely, the largely Federalist city 
councils had no desire to hand out plums in the form of large contracts to 
Republican Evans. Latrobe, on the other hand, nearly seethed sophistication,
22 Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, to the Committees of the 
Senate and House of Representatives on the Memorial of Said Company (Philadelphia: John Ormrod, 
1799).
23B. Henry Latrobe, Remarks on the Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company to the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, as Far as It Notices the “View of 
the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with Wholesome Water. Printed bv order 
of the Committee of the Councils (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799),14.
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was English— always a plus with Federalists— and had no political ambitions.24 
Furthermore, three promises of Latrobe’s design proved crucial to its adoption: a 
pipe system which would distribute the water into more areas of the city, 
discounted water piped directly into investors’ homes, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the inclusion of public hydrants, which made the water available fo r 
free to the entire population.25 Lastly, in a city undergoing an image crisis, 
Latrobe’s suggestion to sheath the upper engine in a graceful pumphouse, giving 
it the appearance of a  temple of republican technology, provided an elegant 
landmark.26
The Joint Com mittee’s selection of a double steam engine system for the 
city’s water supply exemplified the myriad ways that politics and power shaped 
technological choice in the early republic, especially for large-scale infrastructure 
projects. Just as local governments would do throughout the antebellum period, 
the Philadelphia Councils were initially willing to engage in some type of 
partnership with a chartered company, in this case the Delaware and Schuylkill
24David Freeman Hawke suggested that Evans was not patrician enough for the Watering Committee in 
Nuts and Bolts of the Past: A History of American Technoloov 1776-1860 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 
63-68; he also argued that Latrobe's pumphouse was crucial. While these may have been minor factors, 
the Council members were more concerned with politics. Although Latrobe was well-connected among 
Republicans—he had a letter of introduction from Thomas Jefferson— he also was friendly with prominent 
Federalist Bushrod Washington, respected by Philadelphia Federalist Samuel Fox, and had no political 
ambitions. Thus, the Federalist -dominated Council found Latrobe more politically palatable than staunch 
Republican Evans, who ran for election to the Councils on several occasions. In 1802, when Evans gained 
a seat on the city’s Common Council, he submitted a report arguing that much of the Latrobe system—  
already constructed—was inefficient, especially the two-engine design; the report was narrowly rejected. In 
1812, the city finally scrapped the two-engine power plant, replacing both with one high-pressure engine 
built by none other than Oliver Evans.
25 Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with 
Wholesome Water in a Letter to John Miller. Esquire from B. Henry Latrobe. Engineer. December 29. 1798 
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
26Both the Centre Square waterworks and the Fairmount waterworks were excellent examples of the 
technological sublime in American culture. See Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) and David E. Nye, American 
Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
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Canal Company, to provide a public service.27 The city had an honored tradition 
o f private entities serving the greater good: a host o f fire companies, the Library 
Company, the Pennsylvania Hospital, and numerous mutual aid societies, to 
name a few. But in negotiations between the canal company and city officials, 
the company constantly overestimated the strength of its bargaining position. 
Perhaps in 1796, when it still had some money and its leadership was still active, 
the company might have been successful, but by 1798 its leadership had 
unraveled. Robert Morris, the company's founder and president, had speculated 
heavily in western lands; rather than seeing sturdy houses go up, he saw his 
financial house of cards collapse. In March 1797, he was frantically trying to 
unload a half million acres of land, and his former political clout quickly 
evaporated as news of his insolvency spread 28 Joseph Ball, a canal company 
officer, had been a Philadelphia alderman in the early 1790s, but no longer held 
office; John Nicholson, former Philadelphia council member and Pennsylvania 
attorney general, had gone down with Morris. Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company board representatives made proposal after proposal, each more 
unacceptable than the last: for the city to pay the $350,000 to take the entire 
canal off their hands after years of failure; for the city just to buy stock in the 
enterprise and thus not have control over their own water; or for the city to pay 
$200,000 to take water from the canal and still pay for part of the canal’s
27The considerable scholarly work done on the nature of public-private cooperation on infrastructure will be 
addressed in its particular relationships to finance, ideology, and corporations in their respective chapters.
28Morris tried to organize a holding company for all his lands, in the desperate hope that sales of shares 
would provide enough money to keep him afloat; see Plan of Association of the Pennsylvania Property 
Company. Established March 1797 (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1797).The plan was unsuccessful.
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maintenance.29 All this for a project that at its current rate of progress would 
have city residents die of old age if not yellow fever before they would drink 
Schuylkill water. A fter a long series of fruitless negotiations, Latrobe emerged as 
a deus exmachina to solve Philadelphia’s water problem, despite the ambitious 
nature of his proposal.
Latrobe’s plan worked as follows. A sea wall reaching into the river 
guided water into a small basin on the east side of the Schuylkill. By the bank, a 
large steam engine— with a 40” cylinder, far larger than any yet made in America, 
and so powerful that the city leased its excess power to its builder— pumped 
water through a 4’6” wide, 7’ high tunnel from below the river’s waterline to 
Centre Square, so called because it was in the middle of Penn’s plan for the city, 
although then still at the western outskirts of city settlement. There, a smaller 
engine— at 32”, still to be the third largest in the country— pumped the water from 
the conduit to an above-ground reservoir, basically a short water tower.30 That 
Latrobe would think of using steam engines was not surprising, given his 
background. As a well-read engineer, he knew that steam engines had first 
been designed to pump water out of mines, and his design showed striking 
similarities to a waterworks in Chelsea, not far from his boyhood London home.31 
Once in the above-ground reservoir, the water flowed by gravity through wooden 
mains down the major streets, and residents got water from public hydrants or by
29Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 24lh of 
November. 1799. (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
30Carroll W. Pursell, Early Stationary Steam Engines in America: A Study in the Migration of Technology
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1969), 32.
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building a connector a t the ir own expense from the main to their property. The 
m ost aesthetically attractive part of the plan was the pumphouse in Centre 
Square, a beautiful, geometrical structure: a box (containing the engine, fuel, 
parts, and tools) fronted by Greek columns and topped by a dome (containing 
the upper reservoir). Smoke from the engine’s fire escaped in a plume from  the 
top of the dome. The plan impressed many Philadelphians as a sophisticated 
example of the application of the latest technology to one of their direst needs.
Despite the pumphouse’s elegant shape, its contents proved unreliable. 
Latrobe’s engines were inefficient, partly as a result of their design and partly 
because of the inexperience of the builders. The Watering Committee replaced 
the lower engine in 1808, and in 1813 scrapped both engines for a single, high- 
pressure one from O liver Evans situated farther north on the Schuylkill, in an 
area soon to be renamed Fairmount. That engine, too, was replaced in 1819. 
Two years later, the city threw a dam across the river at Fairmount, finally 
harnessing the cheap power of the river. Above the dam, the city built the 
gorgeous Fairmount work; with gardens added in the 1830s, it became one of 
the most celebrated and pictured spots in antebellum America.
The decision o f steam over a canal was motivated largely by non­
technical considerations and held significant political consequences for 
Philadelphia. It meant that the water supply system would be run by the city. 
The Joint Committee became the Watering Committee, a de facto permanent 
body. Alone among subcommittees of the City Councils, the Watering
Latrobe, Correspondence 1784-1804. 141-142.Also see Darwin Stapleton, “Benjamin Henry Latrobe and 
the Transfer of Technology,” in Carroll Pursell, ed., Technology in America: A History of Individuals and
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Committee gained control over a separate budget, authority to enter into 
contracts, and the ability to hire and fire its own employees. As city councilmen, 
members of the W atering Committee were elected officials; nonetheless, they 
possessed far more influence and economic leverage than the entire city 
government had before the construction of the first waterworks. In effect, the 
Watering Committee became a government-within-a-government, collecting its 
own taxes in the form  of water rents and making overtly political decisions about 
city development as it decreed where new water mains would go and when. It 
issued its own printed annual reports and kept its own records separately from 
the City Councils’. It owned land, paid its own bills, and ran a growing 
bureaucracy, running up substantial debts in doing so. The W atering Committee 
commanded a large part of Philadelphia’s budget, the surest sign of power in any 
political entity.
Beyond the Watering Committee's new fiscal power, the construction of 
Latrobe's pipe distribution system as opposed to the above-ground gutters 
proposed by the canal company resulted in greater income, authority, and 
responsibility for the city government. The pipe system required hookups to use, 
either private ferrules (pipes connecting mains to delivery systems) to houses 
and businesses or public hydrants. Therefore, any person or neighborhood 
wanting water could only obtain it through the Watering Committee. When the 
system became operational in 1801, the city passed an ordinance setting 
residential water permits at five dollars a year and charging “brewers, sugar- 
refiners, hatters, soap-boilers, inn-keepers, dyers, curriers, and others, who will
Ideas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 34-44.
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require the water for other purposes than the supply of the ir private-dwelling 
houses” at rates proportional to the amount o f water to be consumed.32 A few 
wealthy residents were so anxious to get Schuylkill water that they advanced the 
city interest-free loans to have mains installed on their block.33 All sorts of 
businesses signed up, including ones like distillers, whose work was water­
intensive, and banks, whose officers wanted the running water for prestige and 
convenience. Some firms paid as much as $80 fo r the privilege. The largest 
customer, year after year, was the almshouse, for an outrageous $100, proving 
that even charities had to pay their share. The Watering Committee could not 
charge private fire companies because they used the public hydrants; however, 
as of 1812, private fire companies had to apply to the Watering Committee for 
permits to test or clean their engines and hoses. Three years later, the Watering 
Committee gained control over the annual $2,000 disbursement to fire 
companies to help defray equipment costs.34 In 1822, the city passed an 
ordinance giving the W atering Committee its own rent collectors, separate from 
city tax collectors; thus, the Watering Committee now had almost total control 
over its own cash flow.35
32City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for Regulating the distribution of water in the City of 
Philadelphia,” in John C. Lowber, comp. Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which 
are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City 
(Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 178-179.
33Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 1. 1803 (Philadelphia: 
William Duane, 1803), 20
34City of Philadelphia, PA., “A Further Supplement to ‘A Ordinance for regulating the Distribution of Water 
in the City of Philadelphia,” Lowber, Ordinances. 229; City of Philadelphia, PA.,"An Ordinance granting aid 
to the Fire Hose, Engine, and other Companies in the City,” Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of 
Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Day of June. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twelve 
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 9-10.
35 City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for the Better Collection of Water Rents,” Ordinances of the 
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia.Passed Since the Twenty-Seventh Day of December. One Thousand 
Eight Hundred and Twentv-One (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1823), 227-231.
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Other more practical legislation included a series of measures specifying 
size and length of hookups, m aterials, and stopcocks, all of which had to be 
installed according the Watering Committee’s exacting standards. The city 
councils enacted individual m easures to solve specific, practical problems. For 
instance, an 1809 law specified tha t private hook-ups fo r city water include a 
stopcock attached “at the distance of twelve inches from the gutter to prevent 
accidents from the leakage o f said pipe.”36 The sum o f these laws, however, 
amounted to more than their individual parts: they represented an 
unprecedented degree of the city corporation’s administrative control over its 
residents. Anyone in Philadelphia wanting Schuylkill water had to lobby the 
Watering Committee to have a main put in, pay a Watering Committee rent 
collector, and hire a Watering-Committee licensed plumber to install a hook-up 
according to Watering Committee specifications. The W atering Committee 
carefully parlayed its control over water distribution into many arenas of the city’s 
operation.
Finally, through its handling of the financing and ongoing costs of the 
waterworks and its ability to award construction contracts, the Watering 
Committee became a powerful entity in financial matters, in party politics, and in 
city. Until the Fairmount works were converted to waterpower in 1821, the 
system’s steam engines devoured fuel twenty-four hours a day. Constructing 
mains and connections required thousands of feet of wood, lead, and finally iron
36City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for Further Regulating the Distribution of Schuylkill Water, 
Collecting the Rents Thereof, and for other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” John C. Lowber, Ordinances of 
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of 
Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 227.
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pipes, all of which needed maintenance and replacements. Even the most 
casual readers of Philadelphia newspapers could not have missed the Watering 
Committee advertisements calling fo r bids on thousands of feet o f lumber, on 
bushels of coal, on carpentry work, on masonry work, and on tunneling work. 
These were the routine expenditures, not including the enormous sums spent on 
initial construction. Almost all such costs were contracted out, giving the 
Watering Committee tremendous potential for patronage contracts.
The amount of money the W atering Committee had a t its disposal for 
such contracts began high and grew astronomically. Latrobe’s original estimate 
fo r his waterworks was $127,000 fo r construction, not including maintenance.37 
According to Watering Committee calculations, the total cost as of October 12, 
1801 was $220,310.55; as of November 1, 1803, $296,604.34; a year later, 
$336,830.99; and five years after that, $482,212.5538. In any given year, from 
the first acceptance of the Latrobe proposal in 1799 through 1825, the 
construction, maintenance, and financing of Philadelphia’s water supply system 
commanded a huge portion of the city government’s energies and resources, 
measured either in total dollars (see Figure 1) or as a percentage of city 
expenditures (see Figure 2).39
37Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
38Report of the Committee for the Introduction of Wholesome Water into the Citv of Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1801); Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common 
Councils. November 1. 1803 (Philadelphia: William Duane, 1803), 5: Report of the Watering Committee to 
the Select and Common Councils. November 1. 1804 (Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1804), 13: Report of 
the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 2. 1809 (Philadelphia: Jane 
Aitken, 1809), 15.
39Not including 1804, for which the surviving data are incomplete. I have included in water expenditures all 
payments expressly dedicated to the waterworks as well as ancillary costs including paving over pipes, 
construction of pipes, machinery for pipe boring, the purchase of land and water rights for Fairmount, debt 
service on waterworks construction (as designated by the councils and as an estimated portion of overall 
debt service). From this total, I have subtracted waterworks income deposited in the sinking fund including
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Figure 1
Philadelphia Expenditures, 1799-1825: 
Total Annual Expenditures by Dollar Amount
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Figure 2
Philadelphia Expenditures, 1799-1825: 
Waterworks as a Percentage of Total Expenditures
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both water rent and sale of old or excess materials. Not included are funds for pumps and wells not 
connected to the central water supply system, interest on city loans because of cash-flow problems induced 
by payments for the waterworks, or opportunity cost on waterworks investment. Thus, the water 
expenditures as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are, if anything, probably lower than the actual costs of the 
waterworks bom by the Corporation of Philadelphia.
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Over the entire period from 1800 to 1825, the waterwo rks soaked up nearly 47% 
of total city expenditures; in every one of those years, total waterworks costs 
exceeded outlays for any other city service or project, even more than for 
fortifications during the W ar o f 1812. Only twice during that period did the 
waterworks cost less than 30% of the city’s dollars (1809 and 1811, at 27.4% 
and 25.3%, respectively); in nine different years, the waterworks constituted over 
half of all city spending, reaching over 60% at least fo u r times.40 By the 1820s, 
the Fairmount waterworks supplied water reliably to Philadelphia and several of 
its suburbs, and the W atering Committee decided how  and where every penny 
was spent. With its hands on hundreds of thousands o l  municipal dollars in 
building and maintenance of the nation's first grand municipal infrastructure
40An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the 
Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson,. Jr., 17991: Report of the Joint 
Committee of the Select and Common Councils, on the Citv Debts and Expenditures, and the Citv Credits 
and Resources (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1801; Report of the Joint Committee of the Select 
and Common Councils, on the Citv Debts and Expenditures, and the Citv Credits and Resources 
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 18021: Accounts of the Corporation, for the Year 1802 (Philadelphia: 
Robert Cochran, 1803); Report of the Committee of Councils. Exhibiting a  Correct Statement of the 
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1803 (Philadelphia: Wm. Duane, 1804); 
Report of the Committee of Accounts, to the Select and Common Councils. February 8th. 1804 
(Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1804); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 
1805 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1806); Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1806. 
accompanied bv An Ordinance for Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the Citv. 
for the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Six, and An Ordinance to Assess Lew and Collect a Tax on 
Personal Estate (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1806); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, 
for the Year 1806 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1807); Committee of Wavs and Means Report for 
Appropriations for 1807. accompanied bv An Ordinance for Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for 
the Services of the Citv. for the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane 
Aitken?], 18061: Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. For the Year 1806 (Philadelphia: 
Jane Aitken, 1807); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1807 (Philadelphia: 
Robert Cochran, 1808); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1808 
(Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1809); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year
1809 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1810); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year
1810 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia for the Year
1811 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1812); Report of the Committee of Accounts, with the Report of the 
Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company on the Present State of the Bridge (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1813); 
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia for the Year 1812 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey,
1814) Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia from the twenty-third of December. 1816. to 
the first of April. 1819 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1819); Accounts of the- Corporation of the Citv of 
Philadelphia from the first of April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823); 
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: from April 1. 1823. to January 1.1828 (Philadelphia:
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project, the W atering Committee had become the behemoth of Philadelphia 
politics.
Just as control over the waterworks gave the W atering Committee great 
leverage over municipal affairs, control over transportation projects provided 
great leverage over regional development issues.41 From the very beginning, 
inland navigation schemes often resulted in intense political struggles. The 
design of a canal o r river navigation dictated what kinds of goods, how many, 
and how fast those goods could travel, and what the costs of construction would 
be. Tremendously expensive, they begged the question of who would bear the 
cost o f construction, the controllers, the users— usually represented by 
municipalities and state governments— or a combination of both. Perhaps the 
most pressing issue became that of control: who would run a given project once 
completed and the extent to which owners could profit from it. And of all the 
transportation improvements in the Philadelphia area, none had a greater impact 
upon the Philadelphia region in the 1810s and 1820s than that of the Schuylkill 
Navigation as it made the Schuylkill River navigable for both upstream and 
downstream traffic.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company initially was typical of early internal 
improvements in that its first promoters generally did not expect stock dividends; 
rather, they wanted transportation projects to provide synergies with other 
investments, making their land speculations or commercial forays inland more
Philadelphia Councils, 1828); General Accounts, Corporation of Philadelphia, vols. 3-5, Philadelphia City 
Archives.
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profitable.42 Proponents of internal improvements in the early republic usually 
supported their projects other rationales beyond the possibility of dividends, 
touting national o r regional economic development, defense preparedness, and 
the further unification of the new nation in terms of interregional trade, 
communication, and goodwill.43 They did so with good reason. Despite the 
protestations of pro-canal and pro-turnpike literature, up until the 1810s everyone 
understood that such projects tended to lose money, and so did not provide 
enticements of direct profit.44 Hinterland trade and land speculation, though, 
were both popular investments, and smart money knew that accessibility to  the 
market, that is, cheap transportation for the bulky produce of the backcountry, 
could mean the difference between gain and loss. Accordingly, land speculators 
and merchants in the hinterland trade carefully rationed money into ancillary 
projects that would make their primary investments profitable: roads, turnpikes, 
canals, and river improvements.45
Josiah W hite’s first attempt to provide better water transportation 
exemplified early internal improvement efforts. He entered the field not to profit 
from the transportation itself but because the transportation could make his main 
business more remunerative. W hite ran a wire-pulling plant on the east bank of
4  ^With the possible exception of one predecessor, Boston’s Long Wharf, no municipal project approached 
the scale of the Philadelphia first waterworks for twenty years, about when the Fairmount works would 
replace them as the standard-bearer for another two decades.
42See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of motives for investment in internal improvements.
43See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the ideology and rhetoric of internal improvement in the early 
republic.
“^ T h e  most successful of early canal projects in terms of physical utility was the Middlesex Canal, which 
eventually paid some dividends but never recouped its investors’ capital. For a detailed investigation of the 
trials and tribulations of that project, see Christopher Roberts, The Middlesex Canal. 1793-1860 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938).
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the Schuylkill, just north of the city, on lands at the Falls o f the Schuylkill. The 
W ar of 1812 proved to be a mixed blessing: suddenly there was great demand 
for his iron products, but British coal and Virginia coal became scarce, and 
lumber costs skyrocketed.46 Like many others in the Philadelphia area, White 
began looking for alternative sources of fuel.
The immediate solution to Philadelphia’s fuel crisis turned out to be the 
end of the war. Not only did British coal become more available, but also a 
flood of cheap British finished iron goods to America sent the domestic American 
iron industry into a tailspin. However, during the War, expectations were even 
higher than profit margins, and Philadelphia’s artisans cast about desperately for 
a cheap source of energy. The long-term solution to Philadelphia’s energy 
shortage was a technological innovation typical for its combination of conscious 
intent and random luck, one that could “afford a supply o f fuel to the capital, not 
only indispensibly required at this period of distressing want, occasioned by the 
interdiction and destruction of the coasting trade, but commensurate with its 
utmost demands fo r centuries to come.”47 The discovery of anthracite coal held 
huge implications fo r Pennsylvania’s industrial future. White had heard of a kind 
of “hard” or “stone” coal available from up the Schuylkill. He knew that Frederick 
Graff, the superintendent of the waterworks, had tried to use it in 1808 to no
45And vice versa: land speculators often asked, before purchasing unsettled plots, whether “they lay near 
the proposed route of the Canal or any turnpike Road of consequence?” March 4, 1826, Andrew Bayard, 
Letterbook, personal business, 1806-1831, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
46Josiah White’s autobiography, Josiah White's History Given Bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and 
Navigation Company, 1909) is interesting but episodic. For a lively account of White’s long career, see 
Eleanor Morton [Elizabeth Gertrude Stem], Josiah White: Prince of Pioneers (New York: Stephen Daye 
Press, 1946).
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avail; this W atering Committee failure remained on humiliating public display, the 
unburned rocks used to gravel paths around the central pumphouse. The 
problem was simple: no one could get the stuff to lig h t White bought some and 
his workmen tried and tried, one day finally slamming the door of the furnace 
shut and knocking off for supper. When one came back, having forgotten his 
coat, he found the  furnace red-hot and called back his coworkers. They 
proceeded through four runs of iron before the furnace finally cooled. White 
immediately realized that this different kind of coal, anthracite coal, could solve 
Philadelphia’s fue l dilemma and quickly set out to find a way to transport large 
quantities o f it to the city.
The slow adoption of anthracite coal as a viable fuel testifies to the 
importance of accumulated knowledge in our understanding of technological 
diffusion, that is, the rate at which the use of a given technology spreads.48 A 
newer, “superior” technology— although that notion is problematic— does not 
immediately or completely supplant an older, perhaps less efficient one, 
especially when the new one requires different skills, equipment, or methods 
than the old. Anthracite coal burned hotter and longer than the “soft” or 
bituminous coal Philadelphians shipped in from Britain and Virginia, important 
qualities fo r anyone working with metal, and it burned with less residue. But 
anthracite did no t ignite easily; Frederick Graff, the superintendent of the 
waterworks, had abandoned its use in 1806 because, when his workmen had
47Berks County petition to the Pennsylvania Legislature from 1814, as quoted in History of the Coal Lands.
and Other Real Estate. Owned bv the New-York and Schuylkill Coal Company (New York: Geo. F. Hopkins, 
1826), 15.
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shoveled some on the fire, the anthracite smothered it. Lighting anthracite, in 
fact, turned out to be counterintuitive because the high temperature necessary to 
ignite it required a method fundamentally different than that currently used to 
light other materials. Early nineteenth-century Americans set fire to wood, 
charcoal, and “soft” coal by giving them as much air as possible. But anthracite 
proved completely different; as one observer later explained, “the more they 
scratched and poked at it— an operation necessary with the bituminous coal—  
the worse it was with the anthracite.”49 When workers at White’s shop slammed 
shut the door of the furnace, they most likely did so in utter frustration, because 
for them closing the door meant putting out the fire. Their accidental discovery, 
though, was not the first successful use of anthracite in Philadelphia. In 1785, 
the omnipresent Benjamin Franklin printed a pamphlet explaining how to burn 
anthracite coal in his famous stove, and Oliver Evans patented his own stove 
specifically designed fo r burning anthracite thirteen years later.50 Charles Cist, a 
Lehigh valley entrepreneur, had tried for years to sell anthracite in Philadelphia, 
at one point helping to publish a pamphlet with endorsements from Evans,
White, and the now more knowledgeable Graff.51 But not until well after Josiah 
W hite widely publicized “his” discovery and large supplies began floating down 
the Schuylkill and Lehigh navigations in the mid-1820s did the use of anthracite
4®See Joel Mokyr, “Technological Inertia in Economic History," Journal of Economic History 52 (June1992), 
325-338 for an interpretation of the reluctance to adopt technological innovations.
49Charles V. Hagner, Earlv History of the Falls of Schuylkill. Manavunk. Schuylkill and Lehigh Navigation 
Companies. Fairmount Waterworks. Etc. (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger, 1869),, 42.
50Oliver Evans to Charles Miner, as quoted in Charles Miner, ed., Lehigh Coal. Certificates from a Number 
of Persons. Shewing the use and Value of the Lehigh Stone Coal, with Some Prefatory Remarks (Wilkes- 
Barre, PA: Charles Miner, 1815), 5.
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become widespread. The Watering Committee had been willing to leap to a new 
technology, steam engines, fo r labyrinthine political reasons, but most of 
Philadelphia’s artisans and other residents were reluctant to use the new 
technology of anthracite because of the more mundane motivations of habit and 
familiarity.
Josiah White not only promoted the use of anthracite, but he also decided 
to make it available to consumers. Unfortunately, the lack of supply became 
even more difficult to solve than the lack of demand: the closest anthracite fields 
lay up the Schuylkill, which was unnavigable upriver beyond Philadelphia. Here 
again, politics determined the solution to a technological problem, in this case 
the challenge of transporting anthracite coal to a market one hundred miles away 
from where it was mined. W hite had trouble rounding up investors, and when he 
finally did, they lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature to charter the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company. Its purpose was to render navigable the length of the 
Schuylkill River that stretched from the coal fields in sparsely settled central 
eastern Pennsylvania through Reading and on to Philadelphia before it flowed 
lazily into the Delaware River. Three years and much wrangling later, White and 
his backers finally got their charter.52 Even then, the state stipulated that the 
company spend an equal am ount of money and time completing the potentially 
less profitable section above Reading. Once the charter was granted, financial
51 Miner, Lehigh Coal. For a detailed treatment of one entrepreneur’s early efforts to sell anthracite, see H. 
Benjamin Powell, Philadelphia’s First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania 
Anthracite (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).
52See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s problems in 
acquiring its charter.
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troubles and technical reverses convinced impatient investors to force White 
from the Company, but work continued.
Schuylkill Navigation Company officials had to  deal with a host of 
obstacles. They built canals to bypass falls and rapids; they used hammers or 
gunpowder to eliminate impediments such as rocks and tree-stumps; they used 
dams to alleviated shallows; and they used reinforced locks and especially 
strong dams to negotiate spring freshets (what are now referred to as flash 
floods). By the time it was finished, the Schuylkill Navigation ran 108 miles, 62 of 
them by canals that skirted falls, rapids, and shallows, and the other 46 by 
channels and pools in the river, all having towpaths. There were 120 locks and 
lock-keeper's 65 houses. Company officials estimated traveling speed along the 
navigation to be four miles per hour through the pools and channels and three 
through the canals. W hether those were downstream or upstream rates was 
unclear, but, for the first time, barges filled with goods could travel the length of 
the Schuylkill.53
Routing provides an example of how different groups shaped inland 
navigation technologies, often in ways that hindered the project’s efficiency. The 
response of the citizens of Reading to the Schuylkill Navigation Company's 
original routing plans was a typical case of politics overcoming engineering. 
Reading lay on the east side of the Schuylkill River at one of its rapids. Because 
the town’s economy was based upon its service as both a milling site and as an 
entrepot for the surrounding countryside, Reading residents made sure that no
53January2,1826, Minute Books, October 1815-November26, 1849, Box1, MG-110, Schuylkill Navigation 
Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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local transportation project bypassed the ir town. In the 1820s, when the Union 
Canal was to connect the Susquehanna River to the Schuylkill navigation, 
company officials planned the route to enter the Schuylkill below Reading. They 
did so as a matter o f economy: it was a cheap solution that involved building a 
dam and putting the canal over bedrock rather than going through Reading. The 
latter route necessitated an expensive aqueduct and included a path over 
limestone, which because of its porous quality forms an inferior bed fo r canals. 
However, Reading residents complained tha t the new route would “avoid 
Reading altogether and thereby deprive the citizens of any chance of navigation, 
the river, or the canal,” which the feared “would be productive of the most fatal 
consequences to the ir town.”54 So some prom inent Reading citizens formed a 
committee that promised to waive damages— one of the main reasons for 
avoiding densely settled areas—and successfully negotiated with the Union 
Canal Company, the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and the legislature for a 
more advantageous route. The new arrangement took nearly four years to 
settle, pushed back the completion of the Union Canal, and proved to be a “great 
source of interruption and delay” for tffe Schuylkill navigation “caused by the 
nature of the limestone formation over which it pass[ed].”55 The citizens of 
Reading influenced canal engineering through the use of lobbying and letter- 
writing; all the parties involved understood tha t well-to-do mill owners with 
connections in the statehouse could be jus t as daunting obstacles to canal
54Letter dated August 4, 1825, quoted January 25, 1828, V-1674, Minutes of Board of Managers of Union 
Canal Company, 7/30/1827-12/31/1831, Reading Company, Accession 1520, Hagley Museum and Library.
55Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders. 
January 3. 1831 (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1831), 13.
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construction as more physical barriers. Canal operators were especially 
cognizant of the economic dimensions of the routes, and planned accordingly. 
Maurice Wurts, president of the Delaware and Hudson Canal, recalled an 
incident in which “the line [of the canal] was changed to the manifest injury of 
public interest after the work was commenced, first to effect the purchase [of 
property along the route], and again altered back to the original design, after the 
object was accomplished.”56 Cost had everything to do with it, physical 
engineering none.
The width of canal and river navigations became another engineering 
issue influenced by social concerns. Unlike later standardization controversies 
such as railroad gauge and electrical voltage, canals and river navigation 
companies never agreed upon regional or national specifications for depth and 
width. For one, they lacked many of the features that engendered the 
standardization of other technologies. Canals were not the dominant form of 
transportation long enough to form governing bodies, their heyday lasting a mere 
decade from the mid-1820s to the mid-1830s. They never formed a national or 
even a regional system; most inland navigations connected rivers to other lakes 
or rivers which then led to  large bodies of water rather than other canals, and so 
no one perceived a need fo r uniformity. Secondly and more importantly, river 
navigations and canals technologies were particularly sensitive to local 
geography. True, American canal engineers found ingenious solutions to a 
variety of challenges, including long tunnels through mountains, aqueducts over
56Maurice Wurts Papers, Series 2, Undated, 1805-1822. Wurts Family Paper, Vanuxem Collection, Hagley 
Museum and Library.
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valleys and rivers, special locks that regulated water flow, steam-powered 
engines to pump water uphill, and cement that could dry underwater. One 
problem no engineer could solve was a lack of water. A canal could only be as 
wide and deep as the water supply warranted. However, the Union Canal 
Company tried desperately to keep a route that clearly had serious water-supply 
problems. They eventually fired engineer Laommi Baldwin, even engaging in a 
pamphlet war with their disgruntled ex-employee over the proper width of the 
canal. Both sides considered which kinds of cargoes they would encourage 
coming down the navigation, the possible size of boats that might use it, and the 
costs associated with excavating canals of various widths and differently 
designed cross-sections57 Neither, however, ever addressed the main problem 
that underlay their differences: the Union Canal did not have an adequate water 
supply to support a very wide waterway. In this controversy in which the physical 
limitations of the technology should have been the main point of consideration, 
concerns of cost and economic potential dominated.
Once its routing decisions were made, the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
acquired its first license to charge tolls before the spring season in 1819 and a 
trickle of coal and other goods found its way down the river that spring and 
summer.58 It was for the most part completed by 1825, the year the anthracite 
coal market took off carrying the corporation’s fortunes with it. The company
57Letters on the Union Canal of Pennsylvania. First Published in the “Boston Daily Advertiser [Boston?, 
1826].
58PhiIip Justice and Seth Craige to William Findlay, Governor of Pennsylvania, January 30, 1819, 
Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal 
Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill Navigation Company No. 42, Folder 1, 
Pennsylvania Sate Archives.
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took in $20,123.91 in tolls and in rents for company real estate during 1825, 
a lm ost six times the previous year’s total. In 1829, the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company declared its first dividend, paying $3.50 a share in profits. Company 
stock reflected its newfound success; only a few years before, the company had 
not been able to sell any at the original price of $50 a share; now they fetched 
around $75.59
The completion of the Schuylkill Navigation along with the Union Canal 
tha t fed into it marked the beginning of the economic explosion of the Schuylkill 
R iver Valley.60 The navigation’s construction involved a huge infusion of money 
into the region in the form of wages and the purchase of construction materials 
such as lumber, stone, and lime as well as other supplies. Through 1826, the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company had spent over $1.8 million on improving the 
river.61 Real estate values rose, both because the company purchased parcels 
fo r canals and tollhouses and because farmlands, mines, and mills along the 
river became more profitable now that residents could transport their goods more 
cheaply. By a stipulation in its charter, the company deposited its operating 
funds at the Farmers Bank of Reading, thereby increasing the area’s money 
supply.62 Although the overseas demand for wheat dropped at the end of the
59Schuylkill Navigation Company, Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company, to the Stockholders. January 4. 1830. (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1830), 6.
60See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978), 121-151.
61 According to official company reports, $1,858,985.42; Report of the President and Managers of the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders. January 1. 1827 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1827), 
9.
62Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia: 
Joseph & William Kite, 1838), 3. The above were all typical benefits of canal and navigation construction; 
see Harvey Segal, “Canals and Economic Development,” in Carter Goodrich, Canals and American 
Economic Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 224.
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W ar of 1812, Schuylkill valley residents used the navigation to specialize in more 
marketable crops and to  better exploit the miles and miles of coal beneath 
them.63 They began sending not only huge quantities of anthracite downstream 
but also all sorts of goods extracted from the ground. In 1827, for example,
31,630 tons of coal, 1472 tons of limestone, 526 tons of iron ore, 678 tons of 
marble, and 6,078 tons o f building stone found their way down the Schuylkill, 
accompanied by traditional agricultural products including 31,436 barrels of flour, 
24,244 bushels of wheat, 12,951 bushels of corn, 1,643 bushels of rye, 6,151 
bushels of flaxseed, and ample quantities of other commodities such as live 
hogs, apples, eggs, soap, nuts, glue, whiskey, tallow, bark, and even rags.64 
Such increased market participation made them better able to afford the 
cornucopia of goods flow ing up the navigation. These included regular 
household products such as china and cloth, delicacies such as fresh oysters, 
and construction materials like limestone and plaster. If the Schuylkill navigation 
allowed residents to w et their feet in the market, a good many of them dove in 
head first.
Because economic development in the Schuylkill River Valley depended 
upon the navigation, the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in its ability to 
determine toll rates for various commodities, modulate the volume of traffic, 
change the route of the navigation, and modify the width of the waterway held 
huge influence over local economies along the 108 miles of the improved river’s
63Lindstrom, 121-151.
^Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders. 
January 7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 9.
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banks.65 Just as the Watering Committee became a center of municipal power, 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company became a  center of regional power. What 
common characteristics did their technologies hold that helped their 
administrators grasp such power?
The centralizing phenomenon shared by waterworks and the navigation 
resulted from the effects of their serving as “nexus technologies.” The navigation 
and waterworks each formed a nexus of constant interaction between controllers 
and the customers who employed these technologies in countless ways. 
Philadelphia residents used Fairmount water every day for a myriad of purposes: 
to cook dinner, wash clothes, distill spirits, and fight fires. They also heated their 
houses and fueled their furnaces with coal that had been shipped down the 
navigation, and used the Schuylkill navigation to sell their finished goods in 
upriver markets. In essence, the waterworks and the navigation produced 
nothing tangible. Rather, they provided constant occasion for Philadelphia’s 
residents to exchange opportunities in return fo r the tolls the navigation company 
demanded or the water rents and taxes that the Watering Committee levied.
The navigation and the waterworks, as nexus technologies, diffused 
benefits to nearly everyone in the areas they affected. In other words, not only 
could stockholders prosper, but also others could use the technologies for their 
own ends. Furthermore, such benefits were continuous, as opposed to discrete:
65The Schuylkill Navigation Company, by its original charter, could charge up to 12.5c a ton below 
Reading, and 8c a ton above; however, it could set its own toll any amount less than that, and could also 
charge different rates for different commodities. In 1821, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the charter 
so that the Schuylkili Navigation Company could charge whatever it wanted, as long as its annual dividends 
did not exceed 25%. Given competition from the Lehigh Coal and Canal Company from 1828 on, the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company's rates fell well below the legal maximum. Acts...Relatina to the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company). 3, 24.
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people used them constantly, ra ther than making a single purchase or 
interaction. These two qualities, diffusion of reward and continuity of exchange, 
made nexus technologies qualitatively different than other technologies in terms 
of their increasing centrality to th e  growth of the market exchange economy in 
the early republic.66 The Philadelphia region's economy expanded intensively 
and extensively, that is, in term s of productivity and income as well as the 
increasing pervasiveness of m arket participation and behavior. The use of 
infrastructure technologies a llowed people to enter the market more fully and to 
become more productive once engaged in it.67 New market participants found 
that nexus technologies soon becam e indispensable to their engagem ent with 
the economy, and the people w ho  controlled such technologies thus placed 
themselves in positions of great leverage over the market activities of others.68
The waterworks’ and cana ls ’ centrality in the market and diffusion of 
reward distinguished these projects from previous economic ventures in the
66For insightful discussions on the inherently political nature of technology, see Langdon Winner, The 
Whale and the Reactor A Search for Limits in an Aae of High Technology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), p. 19-58, and Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in 
Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979).
67For the classic account of the role of transportation in American economic expansion during this period, 
see George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution. 1815-1860 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1951). Shaw’s Canals for a Nation provides a good overview of the effects of that particular technology; 
Nathan Miller, in The Enterprise of a Free People: Aspects of Economic Development in New York State 
During the Canal Period. 1792-1838 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), argued that the Canal Fund 
was just as instrumental as the canal in New York’s development. Also see Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals 
and American Economic Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
68Perhaps nexus technology in early nineteenth-century America most purely manifested itself in the form 
of banks. Banks were essentially a technology for multiplying investors' money for use by the community; 
banks, insurance companies, various financial instruments, investment strategies, and the like will be 
addressed in the next chapter.
Furthermore, although this chapter addresses technologies in the context of a marketplace, distributed 
benefits should not be confused with the purely economic terms “multiplier effects,” “social benefits," 
“indirect benefits,” or “externalities,” each of which refer to a theoretically quantifiable return enjoyed by 
those other than the investors. I am using distributed benefits to define the way nexus technologies, by 
their strategic location at the center of social and economic activities, can be exploited by their controllers 
(investors or administrators) and their users (who are usually not principally the controllers) in 
fundamentally different ways, ways that have deep political and social implications not measured or 
properly defined in economic theory.
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United States that could not diffuse benefits on the same scale. That is, only the 
owners, planters, farmers, tradesmen, or merchants who owned a stake in such 
projects profited from them. Various technological advances in agriculture and 
manufacture tended to provide limited benefits. Agricultural advances, such as 
the cotton gin or introduction of new farming equipment, could increase 
production either through reducing labor costs or increasing yields, respectively. 
Yet, in either case, only the people who adopted such new machinery or 
techniques made more money. The same holds true for industrial innovations: 
fo r example, while the clattering of the looms at Lowell barely drowned out the 
clanking of coins in the Boston associates’ bank accounts, those who did not 
invest in textile factories had little to show for America’s newfound textile- 
manufacturing competence.69 These technologies proved effective in producing 
physical goods, but proved comparatively limited as fa r as providing returns of 
profit and power.
Nexus technologies formed a critical innovation in scale for the 
accumulation of influence because of their potential to “lock in” customers whose 
own activities would increase with the use of the technology. Economists Robin 
Cowan and W. Brian Arthur have described the phenomenon of “technological 
lock-in,” in which the adoption of a given technology becomes more and more 
prevalent until that technology becomes dominant. Lock-in is particularly likely
69Some manufacturing technologies could be considered to have limited nexus technology qualities. A 
good example for early nineteenth-century America was the adoption of Oliver Evans’s techniques for fully 
mechanizing flourmills, which increased the mill owner’s profits while potentially lowering milling costs for 
neighboring farmers. However, such interaction occurred only once a year—harvest time—and was fairly 
localized in nature. Additionally, one of the central tenets of neoclassical economics is that the individual 
pursuit of self-interest always contributes to economic growth and efficiency; however, neoclassical
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when, as in the case of nexus technologies, use of the technology has increasing 
returns and when high barriers exist for potential competitors.70 Both of these 
conditions held for waterworks and for internal navigations. Whereas profits, and 
thus power, from other technologies grew only geometrically, nexus technologies 
had potential for exponential growth. Revenue from technologies such as the 
cotton gin or mill improvements only grew in proportion to the amount of labor 
and either land or machinery an owner could put into production; double the land 
or the spindles, double the profit, triple the land or spindles, triple the profit. But 
for nexus technologies, growth seemed unbounded. While the Philadelphia 
waterworks required high initial investments, it had the potential to grow with the 
city. Upon completion in 1802, it provided water to less than a quarter of 
Philadelphia’s approximately 43,000 residents; by 1830, it provided all of the 
water for Philadelphia’s population of 80,000, and perhaps half for the additional 
87,000 in nearby suburbs, a  total of approximately 123,000 people.71 Thus, the 
Watering Committee had indirect influence over a huge number of people, all 
through a technology that, by the late 1820s, had begun to pay back the city’s 
huge investment. The Schuylkill Navigation, meanwhile, was the lifeblood of 
economies all along the river: Pottsville, Port Carbon, Schuylkill Haven,
Hamburg, Reading, Pottstown, Phoenixville, Norristown, Conshohocken, 
Manayunk, and western Philadelphia. From a trickle in 1818, the goods going up
economics does not address the ways that different kinds of economic activity have different political and 
social consequences, which is at the center of this argument.
70See W. Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events,” 
The Economic Journal, 99 (Mar. 1989), 116-131 and Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in 
Technological Lock-In," Journal of Economic History 50 (Sep. 1990), 541-567.
71 Population statistics from drawn from Lindstrom, Economic Development. 25.
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and down the river turned into a flood in the late 1820s: tolls increased almost 
every year well into the 1830s, reaching a high of $604,190 in 1837 (see Figure 
3C).72 The navigation had a place in as many lives as did the waterworks, and 
so the controllers of these two nexus technologies touched a great many people.
Nexus technologies also exhibited great potential for extending power 
across vast distances. Patrons usually limited their power to certain 
neighborhoods or groups in the case of a city, or at m ost two or three adjoining 
counties in the hinterland. For the Watering Committee, influence reached 
wherever they could install a water main, thus extending through all of 
Philadelphia proper by the 1810s and into connecting suburbs in the 1820s. 
Meanwhile, the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers made 
decisions affecting perhaps most of the people living within twenty miles of their 
navigation, an area of 2,000 square miles, for the Schuylkill was now their 
connection to markets regional and beyond. No one depending upon other 
technologies could hope to project influence on anything approaching that scale 
in terms of physical space.
More subtly, but also more profoundly, controllers of nexus technologies 
learned to exploit them to create a new kind of power. The employment of nexus 
technologies created new dependencies among their customers, ones that, 
unlike patron-client power, did not depend upon face-to-face contact. As early as 
1818, subscribers to the waterworks included 3,296 dwellings and 194 other
72Because the Schuylkill Navigation Company lowered tolls several times in response to competition from 
the Lehigh and elsewhere, the accounting of tolls under-represents Schuylkill Navigation Company traffic 
growth in terms of both traffic and value of goods. Minute Books, Box 1, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1849, MG-100, 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
customers such as soap boilers, distillers, paper factories, hatters, inns, stables, 
and banks, to name a few; other Philadelphians got their water from ubiquitous 
public hydrants.73 Meanwhile, local econom ies all along the Schuylkill grew 
because of the availability of fast and inexpensive transportation up and down 
the navigation. In each case, a trem endous number o f people depended upon 
either the waterworks or the canal for the ir water, the ir livelihood, or both. W hen 
the waterworks did not work, neither could tanners or brewers, much less those 
who needed water to  drink, cook, or clean. Therefore, prospective bondholders 
were not the only boosters for the usually costly improvements in the 
waterworks; the people whose businesses or jobs depended on the water 
formed a powerful constituency in favor of such policies.
Controllers of nexus technologies could demonstrated their power in 
either brash or subtle ways. Administration of the waterworks required the 
enactment and enforcement of a series of measures fo r “regulating the 
distribution of Schuylkill water.”74 W ater was a public resource, so the W atering 
Committee had to conserve and protect it, but their doing so held consequences 
beyond mere reservoir levels. In 1801, the city councils passed one law 
imposing fines ranging from $3 to $50 plus costs of repair and recovery for 
intentionally breaking pipes or mains, and another law imposing a $1 fine plus 
cost of recovery for “a  wanton or willful waste of... water.”75 Five years later, the
73Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. Read January 14. 1819 
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1819).
74The first was in 1801, "An Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water in the City of Philadelphia." 
Lowber; it was supplemented again in 1801, in 1806, twice in 1809, in 1818, and in 1821.
75May 7, 1801, “An Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water in the City of Philadelphia,” The 
Ordinances of the Citv of Philadelphia to Which Are Prefixed, the Act of Incorporation and the Several
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city added $5 fines fo r “soaking, or rinsing... manufactured” goods such as hats, 
dyes, and leather, opening hydrants unnecessarily, and a hefty $20 penalty for 
illegally adding connections to a main and for augmenting one beyond the 
contracted size.76 Eventually, Philadelphians could incur legal punishments for 
not using strong enough stop-cocks, fo r not covering them properiy, for using 
someone else’s water, fo r not using licensed plumbers, and fo r not having pipes 
at the right depth among a host of other petty offenses. These measures were 
necessary for the efficient operation of the waterworks: improper installations 
made repair difficult and caused leaks that resulted in mud in the summer and 
treacherous ice in the winter. Nonetheless, such ordinances did more than 
merely ease maintenance and save water: by criminalizing any “improper” water 
use, the Watering Committee could use the force of the state to establish and 
defend the city corporation’s position as arbiter of water supply and distribution.
Meanwhile, boatmen, merchants, farmers, and operators depended upon 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company fo r their economic wellbeing. Such people, 
who usually owned no stock, would support company officials when they lobbied 
fo r laws that would give them more leverage in eminent domain suits or that 
would impose harsh penalties for those convicted of sabotage on canals.
Several clauses in the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s charter—a rather typical 
early nineteenth century canal charter— addressed the important issue of
Supplements Thereto: Together with the Address of George Washington. Late President of the United 
States, to His Fellow Citizens (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798). May 22, 1801, “A supplement to 
an Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of water in the City of Philadelphia,” Lowber.
76 March 15,1806, “A supplement to the Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water of the City of 
Philadelphia,” Lowber.
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damages.77 “Damages” encompassed any cost to landowners contiguous to the 
waterway whose property had been injured by the company, including flooding 
from the dammed river, crops trampled by workmen, and construction detritus. 
Pennsylvania granted the company the right to put its constructions anywhere 
along the river, that is, on anyone’s property, and to pay the damage done, 
taking into account not only the cost of replacement but the also the advantage 
the landowner received by being along the navigation— advantage being defined 
as increased property value. This definition of advantage represented a hidden 
subsidy to the navigation company: offsetting the legally retrievable cost of 
damages with increased real estate market value meant that company workmen 
and officials could cause substantial harm to properties along the navigation 
without having to pay for them.78 The navigation company had thus gained an 
economic advantage over other participants in the marketplace.
The navigation company's leverage was not limited to its relationships with 
neighboring property owners. When anyone, including boatmen, teamsters, or 
local residents, in some way injured the navigation, he or she had to pay twice 
the damages, as well as the company’s cost in recovering them. Not only that, 
but also the company decided upon the cost of damages against the navigation, 
while a six-member, theoretically impartial panel decided upon damages to 
landholders. In 1821, the company managed to have the legislature amend its
77 Acts... Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 3.
78Legal scholar Morton Horwitz has argued that the changes in laws dealing with damages amounted to a 
juridical redistribution of the wealth from poor property owners to corporations. He somewhat over­
emphasized the upward redistribution of wealth in that the land bordering canals or rivers tended to be 
valuable land or mill property, but was correct in the general principle. Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 67-70.
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charter so that the com pany could appeal any decision on damages to a panel 
from any county in the state; whomever lost the appeal would pay for all court 
and travel costs— a risk that plaintiffs against the company could ill afford.79 
Thus, in its confrontations, Schuylkill Navigation Company officials held all the 
cards: lower settlements, the cost of “improvement” (whether or not landholders 
wanted a navigation along their property), a  lower burden of proof, double 
damages, potentially friendly appeals panels, and the risk of high court costs. 
The Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers successfully used its 
nexus leverage to press for laws allowing it to bully its less powerful neighbors.
River navigations and waterworks operated as nexus technologies 
because of their peculiar historical context. Early nineteenth-century 
Philadelphia was engaged in a market exchange economy. Goods transported 
along a canal brought profits, and the ability to transport goods cheaply in turn 
gave motivation fo r others to enter the market or to increase current market 
production. Nexus technologies did not create the market; rather, people used 
them to extend the market. The Philadelphia region was undergoing spectacular 
demographic and economic expansion. W ithout such growth, water rents and 
canal tolls might have remained constant o r increased only in direct proportion to 
extensions in either system, limiting the attraction for large investments and large 
investors. In many cases, profits never approached expectations for many 
infrastructure improvements. And despite the potential for the consolidation of 
power and authority, nexus technologies did not necessarily reach the extreme
79Acts... Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 24.
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of “authoritarian technics,” to borrow Lewis Mumford’s phrase.80 To be sure, 
Joseph S. Lewis, as president o f the Schuylkill Navigation Company after 1825, 
seemed to be the most powerful person in Philadelphia. On the other hand, the 
Watering Committee was composed of elected representatives; on a t least one 
occasion, incumbents lost reelection because of cost overruns on the 
waterworks. Indeed, Mumford noted that the power that large-scale 
technological systems could confer was limited by the structure of the 
organization that administered them. For many nineteenth-century projects that 
lost money, such as the feeders to the Erie Canal, users fared better than 
investors; the exchange of power had the potential to tip toward the users rather 
than the controllers.
In the case of the waterworks, though, the leverage of nexus technology, 
like the water, generally flowed in one direction despite the benefits drawn by 
users. For the Watering Committee, the ability to employ the waterworks to 
extend its own power and the power of the city corporation even beyond its 
borders became evident during the planning stages of the expansion of the 
works at Fairmount in the late 1810s. As fast as the city of Philadelphia proper 
was growing, its suburbs gained population at an even higher rate. Like any 
adolescent, one of the Philadelphia’s growing pains involved learning how to 
control and coordinate its extremities, in this case the residents and governments 
of neighboring communities: the Northern Liberties, Spring Gardens, Southwark, 
and Moyamensing, all o f which bordered the city but were separately
80Lewis Mumford, “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics." Technology and Culture 5. (Winter 1964), 1-8. 
Mumford postulated that large technological systems were particularly vulnerable to centralized control and
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incorporated municipalities of Philadelphia County. In 1818 and 1819, the 
Watering Committee began investigating ways to lower costs and make sure that 
the water supply would keep pace with the population. They planned to replace 
the old, steam-powered waterworks with a  system whose energy came from a 
dam thrown across the Schuylkill. Considerations for the new system included 
higher reliability, greater output, and the elimination of fuel costs, all important 
practical goals for water supply systems.
The Watering Committee also saw the proposal as a way to make money 
fo r the city and extend its administrational influence over the suburbs through the 
sale of surplus water. In 1819, a Watering Committee report pointed out that 
“the adequacy of the supply of W ater to the City, and the ability it affords of 
supplying the districts, and thereby adding materially to the income of the City, 
will... justify the expenditure” on the new system.81 Thus, the city could 
potentially reduce its own tax burden by charging the suburbs for water. The 
suburbs would pay annual tribute to the city. The city soon built its fabulous 
Fairmount waterworks with its surrounding parks and gardens, and the suburbs 
provided much of its ongoing maintenance costs. For the suburbs, paying 
Philadelphia for water was like paying rent as opposed to owning. Suburban 
governments could avoid the large up-front costs of building their own systems. 
They implicitly decided to pay a different price: rather than building equity in their 
own independence, they became ever more dependent upon Philadelphia for
thus contributed to the consolidation of bureaucratic power.
81 “Report of the Watering Committee on the Subject of Obtaining Water Power from the River Schuylkill," 
February 5,1819, City Council 120.42, Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia 
City Archives.
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their water needs. In political systems, the ability to command taxes is a nearly 
direct measure of power, and the Watering Committee was now using the nexus 
of the waterworks to rein in the city’s smaller neighbors.
While control over water pricing gave Philadelphia leverage over its 
suburbs, the regulation of that w ater proved to  be an even more insidious form  of 
conscious municipal manipulation. Philadelphia’s 1827 contract with Spring 
Garden, an agreement typical o f those between the suburbs and the city, 
included many seemingly mundane conditions: Spring Garden’s pipes and 
ferrules had to be a certain size and its hydrants had to meet the same 
specifications as those in Philadelphia. Such restrictions made extensions to  the 
system much less difficult to construct because mains and fittings could be 
ordered in standardized sizes. Other parts of the contract displayed some 
concern for overall water supply stability: Spring Garden could only wash its 
streets during the same periods as the city, tim es generally chosen when the 
reservoir was full and demand low. Many clauses of the agreement more baldly 
demonstrated Spring Garden’s subordination. The suburb was only to receive 
water if Philadelphia had enough for its own needs; Spring Garden was to 
appoint a local water rent collector, but all books and assessments had to be 
approved by Watering Committee; Philadelphia charged Spring Garden 
residents 50% more than its own residents fo r private water; Spring Garden was 
required to enact all the same ordinances and regulations as Philadelphia had 
relating to the distribution and wasting of water; and, most crucially, the W atering 
Committee could shut off the suburb’s water if Spring Garden did not pay rent or
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if its pipes were not properly maintained.82 This final stipulation, giving 
Philadelphia inspectors— Watering Committee employees— the authority to shut 
off Spring Garden’s water, provided the Watering Committee with the most 
leverage: as anyone who is fam iliar with plumbing knows, if one wants to “find” a 
leak one need only look. Thus, Spring Garden was vulnerable to municipal 
blackmail. Taken as a whole, such contracts provided the Watering Committee 
with more than control over Philadelphia suburbs’ water; the nexus technology of 
water supply gave the Watering Committee influence over suburban 
administration, tax collection, and legislation. In driving such hard bargains, the 
Watering Committee definitely demonstrated the potentially centralizing effects 
of nexus technology.83
For the Schuylkill Navigation Company, tension between founder W hite 
and the company’s boardmembers, who had been elected by big investors, 
symbolized the distinction between interest in the waterway for its physical utility 
and interest in its potential for profits. While White came up with the idea of 
making the Schuylkill navigable, he did not have the cash necessary to 
implement it; a collection of financial bigwigs not only helped push the charter 
through the legislature but also became the commissioners named in the charter 
to be responsible fo r supervising the company’s 1815 general stock offering.
The stockholders soon elected a Board of Managers— the early nineteenth-
82 “Contract between Corporation of Philadelphia and Spring Garden, February 16,1827,” City Council 
120.42, Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, BoxA3118, Philadelphia City Archives.
83For a brief discussion of suburban ambivalence to the Fairmount works, and the role of the waterworks in 
Philadelphia’s eventual annexation of its suburbs, see Howard Gillette, Jr., “The Emergence of the Modem 
Metropolis: Philadelphia in the Age of Its Consolidation,” in William W. Cutler, III and Howard Gillette, Jr., 
eds., The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia. 1800-1975 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1980), 5-6, 21.
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century equivalent of a board of directors. The board included, among others, 
such financial and political notables as company president Cadwalader Evans, 
Jr., who together with his father, Cadwalader, Sr., oversaw one of the city’s 
grandest mercantile empires; treasurer Clement C. Biddle, of the banking 
Biddles; merchants Manuel Eyre and Caspar W. Morris, and brewer Joseph 
Watson, the latter three all once or future members o f Philadelphia’s city 
councils. White, despite his efforts and enthusiasm, did not have the political or 
financial heft to gain election. Nonetheless, having put in a good part of his small 
fortune, he worked nearly full-time on the navigation, and the company benefited 
greatly from his energy and his experience in already having dammed the lower 
Schuylkill.
In the spring of 1817, White proposed constructing a temporary channel 
to allow transport along the lower Schuylkill, from below Reading to Fairmount, 
just above Philadelphia. He remained committed to getting anthracite to market 
and to his factory and submitted a plan to the board that included charging the 
nominal amount of five cents a bushel. White reasoned that this small fee, being 
a large discount from turnpike tolls, would encourage traffic and would keep 
business on the Schuylkill rather than shunting it to the Lehigh River. However, 
boardmembers pointed out that, by law, they could charge up to twelve dollars a 
bushel, which was exactly what they intended to do; they were even willing to 
wait another year or two for the permanent navigation to be in place. White later 
lamented that the Board “spurned my offer of 5 c a bushel & laughed at our 
pretended Rivalship from the Lehigh, & thus ended our last intercourse with them
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on the subject o f using their navigation.”84 Clearly, the Board, representing large 
investors, and White, representing those who would use the navigation, had 
diverged: the controllers of the project saw the navigation in terms of long-term 
profit rather than its immediate physical utility.
Seven years after the Board laughed White out of the ir meeting, they sent 
an even more unmistakable message that they knew how to manipulate the 
navigation’s nexus characteristics to their advantage. Because both the 
navigation and the Fairmount works required the Schuylkill’s waters for their 
operations, the Watering Committee and the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
clashed frequently over who owned the rights to the Schuylkill’s water, water 
power, and banks. In 1824, as part o f a series of complicated agreements 
between the city and the company, the Watering Committee was supervising the 
construction of a dam and a canal, both of which would be owned by the 
company. The company and the W atering Committee bickered constantly over 
the materials, design, route, and specifications; in short, just about everything 
they could find to disagree about. The largest controversy concerned the 
building of an expensive retaining wall, for which the city would foot the bill. 
Company officials sent a letter to Joseph S. Lewis, erstwhile president of the 
Watering Committee, that concluded by reminding him that if the dam and canal 
were not well-made, “the Board of Managers do not think it necessary to add any 
thing more to enduce the Watering Committee whose constituents are so deeply
84Josiah White. Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company, 1909), 18. White accepted the Board’s dare, going on to found the Lehigh Coal & Navigation 
Company, whose business eventually eclipsed the Schuylkill Navigation Company's in nearly every 
measure of corporate success, including revenues, profits, and longevity.
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interested in the navigation o f the Schuylkill to order the walls to be immediately 
made.”85 In other words, if the city corporation continued to drag its feet, the 
company could would bring its case to the council members’ “deeply interested” 
constituents— the Philadelphia voters— in the next election. The wall was soon 
finished according to Schuylkill Navigation Company specifications. The Board 
of Managers had used their nexus leverage well.
If, in both of these cases, one can determine when a technology’s 
controllers began to use it to extend their economic and political clout, how can 
that knowledge suggest a general pattern for identifying the initiation of political 
exploitation of nexus technologies? There are three conditions to be met. One 
indication of the turning point is the moment of prospective profitability: in other 
words, when investors who have enough leverage (administrative o r level of 
ownership) to exert significant control over the project begin to see it as a way to 
extract profits. From then on, they invest not for the project's physical utility, for 
example, to supply fresh water or to lower transportation costs, but to make 
money, regardless of what physical tasks the project performs. However, 
profitability, or the probability of it, does not alone distinguish nexus technologies; 
after all, one would invest in either a canal or a widget-making machine given the 
expectation of good returns.
The second necessary condition for identifying the intentional 
manipulation of nexus technology is a pattern of behavior on the part of a 
project’s controllers that suggests the ir use of the project in such a way that
85Letter from Schuylkill Navigation Company to Joseph S. Lewis, June 6,1820. Letter Books, Box 1, June 
5, 1816-November25, 1824. Manuscript Group 11, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania Sate
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acknowledges the technology's conferring of special leverage. Such behavior 
can include subtle form s of blackmail, such as threatened withdrawal of services 
or raising of rates should opponents not give in to political demands— weapons 
at the disposal of both the waterworks and canal companies— or the enlistment 
of those dependent upon the nexus technology for political support of special 
privileges, such as the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s monopoly of Schuylkill 
water. The latter gave the company all rights to waterpower generated along the 
Schuylkill, rights that formerly had belonged to those who owned property along 
the river. By moving in when profits were likely and using the projects to pursue 
privileges in politics or the marketplace, the men who controlled such projects as 
the Philadelphia waterworks and the Schuylkill Navigation demonstrated quite 
clearly their perception of the power they could grab through the use of 
technology.
The final condition necessary for indicating exploitation of nexus 
technology is the employment of the state to enforce the social interests—  
defined broadly— of those who control the technology. Obvious cases include 
laws to criminalize unauthorized use. For example, in May 1801 the Watering 
Committee put a measure through the City Councils imposing a one dollar fine 
on “idle and disorderly persons... in practice of collecting about the hydrants... 
and wasting water.”86 When the waterworks had first been approved, one 
justification Latrobe offered for the works was to “cool the city” ; however, a bunch
Archives.
86The Ordinances of the City of Philadelphia to Which Are Prefixed, the Act of Incorporation and the 
Several Supplements Thereto: Together with the Address of George Washington. Late President of the 
United States, to His Fellow Citizens (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798).
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of ne’er-do-wells hanging about open hydrants on summer nights, while not 
wasting water from their own point of view, appeared a public nuisance to the 
good and proper members of the city council.87 Laws that allowed Schuylkill 
Navigation Company officials to call local sheriffs to arrest those who interfered 
with the navigation worked much the same way: in 1826, the Pennsylvania 
legislature passed a law that imposed fines and even jail sentences fo r bringing 
animals not used for towing on company towpaths, for going too slow or too fast, 
or for blocking or damaging the navigation, among other petty offenses.88 That 
measure even gave the navigation company the authority to enforce speed limits 
at its own discretion: boatmen could be fined $20 for going over four miles per 
hour, but the company could give written or printed permission to exceed that 
rate. The sort of protests that often had been tolerated almost as a matter of 
course in a patron-dominated society, a “clients will be clients” attitude of patron 
forbearance, now could be quashed or at least more easily discouraged through 
fines and arrests. Furthermore, the navigation company and Watering 
Committee had the advantage in legal disputes over damages, precedents that 
all sorts of corporations would later use to entrench their power. The monopoly 
over water rights, either in Philadelphia by the Watering Committee or along the 
Schuylkill by the navigation company, interposed the state between economic 
actors, namely, the Watering Committee and the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
on one side, their customers and other citizens on the other. In all o f these 
examples, the ability of those who controlled nexus technologies to impose their
87Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
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social and economic interests through the use of the state against all comers—  
patrons or clients— testified to the ways that use of such projects subtly changed 
the construction o f power in early nineteenth-century America.
The phenomenon of nexus technology seems to form a tantalizing 
paradox, both for the history of technology and fo r the study of the early republic. 
Those who have looked at the development o f large infrastructure projects from 
the standpoint of technological determinism either praised such advances as 
heralding a new order of democracy based on increased access to markets, 
energy, information, or natural resources, o r castigated them just as strongly as 
modes of increased authoritarianism.89 Similarly, early republic historiography 
has focused on the creation of a market economy— made possible by 
transportation improvements— that both stimulated greater mass participation in 
politics and precipitated greater consolidation of political and economic power.90 
While these two historiographic traditions show remarkable parallels in 
addressing the concomitant diffusion and consolidation of power, they often 
interpret such developments as being contradictory. What the examination of
88Acts— Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 28.
89For a typical contemporary account lauding the democratic potential of infrastructure technologies, see 
William J. Duane's Letters. Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal Improvement, 
of the Commonwealth: Bv Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811), or, for a 
twentieth-century equivalent, David Lillienthal, T.V.A.: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1944). Daniel J. Boorstin, The Republic of Technology (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1978) 
provides a more historical view. The seminal works warning against the centralizing effects of such 
technologies are Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934) and Jacques 
Eliul, The Technological System. Joachim Neugroshel, trans. (New York: Continuum, 1980).
90For a nearly encyclopedic treatment of rising democracy and power during this period, see Charles 
Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York, Oxford University Press,
1991); Sellers sees the rise of the market as antithetical to broad-based democratic political participation 
and power. Also see Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). For the role of transportation improvements, see George 
Rogers Taylor’s classic The Transportation Revolution (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1951), which is the most 
forceful argument for transportation infrastructure growth as central to American economic and territorial 
growth; for canals in particular see Goodrich, Canals and American Economic Development and Ronald E.
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nexus technologies reveals is that these apparent paradoxes are in fact the 
complementary developments that such projects entailed. Nexus technologies 
acted as media fo r a few to concentrate political and economic power in 
exchange for the many’s ability use them to pursue their own agenda. The more 
central the nexus technology is to the economy, and the more benefits that are 
distributed, the greater the extent of consolidation.
Economic exchanges, whether by barter, cash, or credit, inherently 
include an exchange o f power. It may be power over the actions of others, such 
as wages or a bribe; it may be power in terms of social prestige, such as a title or 
a fashionable piece of clothing; it may be power over one’s physical 
environment, such as food or shelter. In barter transactions, both parties give 
and receive a good or service; thus their exchange is limited to themselves.91 In 
transactions marked by currency, a party that receives cash or credit now has 
the ability to make transactions with other members of society.92 The facility of 
exchange that cash and credit offer means more than greater efficiency. 
Economic transactions also represent the trading of one kind of power for 
another, and, with the spread of money and credit, how quickly that power can 
be diffused or concentrated. Buying or selling something fo r the prevailing 
market price seems a fair trade, but it can involve a greatly unbalanced 
exchange of power. W ages for unskilled labor is a typical case: while the going
Shaw, Canals fora Nation: The Canal Era in the United States. 1790-1860 (Lexington: United Press of 
Kentucky, 1990). For Philadelphia’s growth, see Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development.
91These transactions, too, have great propensity toward inequality; for example, slavery was essentially a 
trade of labor and sexual submission for food and clothing. The balance of power depends upon who 
defines the rate of exchange. In this case, of course, the slaveholders did.
92Chapter 4, on financial institutions, elaborates on the distinctions between cash and credit as they 
become relevant to this discussion.
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rate of pay may be extremely low, the employer can exact great physical 
sacrifice from workers. Economic transactions may not always be equal, and 
they certainly are rarely what one might call fair, but they are voluntary and 
conscious.
From the turn of the nineteenth century on, nexus technologies like canals 
and water distribution systems constantly facilitated exchanges, turning the 
balance toward their controllers. Those dictating the terms of the transactions 
controlled the balance of power exchange in the economy. For example, the 
Watering Committee acted as a filter between citizens, suburbs, and the city 
government. By deciding what money would be spent on the waterworks and 
what individuals should pay for water, it entrenched itself in Philadelphia’s 
political landscape. Likewise, those who can position themselves as a medium 
of transactions gain power from all transactions. Because anyone wanting to 
participate in the market between Philadelphia and the Schuylkill valley sections 
of its hinterland needed to transport their goods down the navigation, the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers gained money and political 
clout for every sale up or down the river. Previously, patrons had dictated those 
exchanges for the ir clients; now, municipal bodies or private companies used 
technologies such as the waterworks or canals to affect the terms of economic 
interactions.
Those who controlled nexus technologies gained influence, but, as the 
term exchange implies, the technologies’ users gained something as well. Just 
as the waterworks brought water to a central reservoir before pumping it to every
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corner of the city, nexus technology tended to centralize o n e  kind of power while 
diffusing another. For many in the City of Brotherly Love, t i ie  resources 
expended on the waterworks seemed well spent, for the w aterw orks were a great 
source of municipal pride. Philadelphians boasted of the ir waterworks, first the 
pumphouse in Centre Square and eventually the fabulous Fa irm ount Works. 
Latrobe designed the first to be a temple of technology, its elegant classical lines 
hiding the steam engine inside. Residents called the s truc tu re  the “pepperbox,” 
because of its distinctive shape, a dome atop a box. They reveled when people 
from the country visiting the big city “gaped with aston ishm ent [at a hydrant], as 
at the tenth wonder of the world.”93 If Philadelphia could ano longer be the 
political or the financial capital, it could lead the nation in m anufacturing and 
technology. Within a few years, exclaimed one city-dwellenr, “Philadelphians 
were more proud of the water works than of Independence Hall. They said one 
might as well visit London without viewing Westminster A b b e y  as come to 
Philadelphia and not see the water works.”94 Residents fa c e d  the nineteenth 
century with the waterworks as a sign that Philadelphia w o u ld  continue its role as 
one of the great cities of the America. The Centre Square sand especially the 
Fairmount works and its surrounding gardens appeared in dozens of engravings 
and lithographs at home and abroad. The waterworks g a v e  residents the
93“Poulson’s Daily Advertiser,” January 29, 1801, as quoted in Blake, Water fo r  the Cities, p. 18.
94James Hosmer Penniman, Philadelphia in the Early Eighteen Hundreds. (Philadelphia: St. Stephen’s 
Church, 1923): 43.
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psychic benefits o f living in the self-proclaimed "Metropolis o f America" in 
exchange fo r the considerable resources spent on the works.95
More practically, those who could afford to receive the fresh, cool 
Schuylkill water pumped into the ir homes gained convenience, prestige, and 
privacy in exchange for their w ater rent; those who could not now got their daily 
water from public hydrants on nearly every block. By the late 1820s, suburbs 
Spring Garden, the Northern Liberties, and Southwark bought their water from 
the Corporation of the City, fa lling into the orbit of the city that would incorporate 
them in 1854. Owners and workers at soap factories, breweries, stables, and 
various other ventures used the  water for their work. The ability of certain 
suburbs or people to get their own water signaled their growing ability to distance 
themselves from  those below them, a critical juncture in form ing class identity in 
nineteenth-century America. W hile the Watering Committee centralized its 
control of city finance and politics, nearly all of Philadelphia’s residents gained 
something by the waterworks.
The Schuylkill Navigation also facilitated many levels of exchange. The 
waterway made the transport o f anthracite coal to market in large quantities from 
the mines of northeastern Pennsylvania economically feasible. For 
Philadelphians, the coal brought a better source of heat fo r metalworking, for 
steam engines, and for heating homes. The flood of anthracite catalyzed 
Philadelphia’s development into a national center for the manufacture of steam
95This is roughly the same phenomena as the current trend of municipally funded stadia for professional 
sports teams: residents have the pride of living in a city with a professional team that has national exposure, 
in exchange for millions of tax dollars, essentially subsidizing the franchise, while at the same time 
contributing to the concentration of capital in both the city and the team ownership.
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engines and heavy machinery.96 Just as important, transportation improvements 
such as the Schuylkill Navigation significantly reduced the cost of intra-regional 
transport, thus allowing the localized specialization that boosted efficiency and 
provided an engine fo r the area’s economic expansion in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.97
The Schuylkill Navigation brought ways to distribute a greater quantity of 
goods into the hinterland, spurring commerce and market production all along 
the Schuylkill. Here again, the company’s control o f the economy was 
complemented by increased general prosperity. Towns such as Reading, 
Schuylkill Haven, Mt. Carbon, and Pottsville experienced great growth. Such 
gains could be wonderful, such as the joy of eating fresh sea bass 100 miles 
inland, “which had such an effect upon the visages of our mountaineers that it 
would have been a fit subject for the pencil of a Hogarth to imitate,” or troubling, 
as many people found the “progress” that came with the navigation ambivalent at 
best. The work of Paul E. Johnson, Mary Ryan, and Carol Sheriff on the Erie 
Canal and the people who lived by it during this period testify to the unsettling 
nature of the emerging market.98 However, all of them demonstrated the 
countless ways that area residents took advantage of the access to markets to
96Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the United 
States,” Business History Review 46 (Summer 1972): 141-181.
97This is one of the central points of Lindstrom, Economic Development. For a summary of this argument, 
see Diane Lindstrom, “American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions,” 
Journal of Economic History 39 (March 1979), 289-301.
98Pottsville Miner’s Journal. October 3,1829, as quoted in J. Bennett Nolan, The Schuylkill (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 29. For the ambiguous meanings and social upheaval 
associated with “progress,” see Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeepers’ Millennium: Society and Revivals in 
Rochester. New York. 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); Mary P. Ryan, Cradle of the Middle 
Class: The Family in Oneida County. New York. 1790-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); 
Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress. 1817-1862 (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1996).
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carve their niche in society. As each of these authors in some way showed, the 
ability to participate successfully in the market gave many the opportunity to 
distance themselves from other social groups. Economic historian Joel Mokyr 
has argued that, while technology’s various uses have been the source of much 
anguish and destruction, in total its use has resulted in a higher standard of living 
for almost everyone, a rising tide that has lifted all bo a ts ." In early nineteenth- 
century America, use o f nexus technologies allowed workers in the market 
economy to become less beholden politically to local patrons, by taking 
advantage of the quick transportation along the river to turn the ir own labor into a 
marketable commodity. In exchange, the Schuylkill Navigation Company not 
only collected tolls but also subtly exercised great influence over regional 
development.
In short, a great number of people exploited the waterworks and the canal 
to establish a distance from workers, while both groups used such technologies 
to help themselves break free of the political and social power of the rich local 
merchants. The bonus for the proprietors of such ventures, beyond their profits, 
was the ability to engage those who made the exchange in a growing cycle of 
even more subtle, and yet in other ways more profound, dependence. Owners 
used nexus technologies to project power across space on a scale far greater 
than their gentry predecessors. Some forms of power were diffused toward the 
many, while others were concentrated by the few.
" S e e  Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990).
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By the late 1820s, one would have great difficulties trying to hear the 
Schuylkill in Philadelphia, even standing on its banks. If fo r some reason the 
busy wharves and warehouses built in conjunction with the great traffic up and 
down the navigation were quiet and no children or grownups were playing or 
shouting along the park by the waterworks, one still could not listen to its roar: 
the falls had been rendered forever silent. Beginning with Josiah W hite’s dam in 
1811, and continuing with Schuylkill Navigation’s constant improvements and the 
Watering Com mittee’s Fairmount dam, the lower Schuylkill had been 
transformed into a series of slow-moving pools, and the falls were no more. Only 
a few rocks showed above the water to mark their demise. Philadelphians had 
subdued the rage o f the river; now it only boiled when heated fo r tea by coal that 
had been shipped down it. The men who had harnessed the river, however, had 
used the technologies involved for less trivial matters: to remake power in the 
early republic. During the same period, other Philadelphians were using their 
indirect dividends o f the waterworks and the Schuylkill navigation to distinguish 
themselves from each other and to create lifestyles and rituals that projected 
their own identities and interests.100 Nexus technologies acted as one of the 
lenses of that transformation, spreading power in one direction while focusing it 
in the other. But fo r people to control technologies, they had to find ways to pay 
for them. The use and role of money will be the subject of the next chapter.
100Perhaps it is no coincidence that two of the best studies of middle class formation during this period, 
Paul E. Johnson’s A Shopkeeper's Millennium and Mary Ryan’s Cradle of the Middle Class both examine 
communities along the greatest of nexus technologies, the Erie Canal.
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In 1790, Philadelphia had inadequate transportation to its growing 
hinterland, no centralized water supply system, and no institutional methods for 
financing the necessary improvements. Over the next four decades, the general 
public paid little in cash up front for expensive technologies that fostered 
Philadelphia’s growth and reaped the rewards in terms of greater economic 
opportunities, but later paid dearly in tolls and water rents and even more in 
terms of lost control over some of the m ost important institutions governing the 
city’s economic future. Corporations at first struggled to make ends meet. 
America’s first major turnpike corporation, the Philadelphia and Lancaster 
Turnpike Company, begun in 1792, would have a mediocre financial record, but 
one much better than the failed Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company and 
Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Navigation Company projects of the 1790s. 
The city corporation struggled mightily to pay fo r its first waterworks at the turn of 
the century, shouldering big debts in the process. But by the late 1820s, the 
Fairmount waterworks profitably supplied fresh water to both city and suburban 
residents, while various artificial waterways— the Schuylkill navigation, the Lehigh 
navigation, and the Union Canal— provided efficient transportation for coal, 
produce, and manufactured goods for the entire Philadelphia region, as well as 
returns for their stockholders. Meanwhile, through the clever use of a sinking 
fund, the City Councils found a way to elim inate risk for investors while insulating 
council financial decisions from the political process. As vital as such 
technologies were to Philadelphia residents, financial control over the institutions 
that administered these technologies came to rest in a few hands, only nominally
122
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subject to the electorate in the case of the waterworks and not at all for inland 
navigations
In the 1790s, the first efforts at public improvements in the Philadelphia 
region—turnpike, bridge, and canal companies— raised money the same way as 
their British predecessors had. A group of local prominent men announced a 
public meeting, often at a tavern or county courthouse, to discuss a proposed 
improvement. The attendees then nominated a committee to look into possible 
routes and estimate general costs; expenses at this point usually were paid 
through a small collection from meeting attendees, generally a few dollars each. 
When the committee made its favorable report at a subsequent meeting, 
attendees nominated a prospective board of managers responsible for 
petitioning the state legislature for incorporation and for administering the new 
company. They also appointed commissioners responsible for canvassing the 
area for investment subscriptions.1 Once the legislature passed the charter—a 
fairly routine proposition for turnpikes and river navigations, but often a more 
difficult one for canals because of haggling over routes—the board of managers 
and the commissioners set to work.
Subscription was the most typical form of soliciting investment in the early 
republic: individuals gave a low deposit— usually five or ten dollars—signed an 
agreement with the company to pay additional installments. Some companies 
set a particular schedule for subsequent payments, many called for payments 
whenever the company needed additional funds, while still others practiced a
’This way of associating and raising funds was fairly typical in the Anglo-Atlantic world, being nearly 
identical to British canal company organization methods as well as the methods of prominent American
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combination of the two. Raising money through subscriptions proved popular 
because it did not require investors to put up much money initially in projects that 
were not likely to deliver a return in the near future (or, as was the norm with 
internal improvements, ever); nor did it require sending in a large sum at any one 
time. Furthermore, despite a legal obligation to pay the company in full, 
subscribers always had the option o f not fulfilling their contract. Subscriptions 
potentially appealed both to the money-sawy and to a broader swath of the 
population.
Unfortunately for early canal companies, the subscription system often 
failed to raise the requisite capital. Investors let their subscriptions lapse for a 
variety of reasons that could range from personal, family, or business financial 
straits to a growing, well-warranted lack of confidence in the completion of the 
projects. Corporate charters did hold subscribers legally responsible for 
subsequent calls fo r capital, but company officials eventually had trouble 
collecting from even the most patient investors. Although companies did have 
the right to sue the ir subscribers fo r nonpayment, the cost and trouble of doing 
so did not justify the effort, and such action might alienate potential new 
investors.2
The need fo r subscriptions and for lotteries— yet another widespread and 
typically unreliable method for raising canal and turnpike company funds—
manufacturing societies. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A 
Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), 13-14.
^Company officials repeatedly tried to coax lapsed investors to complete their subscriptions offering the 
carrot of full shares rather than the stick of legal action; see for example Delaware and Schuylkill Navigation 
broadside, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal and Navigation Companies, 
Delaware and Schuylkill Navigation, File 14, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania Department of State, 
Pennsylvania State Archives. Also, while the company was owed tens of thousands of dollars collectively,
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persisted because even the most successful o f these initial ventures were poor 
direct investments.3 The most famous of the 1790s turnpikes, and the one that 
set off a turnpike-building craze throughout the nation in its first decade of 
operation, was the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike. With an initial cost of 
$465,000 and with yearly maintenance and wages costing around $8,000, the 
company issued annual dividends around 2% for its first three decades except 
fo r the war years 1813-1815, when company dividends crept up to 4.5%.4 Given 
that the contemporary standard for investment remained six percent throughout 
the early republican period, returns that averaged a third of that widely accepted 
figure did not provide the main impetus for the stampede to build turnpike roads 
that occurred in the years following the completion of the Philadelphia and 
Lancaster Turnpike. Had investors bought federal treasury bonds during the 
same period— considered a comparatively safe investment—they would have 
brought home close to six percent in profits year after year. Because the 
dividends on even the most traveled of turnpikes were so low, any turnpike 
investment, considered purely on its own, was effectively a losing proposition.5
the court costs, lawyer’s fees, and general inconvenience of collecting money from any one investor did not 
justify the effort to take all of them to court individually.
For example, the Middlesex Canal, the most famous and successful of the New England internal 
navigation projects, was incorporated by Massachusetts in 1793. By 1819, each share had been assessed 
for S740, and by the time it closed in 1853, only repaid a total of S559.50 including all dividends and 
liquidation disbursements. ‘The canal company was a financial failure from the end of the first year of 
business to the day, fifty years later, when the last boat traversed its nearly abandoned works.” Christopher 
Roberts, The Middlesex Canal. 1793-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 186.
“Donald C. Jackson, “Roads Most Traveled: Turnpikes in Southeastern Pennsylvania in the Early Republic,” 
in Judith McGaw, ed., Early American Technology: Making and Doing Things from the Colonial Era to 1850 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 231. Jackson argues that these dividends 
demonstrated the great profitability of the Lancaster turnpike; however, he does so in a vacuum, not 
considering that the original stockholders did not receive their dividend for several years after their first 
investment, and when they did, those dividends were well below the standard accepted contemporary 
benchmark of six percent a year.
5ln 1825, one investor complained about the high costs of maintenance and calculated that since 1796, the 
shares had yielded an annual return of 3.69% a share, hardly the best of investments. Anonymous to 
Mathew Carey, March 25, 1825, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous 
Correspondence on Internal Improvement, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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However, the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike showed Americans that a 
paved toll road could cover its costs on a regular basis while significantly 
lowering the cost of overland transport, and that became enough to trigger a 
nationwide turnpike mania. Turnpike boosters rarely harbored sober, realistic 
expectations to get rich from  the roadway. Rather, they hoped that lower 
transportation costs would result in better business opportunities and increased 
property values in the communities through which the turnpike traveled. 
Investment in turnpikes remained predominantly local, because it only made 
sense in conjunction with other local investments.
Whether early canal boosters expected to make money on their favored 
projects is hard to divine, but the financial struggles of the Delaware and 
Schuylkill Canal Company and the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation 
Company suggest that the few optimistic investors who might have hoped for 
direct profits were quickly disillusioned. Chartered in early April, 1792, the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company had sold its full allotment of 2,000 
shares by the end of May, a sign that the project held great promise. The stocks 
were widely distributed: 1,124 different individuals had bought in, none holding 
more than three shares.6 First on the list were Robert Morris and John 
Nicholson, each signing fo r only one share, hardly the sort o f commitment the 
two opportunistic financial operators and land speculators would have made had 
they thought the project likely to provide ample returns.7 Some people doubtless
^/Villiam Smith to Governor, May 26, 1792, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, 
Canal & Navigation Companies, Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, No. 14, Pennsylvania 
Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
7According to its charter, individuals were allowed to buy one share on the first day of the offering, another 
two shares on the second day, up to three shares on the third day, and as many as available thereafter; “An 
Act to Enable the Governor of the this Commonwealth to incorporate a Company, for opening a Canal and
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were overly optim istic about early projects: the Susquehanna and Schuylkill 
company shares were so popular that the company was oversubscribed, and the 
board had to assign shares by lottery. Susquehanna and Schuylkill shares were 
widely distributed too, with the vast majority of investors holding only one or two 
shares.8 Even if no one invested large sums, a t least the projects elicited 
investor enthusiasm.
However, difficulties in retaining an engineer, choosing routes, buying out 
or compensating property owners, and lining up contractors for construction 
plagued both companies. When the Due de la Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt 
passed through Pennsylvania in April 1795 he counted only 50 men working on 
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal. Observing the canal's route through hard-to- 
cut marble and porous sand, he saw “little chance of success.”9 Since the 
Company's charter three years before, it had managed to cut only three miles 
from the Norristown end and an equal distance from the southern terminus. At 
the same time, a decreasing number of the subscribers were willing to pay the 
installments on the ir subscriptions. The companies’ directors found themselves 
caught in a vicious cycle: they had trouble covering construction costs because
Water Communication between the Rivers Delaware and Schuylkill, and for other purposes therein 
mentioned,” April 10, 1792. Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Union Canal Company 
of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Lydia r. Bailey, 1825), 13. Even given the possibility that the project sold 
out in two days—thus explaining the maximum holding of three shares—the reluctance of men such as 
Morris and Nicholson to buy the maximum allowed suggests that they did not think that the project would be 
profitable. Considering their experience with the founding of Bank of North America, shares of which 
skyrocketed in price immediately after its initial stock sale, Morris and Nicholson most likely believed that 
the canal would not be a financial success.
8Report of the Commissioners Appointed to receive subscriptions to the Capital Stock for opening a Canal 
between the waters of the Quittapahila and Tulpehocken in the Counties of Berks and Dauphine, Secretary 
of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill & 
Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder Pennsylvania Department of State,
Record Group #26. Pennsylvania State Archives. The Quittaphila and Tulpehocken are tributaries of the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill, respectively.
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subscribers did not pay installments, and subscribers did not want to make 
payments on projects that did not make adequate progress.10 The companies’ 
Boards o f Managers repeatedly warned that “suits will be commenced... [against] 
every person in solvent circumstances... indebted to this Corporation,” but never 
they made good on the threats when subscribers were concerned.11 By 1810, 
over two thirds of the subscriptions of the Delaware and Schuylkill and the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill companies had reverted back to the company 
because of non-payment.12 Few investors were faithful or optimistic enough to 
continue throwing away good money after bad.
Desperate to rescue the ir failing projects and unable to procure money 
from subscribers, the companies turned to the Pennsylvania General Assembly 
for help, asking the state government for a privilege typically granted to cash- 
strapped organizations: the authorization to conduct lotteries.13 On May 14,
1795, the canal companies successfully lobbied the General Assembly for a 
lottery to raise $400,000. The legislature also granted them exclusive lottery
9Fran<pois Alexandre Frederic, Due de La Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt. Travels Through the United States of 
North America. The Country of the Iroauois. and Upper Canada, in the Years 1795. 1796. and 1797: With 
an Authentic Account of Lower Canada (London: R. Phillips, 1799).
luNew York State’s Western Inland Lock Company, a predecessor to the Erie Canal, suffered a similar fate 
in its struggles with subscription default; see Nathan Miller, “Private Enterprise in Inland Navigation: The 
Mohawk Route Prior to the Erie Canal,” New York History 31, 398-413
"December 12, 1798, Series II, Subseries 2, Delaware & Schuylkill Navigation Company, Board of 
Managers Minutes, Reading Company Collection, Accession 1520, Hagley Museum and Library.
,2Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, and Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation [ledgers for 1810], 
Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Of the original 1,000 subscriptions to 
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company, 867 had been forfeited; the Delaware and Schuylkill 
Canal Navigation Company fared slightly better, with 464 out of the original 1,000 subscriptions totally paid 
in.
13See Irma A. Watts, “Pennsylvania Lotteries of Other Days,” Pennsylvania History 2 (Winter 1935), 40-53. 
The Massachusetts state legislature also authorized lotteries frequently; see Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug 
Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1947), 68-70. Maryland, too, authorized lotteries to aid internal improvements; 
see William J. Duane, Letters, Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal 
Improvement, of the Commonwealth: Bv Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811),
110; as did New Jersey, see Harry B. Weiss and Grace M. Weiss, The Early Lotteries of New Jersey 
(Trenton: Past Times Press, 1966).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
rights in Pennsylvania in the hopes that, without competition, the canal 
companies would be able to sell their tickets easily.14 The lottery offered 
substantial prizes in cash and in company stock, with the grand prize valued at 
$100,000.15 Unfortunately, the companies’ efforts to raise money through state- 
sponsored lotteries became as frustrating and as disappointing as their 
subscription travails. Competing with several out-of-state lotteries, the Company 
had trouble finding ticket buyers. Also, despite initial promises from the General 
Assembly of an exclusive franchise, legislators could not resist the pleas of 
countless other organizations such as bridge companies, religious 
congregations, and libraries to conduct their own lotteries. For legislators, 
authorizing lotteries was an easy political decision: they could show concern for 
their constituents by pressing for lotteries to build schools, churches, and 
hospitals while not having to raise taxes a dime.16 Such legislative generosity 
resulted in stiff local competition for the legal gambling dollar, especially for the 
canal companies. Their difficulties in selling tickets, however, did not exempt 
companies from having to award the promised prizes. They got embroiled in 
several lawsuits over disputed prize payments, proceedings that diverted the 
companies’ money and attention away from construction.17 Editor and 
pamphleteer William Duane later suggested that the companies netted only 
$50,000 in their lotteries, although George Paleske, a booster and insider
14Gertrude MacKinney, ed. Executive Minutes of the Governors, vol. 4. Pennsylvania Chronicles, no. 9 
(Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1931), 979-980.
“Plan for Lottery,” April 27, 1795, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal & 
Navigation Companies, Schuylkill & Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder 2, 
Department of State, Pennsylvania State Archives.
16“Memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by the 
President, Mannagers [sic] and Company of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation,” Society 
Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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perhaps more familiar with company finances, argued that “the lotteries 
heretofore granted to the canal companies, have actually involved them in 
debt.”18 Lotteries, then, did not provide a viable solution for the financial woes of 
inland navigation companies.
Canal company boardmembers may have made quiet inquiries to 
potentially sympathetic legislators, but neither company effected a wholehearted 
campaign to gain direct funding from the biggest potential source of funding, the 
state of Pennsylvania. They did, however, try to get the legislature to grant them 
a percentage of the duties placed on certain auctions in Philadelphia. The 
auctions in question were most likely the ones used to liquidate large lots of 
manufactured goods imported from Britain. In the decades following the 
American Revolution, British manufacturers often flooded United States ports 
with products for which they could not get a good price in Britain in an attempt to 
alleviate problems of overproduction and to secure the American market. The 
most active canal boosters chose to push duties on auctions as their source of 
state-sponsored funding out of shrewd political calculation. Although state 
revenues would be going to a project that primarily benefited the Philadelphia 
region, the tax would be levied only in Philadelphia. Philadelphia manufacturers 
and tradesmen would not object to the tax because it would effectively raise the 
final price to the consumer for their overseas competitors’ goods, and local
17Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, and Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation [ledgers for 1810], 
Box 4-b (mss., 1810), Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
18William J. Duane, Letters. Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal 
Improvement, of the Commonwealth; By Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811), 69; 
Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application fora Law to Incorporate ‘The Union Canal Company" 
Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: 
Duane, 1808), 6. Nonetheless, Paleske advocated a lottery for the Union Canal Company on the condition 
that the state grant the company exclusive lottery rights.
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Philadelphia m erchants already grumbled tha t low auction prices allowed British 
merchants to undersell them. The duties would provide a steady annual income 
that would not com e out of the General Assem bly’s main budget and therefore 
would not visibly threaten the pet projects of o ther regions and interests.19
Nonetheless, the legislature never did grant the duty on auctions to the 
canal companies. Central and western representatives were reluctant to support 
any initiative fo r eastern and especially Philadelphian interests, as they showed 
when they insisted upon moving the state capital from the Quaker City to 
Lancaster and eventually to Harrisburg. They may also have opposed the duty 
as they did federal tariffs on imported goods because of the consequent rise in 
prices and the danger of trade retaliation against American grain exports. The 
General Assembly rejected the companies’ request for tax-supported funding, 
and by 1796 work on  both the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal and the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal had come to a halt. The companies might 
have been able to  overcome either their technical obstacles or their financial 
difficulties, but the tw o sets of problems combined proved insuperable. 
Furthermore, in keeping with its policies regarding business corporations, the 
state did not step in to  rescue these struggling companies.20 Not until after the 
W ar of 1812 would an internal navigation com pany successfully raise enough 
money to complete construction; meanwhile, the City Corporation of Philadelphia 
had money problem s of its own.
19The end result would still be that the state would take in less revenue; however, this way the canals’ 
money would not be subjected to the annual budgeting and appropriations process, a notoriously unreliable 
source of funds in early republican Pennsylvania.
20 See Chapter 6 for an analysis of state-corporate relations.
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Despite overwhelming public support fo r a better supply of fresh water, 
the city government struggled mightily to finance the waterworks. Because of the 
yellow fever epidemics of 1793, 1797, and 1798, the City Councils certainly had 
a mandate to spend some public money to improve the city’s water supply; 
indeed, one Joint Council report argued that yellow fever “rendered a copious 
supply of more wholesome water, in the estimation of many, indispensable to the 
health and preservation of the city.”21 However, even then, council members, 
politicians that they were, wanted to avoid large tax-hikes. In 1799, the total city 
budget amounted to $72,397.18, of which $56,000 was to come from tax 
revenue and the remainder from fixed-income sources such as rental of 
corporate properties, licensing fees, and fines.22 Meanwhile, each of the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company’s proposals would cost the city up to 
several hundred thousand dollars.23 Even the Latrobe plan that the C ity Councils 
finally selected carried an original estimated price tag of $150,000, all hopefully 
to be spent on construction in the space o f one year.24 To raise that sort of 
money through local taxes would mean nearly quadrupling them, a politically 
unfeasible solution.
From their initial negotiations with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company through their construction of the works at Fairmount in 1819, the
21 Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 24th of 
November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
^An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the 
City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
2JThe City Corporation and the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company negotiated for much of 1798 and 
1799, to no avail. The canal company offered, at various junctures, to sell the entire stock to the city at first 
cost (meaning that the city would pay for the company’s mistakes) and for the city to pay annual rent or 
make a one-time payment for the water at fairly exorbitant rates. See January 31, 1799, Series II, Subseries 
2, Delaware & Schuylkill Navigation Company, Board of Managers Minutes, Accession 1520, Reading 
Company Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
24February 17,1799, Select Council Minutes, October 14, 1796-April 14, 1799, Philadelphia City Archives.
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Councils attempted to raise money in other ways besides taxing the electorate. 
The timeless, universally preferred form of budget management is to find a way 
to spend someone else’s money with no strings attached, and indeed, the 
Philadelphia Corporation certainly tried its best to do so. While the boards of 
business corporations worried constantly about the strings associated with state 
aid, the city government could reasonably expect that financial help from the 
statehouse wouid not come with conditions of unwonted state interference in city 
affairs. With hope in their hearts, in 1797 the City Councils appealed to the 
General Assembly for direct aid. Not surprisingly, no funds were forthcoming 
from a legislature that had recently relocated Pennsylvania’s seat of government 
away from Philadelphia because of sectional jealousy and general rural 
uneasiness with the big city. The General Assembly also rejected the city 
corporation’s pleas for another politically painless solution (from local politicians’ 
point of view, that is), the right to receive taxes on all auctions taking place in the 
city, the revenue from which currently went into state coffers.25 Given the canal 
companies’ fiascoes, the City Councils could easily rule out the possibility of 
state-sanctioned lotteries as an effective fund-raiser. The Corporation of 
Philadelphia was forced to look for new methods to gather enough capital to 
build its waterworks.
Just as business corporations took their institutional structure and fund­
raising schemes from British precedents, the Corporation of Philadelphia took 
advantage of British experience with water-supply companies. London-born
25The legislature had just spumed a request from the City Corporation to grant auction duties to contribute 
to the construction of a bridge across the Schuylkill, too. December 4,1797, Select Council Minutes, 
October 14, 1796- April 14, 1799, Philadelphia City Archives.
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Benjamin Henry Latrobe’s plan to  use steam engines to pump Schuylkill water to 
the city came as a  godsend to the  Philadelphia’s Councils for reasons beyond 
the frustration with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company. Use of the 
canal for water supply would have entailed a  system of open access: residents 
would have gotten their water either directly from  the canal or from smaller 
branches that ran down gutters through streets in the various neighborhoods.
The water would have been there for the taking, free for every resident.
Because Latrobe’s design called fo r a closed system, the city could charge for 
access to the water. Latrobe took his inspiration from London water-supply 
companies, which had been constructed with the intention both to supply water 
and to provide return on investment.26 From a  financial point of view, Latrobe’s 
underground distribution system held a great advantage over the canal system 
because the water would be distributed in p ipes that had to be tapped by city- 
authorized workmen for private connections to  residences or businesses. The 
city government could hope to gain substantial revenue by charging businesses 
and residents for “water rent.” Not only would such a system arguably be more 
fair than the canal in that those who used the water would pay for it, but also the 
city could charge extra to those businesses such as breweries, inns, tanneries, 
and soapboilers that were particularly water-intensive. The British engineer 
suggested the installation of public hydrants on the streets, offering the free 
public access to “the poorer inhabitants” that would make the plan easier to sell
26See Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia 
with Wholesome Water in a Letter to John Miller. Esauire from B. Henry Latrobe. Engineer. December 29. 
1798 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799); also see “Philadelphia Waterworks, Editorial Note” in 
John C. Van Home and Lee W. Formwalt, ed. Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of Beniamin 
Henry Latrobe. vol. 1. 1784-1804 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 109-110.
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politically across class lines.27 He also optim istically pointed out that if the 
owners of two-thirds of the approximately 6,000 houses in the city paid $10 each 
annually, the resulting $40,000 in revenue would pay the interest for a loan of up 
to $666,666.66, far more than the projected bill fo r building the system. Such
grand revenues would be sufficient to cover interest on the initial construction
28and an estimated annual $6,000 in costs for the steam engines. Latrobe’s 
proposal, then, carried the possibility of offsetting its considerable estimated 
annual costs for fuel and labor by having its own revenue stream from private 
domestic users and intensive industrial customers while affording everyone 
access to the public water.
Despite these rosy estimates for future solvency, the city corporation 
could not collect water rents until it had built the waterworks, requiring a 
considerable expenditure up front. Not wanting to risk further epidemics, the city 
councils decided to proceed alone rather than wait fo r money from the 
statehouse. Instead of raising taxes, the City Councils first resorted to the fund­
raising method that had met with such success for the federal government: the 
issuance of interest-bearing bonds. The Councils used Latrobe’s estimate of 
$150,000 for the completion of the waterworks, proposing to sell up to 1,500 
bonds, each for $100. They would be sold as subscriptions: the buyer was to 
pay $10 at the time of subscription, and $30 in each o f three subsequent 
payments scheduled over the subsequent six months. Once paid up, 
subscribers received six percent annual interest in semiannual payments, in 
other words, two payments a year of three dollars each. In addition, the
27Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
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subscriber’s house would be hooked up to the city water for three years free of 
the usual five-dollar annual charge, increasing the bond’s annual yield for the 
first three years to a substantial eleven percent.29 That impressive interest rate, 
the council members hoped, would be more than enough to attract significant 
investment.
They were wrong. The city’s unsuccessful attempts to fill all, or even 
most, of the 1,500 subscriptions demonstrated the novelty and fragility of 
complex municipal finance in the early republic. The City Councils employed the 
same methods as did the canal companies: they appointed a group of respected 
and responsible men to serve as commissioners who would supervise the 
subscription books and solicit investment among their neighbors and business 
associates. These men were chosen because they were influential in the 
merchant community and familiar with— and trusted by—the people most likely to 
have funds to invest. However, they only managed to sell around $73,000 of 
the $150,000 dollar issue.30 They partly blamed the weather: the weeks 
following the passage of the ordinance had been cold and snowy, preventing the 
commissioners from making the rounds in their neighborhoods as thoroughly as 
they had hoped. Still, between appeals to the financial community— bankers and 
insurance company insiders— and door-to-door canvasses, the city’s seemingly 
attractive offer fell short. The city’s biggest obstacle was its inefficiency in tax 
collection. Federal bonds sold well because investors had confidence in the
28Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
“29An Ordinance Providing for the Raising of a Sum of Money, on Loan, for Supplying the City of 
Philadelphia with Wholesome Water,” February 7, 1799, An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making 
Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: 
Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 3.
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national government’s ability to collect taxes and so fe lt assured that the 
government would have the necessary cash flow to pay interest on the bonds. 
However, the yellow fever epidemics had coincided with local summertime tax 
collection efforts, and the city corporation had encountered great difficulties 
collecting its entire assessments during the 1790s.31 After 1805, with an 
overhaul of the tax-collection system and an alleviation of the summertime 
scourges, the city’s revenue became more solid, but in 1801 such prospects 
provided no consolation.
For the city to sell these long-term bonds— the first issue actually had no 
stated maturation date at all— the Councils had to come up with a way of paying 
down the debt or at least of paying the interest into the indefinite future. In 1807, 
after struggling to fill out their third bond issue, they turned to a financial device 
that was first suggested nearly a decade before, had been all the rage in British 
financial circles from the 1760s on, and became popular in the United States in 
the 1790s: the sinking fund.32 The city corporation would contribute a given 
amount every year into an account set aside specifically to pay off the debt; this 
sum would be an appropriation in the annual budget just like those for salaries,
30August 1, 1799, Common Council Minutes, vol. 2. February 18, 1799-January 13, 1803. (mss.), 
Philadelphia City Archives.
31 In the ordinance authorizing the bonds, the Councils admitted that “though there is reason to hope a 
liberal aid will be granted by the legislature, towards enabling the city to complete this important work... the 
speedy accomplishment thereof appears to require the immediate exertions and resources of the citizens of 
Philadelphia." Clearly, given that they had unsuccessfully appealed for state money before with the 
lobbying assistance of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, the chance that they would get any 
money over the Company’s objections was slim indeed. However, the Councils hoped that invoking the 
General Legislature would give potential investors confidence that the state might back the city’s ability to 
make good on its loans. An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services 
and Exigencies of the City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799),
3.
32The use of a “sinking fund” is now generally referred to as “funded debt.” The city had first considered 
starting one to pay for shares in the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company in exchange for watering the 
city; see Report of the Joint Committee of the Select and Common Councils, on the Subject of Bringing 
Water to the City (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798). Also see Donald F. Swanson and Andrew
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paving the streets, and fuel for public buildings. The money in the fund could 
then be used in several non-exclusive ways, including paying off current interest, 
gaining returns through investment in state or federal bonds, or buying back city 
bonds until the corporation owned them all, at which point the debt could be
33retired. The City Councils quickly found that the very existence of a sinking 
fund gave potential bondholders much greater confidence in the corporation’s 
ability to redeem bond issues. Prudent administration of the sinking fund could 
also give the city the financial security to attract investment in city bonds and to 
pay off city debts.
The City Councils established the corporation’s sinking fund in 1807.
From then on, the corporation had little trouble selling the bonds, sometimes 
even above par value in the early 1820s.34 Declaring their intent that “the 
reduction and payment of the debt due from the city of Philadelphia should be 
effected as speedily as circumstances will perm it,” the Councils passed an 
ordinance allocating $5,000 a year from the income of the corporate estates—  
city-owned buildings, wharves, market-space, and real estate leased on an 
annual basis—to be put in a ‘“sinking fund,’ to be applied to the purchase and 
redemption of the several species of stock, constituting the funded debt of the
P. Trout, “Alexander Hamilton’s Hidden Sinking Fund,” William & Mary Quarterly 3d.Ser., 49 (Jan. 1992),
108-116 for the popularity in sinking funds in Britain and America.
“^ An Ordinance for the Reduction and Payment of the Funded Debt of the City,” March 26, 1807, John C. 
Lowber, ed., Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original 
Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia: Moses 
Thomas, 1812), 212-214.
^From 1821 to early 1822, demand for bonds was so high that the city even managed to refinance much of 
its outstanding debt at 6% rather than 5%. See Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. 
Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City 
Councils, 1822), 168-169: Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the 
Twenty-Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City 
Councils, 1823), 209-210, 221.
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city.”35 A t first the money in the sinking fund could only be invested in federal 
bonds, although the Councils later relaxed that requirement to allow the fund 
managers to buy stock in local internal improvements, thereby investing in the 
community at the same time as paying down the debt. Councils increased the 
annual appropriation from the corporate estates to the sinking fund to $7,000 in 
1811 and then to $8,000 in 1816.36 Once the annual operations of the 
waterworks exceeded routine costs, the Councils began to set $4,000 aside 
every year from the water rents, increasing that am ount to $10,000 and 
eventually to $14,000.37 From time to time the Councils added stock from 
investments in local projects such as the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company 
and the Schuylkill Navigation Company as well as premiums (that is, any amount 
paid above par) on the sale of bonds. When interest rates temporarily fell 
slightly in the early 1820s, the city consolidated much of its debt by selling a total 
of $535,000 in bonds at five percent annual interest to pay off earlier debts
On other occasions, the city sold bonds above par and put the premiums into the sinking fund, for example 
for the loans of 1819 and 1820. See Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia from the first of 
April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823).
John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the 
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: 
Moses Thomas, 1812), 212-214.
Hendrik Hartog, in Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the Citv of New York in American 
Law. 1730-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), argues that New York City was 
typical of municipal corporations at the turn of the nineteenth century in its selling of corporation-owned 
lands as a policy of keeping as much property as possible in private rather than public hands. However, he 
also admits that the New York City Corporation had trouble collecting rent and could not be sure in its legal 
authority from the state to collect taxes, either, and so the selling of property was a rational way for the city 
to raise money. Because Philadelphia had the legal authority to collect taxes, and had no problem 
collecting rents, it held on to and even enlarged its corporate property in this period, buying the old 
statehouse (Independence Hall) and collecting rent on it.
36John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the 
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: 
Moses Thomas, 1812), 212-214, 239-240; Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia:
Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: 
City Councils, 1817),69-71.
37Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Sixteenth of July. One 
Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819), 117-118, 126-128;
Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One 
Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 171-172.
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contracted at six percent.38 The fund grew accordingly from its modest 
establishment in 1807 to one of the largest single pools of assets in the 
Philadelphia area by the late 1820s, reaching a value of $383,266.88 by March 
of 1830.39
The use of a  sinking fund revealed two assumptions on the part of the 
men who ran Philadelphia’s City Councils. The first was that the Councils would 
have the political discipline to make significant appropriations to the fund on a 
regular basis while not raiding it for purposes other than debt reduction. This 
assumption held true. From its inception in 1807 through 1830, every 
disbursement made from the sinking fund went either to the purchase of financial 
instruments for the purpose of income or towards the acquisition of city bonds to 
retire the debt. The second assumption behind the sinking fund was that the 
corporation’s revenue base would continue to increase at a rate that equaled or 
exceeded the growth in the corporation’s routine costs. In other words, as long 
as the city grew faster than the cost of governing it did, the Councils could afford 
to pay off the interest on their loans without resorting to higher taxes with 
potentially adverse economic (and electoral) effects. As early as 1807, a City 
Council subcommittee argued against higher taxes, claiming that the increased 
tax burden resulting from the cost of the waterworks had been “very injurious by 
lowering the value of real estates, and discouraging improvements.” The 
subcommittee believed that loans to be paid off by future revenue made more
^ Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Second Dav of April. 
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Nineteen (Philadelphia: Citv Councils. 1821), 158-159; Ordinances of 
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 164-165; Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv 
of Philadelphia from the first of April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823).
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sense because “the benefits arising from the water works are of a permanent 
nature, and the income from  that source likely to increase.” The committee 
suggested that the most “expedient’ course would be “to raise by tax no more 
than the sum necessary fo r the usual expences of the year, and that the moneys 
necessary to pay for...permanent improvements, ought to be borrowed.”40 Here, 
too, the Councils proved prescient: Philadelphia’s economy and its waterworks 
revenue expanded fast enough to accommodate the cost of government and 
government services w ithout necessitating significant tax hikes. For these 
reasons, the sinking fund did become an efficient tool in the City Councils’ 
finances.
Despite their discipline in refraining from  raiding the sinking fund directly 
for routine costs, the City Councils did use the sinking fund and the city budget in 
creative ways to lessen the immediate tax burden and to pay for potentially 
controversial projects. Because the city now had a fund expressly dedicated to 
eradicating debt, investors proved much more willing to buy city bonds: they 
knew that their money would be on a safe footing and likely to be repaid. The 
success o f the sinking fund device to liquidate debt and to assure potential bond 
buyers of the security of the ir investment offered unexpected flexibility to the 
Councils in dealing with cost overruns and other costly contingencies. After the 
sinking fund ’s establishment, the Councils routinely took out loans fo r capital 
projects and for budgetary overruns on annual appropriations: between 1807 and
39March 1, 1830, Philadelphia City Councils, Committee on the Sinking Fund, Minutes 1824-1834, Series 
120.32, Philadelphia City Archives.
40Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1807. accompanied by An Ordinance for 
Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the City, for the Year One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane Aitken?], 1806), 3.
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1811, the Councils authorized six loans for enlarging markets, improving streets, 
and building sewers and another three loans for making up budgetary 
shortfalls.41 The pattern continued: $20,000 to prepare fo r the defense of the 
city in 1813, $25,000 to make up for shortfalls in 1813 and 1815, $70,000 in 
1816 to buy the old statehouse (Independence Hall) from the Pennsylvania state 
government, and $12,000 fo r the construction o f a culvert in 1817.42 The City 
Councils also issued bonds to  fund improvements to the waterworks. To expand 
the pipe distribution system, the Councils authorized another $70,000 in bond 
issues in 1818. The following year the city began its efforts to expand the 
waterworks at Fairmount, giving Josiah White and Joseph Gillingham $150,000 
in city bonds in exchange fo r land and water rights at the Falls (in addition to 
issuing bonds worth the $200,000 earmarked fo r construction). White 
interpreted the bonds-for-land swap to be politically possible specifically because 
of the use of bonds rather than tax moneys: incumbents could point to their 
acquisition of lands to expand the waterworks while holding down taxes.43
41“Supplement to the Ordinance Entitled ‘An Ordinance for the Reduction and Payment of the Funded Debt 
of the City,’" February 28, 1811; John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: 
to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to 
the City (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240.
^ “Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor to Borrow Twenty Thousand Dollars, and to Loan the Same to the 
United States, for the Erection of Forts and Batteries on the Island in the River Delaware, Commonly Called 
the Pea Patch,” June 23, 1813; “An Ordinance Authorizing the Borrowing Ten Thousand Dollars, in 
Anticipation of the Taxes of the Present Year," September 30, 1813; “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor 
to Borrow Money in Anticipation of the Taxes of the Present Year," June 15, 1815; Ordinances of the 
Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Day of June. One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Twelve (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 11,12-13, 54; “An Ordinance Providing 
For the Purchase of the State House, and State House Square in the City of Philadelphia, and raising the 
funds to make payment therefor,” April 11, 1816; “An ordinance providing for the construction of a culvert in 
Tenth street and Spruce street," July 14, 1817, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: 
Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: 
City Councils, 1817), 69-71.
^ ’’Ordinance empowering the Mayor of the City to raise Money to be applied to laying down Iron Pipes of 
Conduit, from the Water Works at Fair Mount,” December 17,1818; “An ordinance empowering the 
Watering Committee to purchase from Josiah White and Joseph Gillingham their rights to the Water Power 
of the river Schuylkill, and also to raise money on loan for the purpose of erecting a dam and other works at 
or near Fair Mount,” April 8, 1819; Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since
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On at least one occasion, the Councils used the sinking fund to absorb 
directly a budgetary overrun. In late 1824, the City Councils found that the 
corporation needed approximately $26,000 to provide fo r unexpected costs in a 
variety of categories and voted to authorize a bond issue for that amount.44 A 
week later, the sinking fund committee pointed out that the fund had $19,315.77 
in cash on hand, and the committee could sell enough of its federal bonds to 
make up the difference to buy the entire issue, a proposal soon approved.45 In 
this particular incident, the account fo r the ensuing year’s tax fund was charged, 
meaning that the money would still have to be accounted for out of taxes 
somehow. However, this case is only a particularly clear example of the general 
purpose for which the Councils used the sinking fund: to put off indefinitely the 
consequences of tough financial decisions. For the members of the Common 
Council, who were up for reelection annually, postponing budgetary crises 
essentially meant avoiding them altogether because the sitting council would not 
be blamed for problems inherited from the previous session. The loss of a 
council seat because of budget problems was not an idle threat: in 1802, 
Democrats swept the incumbent Federalists out of the Councils largely by 
blaming the officeholders for cost overruns on the waterworks and the taxes that 
those extra expenditures necessitated. Wise use of the sinking fund gave the 
City Councils the wherewithal to spend tomorrow’s money today rather than raise 
taxes, relieving politicians on the Council of the politically heavy burdens of
the Sixteenth of July. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819); 
Morton, Josiah White. 100.
^ “Ordinance to Provide for the extraordinary expenses incurred during the present year," November 5,
1824, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Eighth Dav of January. 
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Four (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1825), 275
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unpopular tax hikes or cuts in servicess. They could cut their revenue pie and eat 
it too, as long as the city brought in ennough dough to bake a bigger one the 
following year.
The ability to float bonds e ith e r for budget overruns or for potentially 
unpopular projects in essence insulatied the City Councils from making 
controversial decisions over budgeting  because it allowed them to postpone 
cutting services, raising taxes, or ansrwering to the electorate for particular 
appropriations that might be objectionable. This is not to say that the City 
Councils demonstrably misled the putblic about how much the corporation was 
spending or on what projects. Furthesrmore, manipulation of the Sinking Fund 
allowed the corporation a welcome flex ib ility  to pay for unforeseen expenses and 
for waterworks-related construction wvithout raising taxes significantly.
However, any time the Councils fe lt p ressure  on the corporation’s bottom line, 
they could simply issue bonds that inwestors willingly snapped up. The cost 
associated with the bonds would be transferred to the sinking fund and therefore 
out of the year-to-year, potentially contentious process of deciding upon 
appropriations. The annual appropriation to the sinking fund amounted to a 
discretionary fund for the Councils to build or to spend: the overruns and the 
building projects they funded only appeared in the annual appropriations under 
the rubric of the sinking fund. No o n e  would be willing to oppose Council 
incumbents on a political platform suggesting that the corporation should not pay
45November 13,1824, Philadelphia City Councils,. Committee on the Sinking Fund, Minutes 1824-1834, 
Series 120.32, Philadelphia City Archives.
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its bills—especially if he ever expected to get a loan from any Philadelphia-based 
bank, several of which held large blocks of city bonds.46
Through its flexibility and its potential for being manipulated, the sinking 
fund increasingly fu lfilled a political role beyond that o f a convenient financial 
device: its use allowed the City Councils to make significant financial decisions 
regarding the corporation in ways that limited public scrutiny of City Council 
policy. Non-investing residents got something, too: the best citywide waterworks 
in America and low taxes, at least as long as the city grew. Meanwhile, the 
sinking fund provided investors with city bonds, an extremely safe vehicle for 
capital appreciation.
Use of a sinking fund was only possible if private individuals were willing 
to buy Philadelphia municipal bonds. The Corporation of Philadelphia and all 
Philadelphia-area business corporations— internal improvement companies, 
banks, and insurance companies— competed for investment dollars from 
individuals and, occasionally, each other. The questions of who invested in 
these corporations and why are fundamentally d ifferent from those concerning 
the motivations fo r founding or controlling such institutions, although sometimes 
the two overlapped. Insiders who invested in banks wished both to make money 
from their stocks and to have access to capital for the ir other business dealings. 
Men who owned large parcels of land up the Schuylkill expected their property to 
appreciate because o f the navigation and hoped the navigation company would 
turn a profit. Some Philadelphia residents wanted the ir homes or businesses
46ln 1817, for example, the city owed the Bank of Pennsylvania $54,000 and the Philadelphia Bank 
559,000; Statements Submitted to the Senate, from the Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, and Farmers’ and 
Mechanics’ Banks ffHarrisburq?!. 1817).
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protected and counted on steady returns from their insurance company stock. 
Nonetheless, many people invested in city bonds or company stocks did not do 
so out of a commitment to local development or a desire for control over 
economic resources. The majority of investors bought company shares knowing 
that they would never become company customers, and the purchase of city 
bonds (after the initial discount on city water for the 1801 issue) had no direct 
effect on services to individuals: for most people, there was no relation between 
investment and services rendered.47 Although a few speculators may have 
made a pretty penny from exploiting fluctuations in the value of bank notes, 
government bonds, and corporate stock, the prospect of getting rich quickly 
rarely formed the primary motive for investment in these firms, either.
Motivations for investment varied somewhat by the kind of institution and the size 
of investment. For some institutions, the reasons for investment changed as the 
fortunes of the company waxed or waned, but in nearly all cases, investors 
emphasized long-term, stable returns and a desire for minimal involvement in 
company affairs.48 Those passive investors allowed institutional officers great 
leeway in their administration of the organizations they financed.
City bonds and financial institution stock tended to appeal to sim ilar 
investors. From the beginning, banks represented a stable investment that 
promised and usually delivered high dividends year after year. Boosters and 
bank opponents alike regarded such corporations as nearly mystical machines 
for multiplying investors’ dollars. The basic principle by which they operated was
47See Robert E. Wright, “Bank Ownership and Lending Patterns in New York and Pennsylvania, 1781- 
1831,” Business History Review73 (Spring 1999), 40-60.
48Wright, 48.
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fairly simple: lending out a sum of money at six percent interest—the highest rate 
allowed by law—could lead to profits of up to six percent a year, the same as 
United States bonds generally paid. However, the ability to lend tha t same 
amount to three people at once could lead to much higtier profits, up to eighteen 
percent. Banks in the early republic were able to lend out the same amount of 
money several times over by being allowed to issue the ir own currency with a 
face value up to four or five times the amount of specie , that is, hard money, in 
their vaults. In practice, banks yielded dividends considerably lower than 
eighteen percent a year, more often paying out profits in the seven-to-eleven 
percent range. A number of practical factors limited b a rk  revenues to that level: 
some customers did not pay back their loans, many banks’ paid-in capital was 
lower than their paper capital, the lending process was not completely efficient 
(new loans were not necessarily issued the instant old loans were paid back), 
and banks had ancillary costs including salary fo r employees, renting or owning a 
place of business, and the printing of banknotes.49 S till, dollar fo r dollar, banks 
represented the surest bet in early republic investments.
The composition of investors and investment in early banks reflected the 
notion that banks would yield consistent dividends without much attention from 
shareholders.50 In its initial stock offering in February, 1807, the Farmers and
49ln the founding of many banks, inside investors were allowed to take loans from the bank to pay for their 
stock shares, with the stock shares used as collateral. With no money changing hands, the insider would 
own stock which would net a profit because dividends would be higher than the interest rate paid on the 
stock. Furthermore, the insider could sell the stock; bank stock usually rose far higher than par fairly 
quickly. Even though a bank may have sold ail its shares authorized by the charter, it did not necessarily 
have all its capital paid in for a long while, and in the case of some banks, ever.
“ in terms of motivation for investment, Philadelphia-area banks and insurance companies mirrored other 
early nineteenth-century American corporate ventures. Contrary to previous interpretations suggesting that 
investment in Massachusetts textile corporations was triggered by lower s.hipping profits, Robert Dalzell 
convincingly demonstrated that Boston merchants, still quite successful, invested to diversify their portfolio 
and to provide more stable returns with greatly decreased direct involvement in management. Robert F.
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Mechanics Banks attracted investment ranging from the 113 buyers acquiring 
three or fewer shares at a  par value of $50 to the 30 investors who put in over 
$5,000 each, with a top initial holding of $15,250.51 The median holding was 10 
shares, or $500, a significant amount of money, and far more than the median in 
potentially risky ventures such as internal improvements. The large number of 
big investors suggests an impression among men of capital that the bank would 
be a profitable venture worthy of tying up large blocks of money fo r an extended 
period of time. Especially telling, only four of the top 30 investors were on the 
board, meaning that many of those men may have invested without the purpose 
or even expectation o f getting special treatm ent when applying for loans.52 
Without the motive of access to credit, these investors must have seen the bank 
as a likely vehicle fo r income. Their lack o f participation in the board shows their 
willingness to have others guard a significant portion of their wealth. These 
investors had either made their fortune on their own or who had at least 
stewarded family m oney wisely, and so had the ability to use it in their own 
businesses ventures had they so chosen.53 Men of capital, then, saw banks as a 
safe and convenient investment vehicle.54
Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), 61-67.
These statistics and the ones that follow regarding the stockholders of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank 
were compiled and calculated from Corporate Series, Vol. 8, Stock Ledger, Farmers and Mechanics 
National Bank, Accession 1658 Hagley Museum and Library .
This analysis agrees exactly with that of Wright’s interpretation of the motivation for investment in middle 
Atlantic state banks, as opposed to Lamoreaux’s interpretation of New England banks that loaned a much 
higher percentage of their capital to insiders who invested because they wanted access to the banks’ credit.
According to James Willard Hurst, “the obverse of creating a firm, substantially autonomous center of 
direction for corporate business was assurance to investors that they had a vehicle for limiting their 
investments of time and energy as well as of money”; The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the 
Law of the United States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 26.
See Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), for an account of how Boston-area merchants increasingly 
invested in manufacturing and banking because of their relative safety compared to mercantile activities 
rather than out of an expectation of higher returns.
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The number and size of investments made by and fo r women, in trusts fo r 
children, and by charitable and social organizations also indicated that many 
people perceived shareholding in banks as being prudent but profitable.
Because minors and, to a varying degree, some women were unable (or 
unwilling) to run their own businesses, investment on their behalf was generally 
intended to provide for a stable income over a long period without requiring 
business expertise or investors’ time.55 Some trustees were also stockholders 
in their own right, while others only held stock fo r dependents. At least one trust, 
consisting of 16 shares, was the property of a local Mason’s Lodge. Out of the 
shares listed as originally issued by the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, 1,837, or 
15.3% were held by women o r in trust for women or minors.56 The size of 
holdings in trust nearly exactly mirrored those of all investors: the median holding 
was ten shares, or $500. Women, however, tended to own half as many shares, 
with a median holding of five, or $250. Perhaps this lower figure indicates that 
some independent women, though having on average lower assets than men, 
invested fo r themselves, whereas wealthy men set up many of the trusts. The 
Farmers and Mechanics Bank clearly had a reputation as a worry-free 
investment.
The Farmers and Mechanics Bank did not stand alone in this regard. In 
1805, the Board of Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania proudly claimed that 
“the stock o f the Bank of Pennsylvania has long been considered as a most
55Possibly, some investors put shares in trust for their children or in the names of female relatives to protect
assets from creditors; however, because such practices would account for a small minority of these 
investments and because many men likely bought shares in their own name intending to keep money safe
for their legal dependents, if anything the following analysis most likely undercounts the overall percentage 
of stock bought for family purposes.
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secure and provident fund, for the investment of the monies of widows, orphans, 
and benevolent associations, to whom the safety of their capital, and the 
punctual payment o f its product are all important.”57 While bank directors were 
not above using hyperbole for political effect—references to helpless widows and 
orphans are the second refuge of a scoundrel— the bank did include many 
women and trusts among its stockholders. The number of shares held in trust 
and by women strongly indicated a widespread perception that banks were a 
safe haven for those depending upon stable long-term gains.58
That need fo r steady income over the long haul, in turn, influenced the 
way directors ran the big Philadelphia banks.59 Cashiers, under the watchful 
eyes of Boards of Directors, tended to value long-term safety in their loans over 
the ability to stretch out available capital in an effort to maximize immediate 
gains.60 As long as the bank could provide dividends in the seven-to-nine 
percent range, bank officers eschewed lending out as much money as they 
possibly could, preferring to keep reserves against runs so as to promote 
confidence in the bank and to do their part to stabilize the money supply.
Besides, banks could and did use excess capital to buy federal and local bonds 
that in effect yielded nearly as much as loans did anyway.61 At the same time,
“ Of the original issue of 12,000 shares, 11,970 are accounted for in the list of original stockholders; the 
1,837 are taken as a percentage of 11,970 in the text.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Memorial of the 
President and Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: 1805?), 2
““Ownership in stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments was spread well beyond the richest sectors of 
society. See Winifred Rothenberg, “The Emergence of a Capital Market in Rural Massachusetts, 1730- 
1838 (Journal of Economic History, 45 (1984), 781-808.
S9This discussion does not hold for many of the Pennsylvania country banks, especially those established in 
1814, that often worked on little paid-in capital, paid scandalously high dividends, suspended specie 
payments at the drop of a hat, and folded at the slightest whiff of economic trouble.
See Perkins, American Public Finance. 266-281; J. Van Fenstermaker, The Development of American 
Commercial Banking. 1782-1837 (Kent: Kent State University, 1965).
bl Eventually, the state legislature tried to curb bank investments as a percentage of overall capital in order 
to increase the amount available for lending.
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the notorious policies of early republican banks to reserve much of the ir loans for 
merchants in general and insiders in particular—those on the board, their 
families, and business associates— certainly excluded many would-be bank 
customers, but it also operated as a credit-checking device. By definition, 
insiders were known quantities, people w ith whom the bankers had been familiar 
fo r a  long time and whose businesses and expertise had been well established. 
They therefore appeared to be a  safer be t fo r loans than strangers who had 
unfamiliar business credentials and who m ight not feel the same social pressure 
from friends and relatives to be punctual as far as paying the bank back.62 The 
desires of investors and the lending policies of banks dovetailed to produce 
institutions with a long-term focus that nonetheless could operate mostly beyond 
the supervision of the general population o f stockholders.
The investment priorities both of insurance companies and the ir 
shareholders tended to be even more conservative than those of banks. The 
very reason for their founding was to m itigate the financial risks of business, of 
property ownership, and, eventually, of m ortality itself. Philadelphia companies 
specialized in particular sectors o f the insurance business: the earliest insured 
ships and cargoes; then came firms that insured houses, warehouses, and their 
contents against fire; and finally, in the 181 Os the first of life insurance
“ Philadelphia banks were also reluctant to lend to manufacturers rather than merchants, claiming that 
merchants could pay back 30- and 60-day loans promptly while manufacturers needed long-term loans to 
buy machines, build workspace, and acquire raw materials. However, that reasoning is questionable, given 
that a great number of the short-term loans to merchants were continuously rolled over, essentially making 
them long-term loans, and that, once manufacturers were established, they were better able to generate 
continuous cash flow and therefore more likely to be able to pay back loans than were merchants.
Wright argued that bank officers were able to
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companies began writing policies.63 Regardless o f what line of business 
insurance companies were in, they all operated according to the same general 
pattern. Companies competed heavily, advertising their premium rates. They 
were all offering the same service to the same pool o f potential customers and 
tried to keep the cost of premiums close to their estimated costs of business, that 
is, the calculated chance of total losses as well as salaries and office rent.64 
Because of this stiff rate competition and the inexactitudes o f contemporary 
actuarial methods, insurance companies struggled to make significant profits on 
the differences between premiums and claims.
However, insurance companies always kept a large pool of capital in 
reserve: the original capital paid in by investors along with all the paid-in 
premiums, from which the occasional claim was paid. They made their often- 
significant earnings from investing their reserves in a variety of ways including 
buying federal and Philadelphia city bonds, owning stock in other corporations, 
and making commercial loans and private mortgages. As Jacob Shoemaker, the 
actuary for the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, 
reported to his Board, they were losing potential customers to the Union 
Insurance Company of New-York, which was offering lower premium rates. He 
suggested that the Pennsylvania Company “can safely reduce their terms to the 
Scale acceptable by the NY Company," because “hitherto we have been able to
“ See Harold Edgar Gillingham, Marine Insurance in Philadelphia 1721-1850 (self-published, 1933); Mary 
Ruwell, Eighteenth-Century Capitalism: The Transformation of American Marine Insurance Companies 
(New York: Garland, 1993); and Vivian A. Rotman Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development of Life 
Insurance in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
°‘The Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities advertised its rates in 
Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore, and sometimes adjusted its rates in response to competition from 
New York companies. July 1, 1815, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1, Pennsylvania Company for 
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession #1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
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employ money to better advantage than 6 pCent compound interest.”65 
Insurance companies’ ability to invest their reserves provided the great majority 
o f their profits. These investments had to be on the safe side to guard against a 
rash of big claims, for example, when a hurricane sank several ships warranted 
by marine insurance company, when a large conflagration burned several 
buildings covered by the same fire insurance company, or when an epidemic 
took the lives of many life insurance policy holders. That way, one company told 
prospective customers, they “should ever be impressed with a firm conviction of 
the solid foundation of the institution, and of its entire capacity to comply with all 
its engagements.”66 As part of their conservative investment strategy, insurance 
companies included a clause in their articles of association or in their charters 
that forbade them “to buy or trade in any stock whatsoever, for the purpose of 
making a profit by such buying and selling.”67 Doing so committed insurance 
companies to make investments based on long-term stability from dividend- 
based revenue rather than short-term profitability from the fluctuation o f stock 
values. Nonetheless, insurance company charters allowed them to invest in 
stocks and bonds in any Pennsylvania corporation, and invest they did.68
65June 3, 1819, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1,163, Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
66Typescript copy of “An Address from the President and Directors of the Pennsylvania Company for 
Insurances on lives and granting annuities, to the Inhabitants of the United States, upon the subject of the
beneficial objects of that institution. Philadelphia: J. Maxwell, 1814,” 47 in Pennsylvania Company for 
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession #1476, Hagley Museum and Library. 
s?The Charter and By-Laws of the Pennsylvania Comoanv for Insurance on Lives. Granting Annuities, and 
Executing Trusts (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Brother, 1836), 8.
“ For example, the Insurance Company of North America, chartered on April 14,1794, was allowed to “be 
vested in securities for or evidence of debts due by the United States, or in the stock of the Bank of 
Pennsylvania, or of the Bank of the United States, or of the Bank of North-America, or of the Susquehanna 
and Delaware Canal, or of the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company, or of the Lancaster and 
Philadelphia Turnpike Company” or any other company subsequently incorporated by Pennsylvania. An 
Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Insurance Company of North-America (Philadelphia: William W. 
Woodward, 1801), 4.
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Insurance companies were a fa irly safe haven fo r investors who wanted reliable 
dividends over a long period.
While the motivation fo r putting money in insurance companies remained 
constant, motivation fo r investment in Philadelphia city bonds shifted over the 
course of the first two decades o f the nineteenth century. The people and 
organizations buying bonds in the first issue of 1801 and 1802 invested either 
out of civic duty or because o f a potential increase in property values, much like 
internal improvement investors. Most bondholders purchased only one bond, 
many of them doubtless doing so because of the combined inducement of 
interest and the free water subscription for the first three years.69 Institutional 
investors certainly hoped for gains, but they also bought bonds because the 
successful completion and operation of the waterworks could contribute to their 
respective missions. The Insurance Company of Pennsylvania bought 20 of the 
$100 bonds and the Mutual Assurance Company bought 30. Each most likely 
hoped that the waterworks would greatly enhance the city’s ability to fight fires. 
The Pennsylvania Hospital purchased another ten, both because of the medical 
consensus that fresh water would make the city’s residents healthier and more 
resistant to yellow fever and because the hospital was extremely water­
intensive.70 Although some investors bought multiple bonds, most seemed to be 
content with buying one to do the ir part in keeping the city pleasant and livable.
69Statistics compiled from Loan Certificate Transfer Journal, City Treasurer, Feb. 1801-Aug. 1820, 
Philadelphia City Archives.
70As of 1809, the Pennsylvania Hospital was the waterworks’ second largest consumer, behind the city alms 
house. See Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 2. 1809 
(Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809), 16.
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Unfortunately fo r the city, though, a few institutional investors were not 
enough to buy up the whole issue at first. In 1799 the federal government had 
just issued bonds paying eight percent, and the Delaware and Schuylkill Cana! 
Company had lobbied the General Assem bly to declare the city’s use of 
Schuylkill water a violation of the canal company’s charter, both of which made 
the city bonds seem less attractive because the city might not be able to collect 
water rents.71 The city’s difficulty in collecting taxes in several of the previous 
years because of the chaos of the nearly annual yellow-fever epidemics probably 
also discouraged those looking for a safe place to put their money.
Eventually, the city’s prompt payment of interest on the first issue of city 
bonds, the creation of the sinking fund, and the city’s more efficient tax collection 
efforts combined to establish confidence among investors in city bonds. From 
1805 on, the City Councils borrowed money by issuing interest-bearing bonds 
nearly every single year and sometimes several times in a year for a variety of 
purposes. They borrowed the most money for expenditures relating to the 
waterworks and the water distribution system: $25,000 for pipes and repairs in 
1805, $70,000 to replace wooden pipes with iron ones in 1818, $150,000 to buy 
the land and water rights at Fairmount and an additional $200,000 for 
construction in 1819, and another $75,000 for the extension of the iron water 
main system in 1822.72 They also took out loans to pay for other capital
71Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 24th of 
November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
/2 John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia; to Which Are refixed, the 
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia: 
Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240: Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since 
the Sixteenth of July. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819), 
117-118, 126-128; Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twentv-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
156
improvements to the city such as the construction of culverts and markets in 
1808, 1809, 1810, 1817, 1821, and 1824.73 They issued bonds to pay for 
emergencies, such as to build fortifications to defend the city in the War of 1812 
or to make up for budgetary shortfalls.74 They even sold bonds to buy the old 
statehouse, soon to be called Liberty Hall, from the state of Pennsylvania for 
$70,000 in 1817.75 The city’s ability to fund all these projects as well as 
shortfalls in its more routine activities stemmed directly from the willingness of 
investors to snap up the city’s bonds.
City Council members probably thought of bondholders as the best kind of 
partners in their building of Philadelphia: investors who footed the bill with no 
questions asked. Although taxpayers were willing to pay for a budget that 
included incrementally larger appropriations into a sinking fund—payment for 
debts already contracted— they were loathe to approve big new expenditures or
Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City Councils, 
1823), 109-110.
73John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the 
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia: 
Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240: Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: Passed Since 
the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eioht Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 
1817), 87: Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August. 
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 168-169; Ordinances of the 
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Fourth Dav of February. One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Twenty-Three (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1824), 253-254; Ordinances of the Corporation of 
the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Eighth Dav of January. One Thousand Eight Hundred and 
Twenty-Four (Philadelphia: Citv Councils. 1825), 280-282.
/4Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1807. accompanied by An Ordinance for 
Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the Citv. for the Year One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane Aitken?], 1806), 5; John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation 
of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other 
Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 191, 239-240; Ordinances of 
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Dav of June. One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Twelve (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 11,12-13, 54: Ordinances of the 
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Second Dav of April. One Thousand Eight 
Hundred and Nineteen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1821), 158-159: Ordinances of the Corporation of the 
Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred 
and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1823), 182; Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of 
Philadelphia. Passed Since the Fourth Dav of February. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Three 
(Philadelphia: City Councils, 1824), 248-250.
Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of 
September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1817), 69-71.
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to support unexpected costs. Bondholders were much less fickle than taxpayers 
as a source of immediate funding for large capital projects and for overruns and 
annual expenditures. They did not expect efficiency, responsibility, or 
competence, merely the ir interest payments twice yearly. They invested in city 
bonds fo r the same reasons that they invested in banks or insurance companies: 
precisely because they did not want to spend the time and energy necessary for 
other potentially profitable pursuits. That lack of energy suited the politicians on 
the City Councils, especially the Common Council whose members who were up 
for annual reelection: through the sinking fund and city bond issues, the 
corporation shifted the  burden of financial scrutiny of its affairs from the 
electorate to people whose precondition for investment was the ability to  ignore 
the details o f the corporation’s finances altogether.
City bond values stayed fairly steady during the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, but because of the poor success rate of internal 
improvement companies, canal stocks often fluctuated wildly. Investors were 
much more likely to sell these corporate stocks merely to recoup some of their 
losses than they were interest-bearing bonds. Conflict over rights of original 
investors as opposed to subsequent owners was typical of early republic debates 
concerning the ownership and exchange of financial instruments and company 
stocks. The earliest battle between first and subsequent owners had raged most 
fiercely in the 1780s and early 1790s as a result of the economic chaos during 
and after the Revolution. To finance both the prosecution of the Revolutionary 
War and more pedestrian government activities when even routine tax collection 
was difficult, both the Continental Congress and the states resorted to a variety
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o f tactics including printing paper money, selling interest-bearing certificates, and 
issuing scrip that amounted to nothing more than the government’s IOU.
Because of the post-war economic slump and the widespread uncertainty over 
the ability of the fledgling governments to make good on the ir considerable 
financial commitments, all o f these instruments depreciated greatly during the 
1780s, leading most of the farmers and soldiers who held such paper to unload it 
for what little they could get in return. Speculators and urban merchants often 
ended up with large amounts of such paper. Then, in the late 1780s and early 
1790s, the states, following the federal government’s lead, began to make good 
on those debts either at par or at least well above their lowest market value. The 
new owners now held paper of value, and many of the original owners felt as 
though they had been swindled.
Protests against the Union Canal Company charter reprised the same 
controversies along sim ilar terms. Once the Watering Committee had rebuffed 
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company’s overtures in 1799, both that 
company and its sister, the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company, 
fell nearly dormant, victim to the entire litany of problems tha t beset early canals. 
The routes had been poorly chosen, there was trouble finding competent 
engineers to stay on the job, contractors fleeced the companies, land costs 
skyrocketed because of speculation, and capital-raising efforts could not keep up 
with the ballooning costs. A t one point, the workmen even got involved in a 
tavern brawl with locals in an affair so violent that the governor finally had to 
mediate between company president Robert Morris and angered Myerstown
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residents.76 Although the Delaware and Schuylkill project was all but 
abandoned, in 1807 a number of men still harbored the notion that connecting 
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Rivers was a goal worth pursuing. However, 
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company’s finances were by that 
point unsalvageable because of the large number of defaulted subscriptions, the 
failure of the state-sponsored lotteries, and its complicated relationship with the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal. So, in 1807, some of its investors decided to try 
out another solution of British origin: a merger of the two companies into the new 
Union Canal Company, in the hopes that it could provide a better institutional 
and financial footing for the project.77
To begin operations, the sponsors of the new company had to obtain a 
charter and determine what stake the stockholders of the old companies would 
have. The legislature did not pass a charter until 1811, four years after the first 
proposal. In the end, boosters successfully applied to the legislature under a 
plan in which those who had paid their full subscriptions of Schuylkill and 
Susquehanna Navigation Company stock would receive two shares of the new 
company, and paid-up stockholders in the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Navigation Company would receive one share in the Union Canal Company for 
each completed subscription.78 The application for and the granting of the 
charter precipitated wrangling in the legislature and the newspapers between 
rival factions of stockholders. Those who had paid up their full subscriptions—
76Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill & 
Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder 2, Pennsylvania State Archives.
^The Birmingham Canal Navigation and the Birmingham and Fazeley Canal Navigation merged by act of 
Parliament in 1794; Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act. 1720- 
1800 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 375.
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both original subscribers and speculators who had bought completed 
subscriptions at bargain-basement prices— generally' favored the arrangement: 
the possibility that their investment would retain som e  of its value o r at least 
result in a completed waterway had drastically increased.79 Those subscribers 
who had not paid in all their subscriptions com plained loudly because only 
completed subscriptions could be exchanged fo r shares of the new company. 
They lost whatever money they had paid in. Others, who had sold their 
completed subscriptions well below par in a desperate attempt to salvage some 
of their investment, also protested, arguing that they had put fa r more money into 
the project than the speculators to whom they had so ld  their shares and who 
would now get shares in the new company. Opponeints to the new charter also 
pointed out that it limited ownership to American citiziens, shutting out foreign 
stockholders in the original companies.80 This last objection was moot because 
as of yet neither canal had attracted significant foreicgn investment. Still, it was a 
point worthy of consideration because banks did hav*e large numbers of foreign 
stockholders and company founders hoped that a  successful navigation 
company could, as well.
Arguments concerning stockholding in the chartering of the Union Canal 
Company seemed like a recurrence of the debates in  the 1780s and 1790s 
concerning federal and state financial instruments: thiose who had sold out were
78Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 40.
See for example Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Applicatio-n fora Law to Incorporate “The Union 
Canal Company” Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808) and January 3, 1812, Aurora General Adwertiser.
Memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of PA, in General Assembly 
met, from Stockholders in the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation^ and the Delaware and Schuylkill
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accusing speculators of cashing in while the investors who had made a greater 
initial sacrifice would be left with nothing. In this case, as in the previous debates 
over the holding o f Continental Congress debt from the Revolution, those who 
had the stock in the ir possession last won the day. After this debate, the 
Pennsylvania legislature did not revisit the subject, essentially settling the issue 
with profound consequences for the finance o f large projects and institutions.
The assurance that all transactions were final and not subject to ex post 
facto review by civil authority gave investors the security to invest in stocks and 
bonds knowing tha t such instruments would keep their value independent of the 
political climate. A t the same time, the refusal of the General Assembly to 
compensate the original investors who had sold their shares in the defunct canal 
companies made the investment world a much riskier place. Together with the 
government’s haphazard support of big projects such as the waterworks and 
internal improvement companies, the decision of the legislature to leave stock 
values to the marketplace most likely discouraged those with little to spend from 
investing in local projects because of the risk involved. For the rich, such 
investment remained possible because they had more opportunity to diversify 
their portfolios and because they had greater access to credit and so could 
weather economic storms while others would be forced to sell assets like stocks 
and bonds. The continued insistence of corporations and the legislature alike to 
keep initial stock prices at $50, $100, or more further exacerbated the 
investment gap between the rich and the middling and lower sorts. The 
combination of all these factors ensured tha t investment and therefore control of
Canal Navigation Companies, Box4-B, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
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banks, insurance companies, city bonds, and especially internal improvements 
would stay in the hands of a small sector of the population.
After the W ar of 1812, the consolidation of the control of internal 
improvement projects in fewer hands became increasingly pronounced, 
especially in those that would become profitable through the anthracite trade.
The first major Philadelphia-area coal-related internal improvement, the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, started out in 1815 with a roster o f investors 
closely resembling those of previous projects. The average investment in the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company was just over $350, with a maximum single 
holding of $2,500.81 Subsequent efforts, though, especially to make the Lehigh 
River navigable, involved fewer investors pouring in larger sums.
Once ousted from the Schuylkill Navigation Company— after his 
suggestion that they reduce tolls— company founder Josiah White remained 
determined to bring coal cheaply to Philadelphia. He set his sights on the Lehigh 
River, a fast-flowing and rocky waterway running from the coalfields to the 
Delaware River some sixty miles above Philadelphia. He decided that the 
Lehigh could be made navigable, and hoped to do so on his own after his bitter 
experience with the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Within two years, though, 
W hite’s travails in his quest for funding for the Lehigh Navigation and Coal 
Company demonstrated that Philadelphia’s capital formation market retained 
some features of its old, clubby system of merchant networks. At the same time,
Pennsylvania.
81Statistics compiled from C-Miscellaneous Records; Reel 3327; Stock subscription book, Schuylkill 
Navigation Company, MG-110, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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that market was gaining the advantages and efficiencies related to the growth of 
and access to large pools of capital from banks and insurance companies.
Knowing that no bank would be willing to loan hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for years to a man with little collateral, White used the tried and true 
method of capital formation in the early republic: he went to moneyed friends and 
acquaintances who had access to capital. He had made these rounds before, 
first when trying to find backing for his nail mill in 1811 and again when he 
started the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Because he came from a prominent 
Quaker family, and because of his experience with the Schuylkill Navigation and 
as a local manufacturer, White was at least familiar with many of the men most 
prominently involved in financial activities in Philadelphia. Armed with pamphlets 
he had had printed trumpeting the advantages of the Lehigh River and Lehigh 
coal, he and his partner Erskine Hazard made a long series of fruitless calls; 
reactions ranged from only passive encouragement to outright rudeness.
Joseph Buonaparte— the Emperor’s wayward brother who settled for a time in 
Pennsylvania— demurred in a note; Samuel Archer “agreed to give us a hearing 
on the subject for 5 minutes by the watch” before saying no; “Stephen Girard 
said he formed no partnerships” ; Samuel Spackman was to call back in three 
days, but never did; Benjamin Stille “was polite enough to allow of some general 
Remarks, but said he was unable to appretiate them”; John Friese claimed "he 
ha[d] no money at his command”; Joshua Longstreth made appointment, “but he 
was gone next door to a party to have some fun” ; Jacob Ridgway “treated the 
project & ourselves with much Contempt” ; John Rogers “hoped we would do 
well” ; John Stille “proceeded to Read his news paper, & alltho we bid him, good
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afternoon, he was so mutch engaged at Reading the chit chat, occurences of the 
day, that he had no time to bid us good night.”82 A fter so many rebuffs, the 
prospects for support seemed slim.
Finally, White appealed to Jacob Shoemaker, a fellow Quaker.
Shoemaker had been a founding director o f both the Delaware Insurance 
Company and the Bank o f Philadelphia before helping organize and becoming 
the actuary of the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting 
Annuities in 1809. In the Pennsylvania Company office, Shoemaker revealed 
“hav9 formerly an intention of forming a Co. fo r a sim ilar purpose up the Lehigh,” 
and told White that in exchange “for 20 shares of stock he agreed to give... his 
weight and influence to get [the] Stock subscribed.”83 Shoemaker quickly 
delivered on his promise, enlisting company president Condy Raguet for $10,000 
and company board member James Spencer and speculator John Stoddart for 
identical stakes. According to White, “the Balance of the stock was then fill’d in 
about 24 hours.”84 On the one hand, raising money through business partners 
and their associates reflected nearly timeless practice. On the other hand, the 
amounts involved, the speed in which they were pledged, and the motivation for 
their investment signaled a significant shift in transportation improvement 
financing.
The sums that major investors were willing to grant to the Lehigh 
Navigation and Coal Company dwarfed the amounts previous investors had put 
into other public improvements. The average investment in the Schuylkill
^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 23-
26.
^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27.
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Permanent Bridge in 1801 was only $36 and the highest only $220 despite its 
obvious potential for success. Perhaps the reason for th is broad distribution of 
shares was the initial sale price of only $10, allowing a  greater slice of the 
population the chance to invest in the city’s and the company’s futures.85 A 
listing of stockholders in the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal as of 1807—by which 
time many of the smaller shareholders had defaulted on their subscriptions—  
revealed the average holding to be $325, with a maximum single investment of 
$2,200.86 These projects were typical of early improvements whose wide 
distribution of small, local investors reflected an expectation that a lack of direct 
profitability would be more than made up for by higher property values and 
cheaper transportation to and from the metropolis.87 As one Union Canal 
Company booster pointed out in 1808, “people of moderate fortunes can turn
their money to superior advantage in a shorter time, and with less supposed risk”
88than in internal improvement ventures.
By the early 1820s, the possibility of huge profits from the transportation 
of coal distinguished the Lehigh navigation and the Schuylkill Navigation from 
previous efforts. Here, as in so many other facets of American economic and 
technological development in the early nineteenth century, the British precedent 
loomed large. English coal canals numbered among the most profitable
^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27. 
^Statistics compiled from Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, List of Subscribers (mss., 1801),
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
n6Statistics compiled from List of Subscribers, May 26, 1792, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal
Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, No. 14,
Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group #26, Pennsylvania State Archives
87See John Majewski, “Who Financed the Transportation Revolution? Regional Divergence and Internal
Improvements in Antebellum Pennsylvania and Virginia,” Journal of Economic History 56 (Dec, 1996),
763-788.
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corporate projects in the Atlantic world during the preceding few decades.89 
Furthermore, not only would the Lehigh navigation be able to deliver much 
needed coal to the metropolis, but also, unlike other improvement companies, 
the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Company held mineral-rich properties not far 
from the river. The company could mine its own coal and bring it to market 
considerably more cheaply than potential competitors. Some of the investors 
thought that the navigation would be the main revenue-producing part of the 
operation, while others calculated that the coal lands would be more profitable.90 
The two together, though, represented an investment more likely to thrive than 
either would by itself.
The early Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company and the later Schuylkill 
Navigation Company differed from their internal improvement predecessors in 
their potential for profit; the investors in these two ventures also had easier 
access to larger amounts of capital. The proliferation of banks and insurance 
companies in the Philadelphia area had given many more city residents the 
ability to invest their own cash or to borrow money to invest in big, risky ventures. 
In addition, the banks, insurance companies, and the city of Philadelphia had 
reserves of money available for underwriting area projects. Furthermore, the 
coal-region navigation companies had fewer barriers to large investors than did 
banks and insurance companies. The state legislature had always carefully 
regulated the issuing of stock in banks— and to a lesser extent insurance
“ Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application fora Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal 
Company” Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 4.
See J.R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eiahteenth-Centurv England (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974).
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companies—in the hope o f making the opportunity fo r profits widely available 
and out o f the fear that a  few  individuals could easily gain control of financial 
institutions crucial to the workings of the economy.91 Many internal improvement 
company charters contained the same kinds of provisions that banks and 
insurance companies did regarding distribution of stockholding.92 However, the 
great difficulties canal and turnpike companies faced in attracting subscribers 
resulted in far more leniency than banks received in term s of limiting individual 
shareholding: here, the sense of urgency fo r transportation improvements 
trumped anxieties about the undue influence of a few  individuals in the 
corporation. The onset o f construction on the Erie Canal served to deepen the 
rush for internal improvements in Pennsylvania and to lead legislators to look the 
other way when the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany and the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company w ent searching for large sums o f money to finish their
QQ
projects.
The chronic shortage of cash on the part o f the internal navigation 
companies in the late 1810s and early 1820s gave potential large investors a 
strong position in dictating terms to Boards of Managers of struggling projects, 
further concentrating control of those institutions in few er hands. Those
^Josiah White, Josiah White's History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company, 1909), 46.
91 See Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William and Mary Quarterly 
3d Ser., 50 (1993), 51 -84 for an analysis of this debate; see Chapter 4  for an analysis of the corporate 
boosters’ responses.
^Pennsylvania corporate charters generally carried stipulations limiting individuals from acquiring large 
blocks of stock at a company's founding. The most usual way of doing so was to limit buyers to the 
purchase of one stock on the first day available, two stocks on the second day, and three on the third. 
Should here by any stocks left after the first three days, they would be distributed in proportion to the size of 
bids for those remaining. Some charters also limited the total number of stocks that any individual could 
purchase in the initial issue.
See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the ways that Pennsylvania inland navigation companies exploited 
concerns over competition from Baltimore and New York City.
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investors used their leverage to  protect their money in a variety of ways, each of 
which placed their rights and privileges ahead of earlier stockholders and 
lenders. In 1817, the Schuylkill Navigation Company board bent to the demands 
of large investors when not enough small ones came forward to buy up a stock 
issue. “From the backwardness of the people to come forward and make further 
additions," the board reported, "it appears not probable that much progress can 
soon be made therein.” Board members weighed the offer of “a  number of 
monied men...to subscribe large am ounts on condition that such subscriptions 
shall not be binding on them unless the full amount o f five thousand shares now 
wanting shall be fully made up and subscribed.”94 In the end, the board voted to 
accept the rich men’s offer, having no other alternatives to raise the needed 
sums.
In these sorts of affairs, too, the companies and investors cooperated to 
use financial devices already pioneered by British internal navigation companies. 
For example, in 1821 the Lehigh Canal and Coal Company began using 
preferred stock.95 The company had run out of cash, and the stockholders did 
not want to throw even more into a project that as yet had produced no revenue. 
Their money had already been tied up in the concern for several years, and 
potential returns still appeared to be a few years in coming. The Board of 
Managers solved the problem by dividing shares into two classes. Josiah White 
and Erskine Hazard, who jo in tly held $150,000 in stock and by fa r the largest
94August22, 1817, Minutes, Board of Managers, Roll 1, Oct 7, 1815-January 5, 1846, MG-110, Schuylkill 
Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
95See George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A Study of Preference Shares 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936) for an extended discussion of the use of various 
kinds of preference shares in British canal finance. Pioneered in Britain, these methods of raising capital 
were replicated nearly identically in America.
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stake in the company (over 30% of it), agreed to accept a lower priority on 
dividends for that block of stock.96 In other words, should the company make a 
profit, all the other stockholders— old and new—would get to share the dividends 
first, and White and Hazard would only get a share of the profits once everyone 
else had received a reasonable return. The practical effect of this arrangement 
for prospective investors was that the threshold for returns had become much 
lower: the company only had to make $21,000 in total profits to yield new 
investors a 6% return on investment, rather than the $30,000 previously 
required.97 White and Hazard agreed to this deal because they knew that, 
should the company be unable to attract more money, the ir entire investment 
would go down the drain. They also understood that the stock had not been 
selling under the current arrangement. Hence, new investors could now take 
advantage of the company’s straits to demand better terms.
Stephen Girard, no stranger to financial machinations, found another way 
to use investment at a critical time to gain a significant stake in a struggling 
company. In 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Company ran out of cash and 
projected needing another several hundred thousand dollars to finish the 
waterway. The Board of Managers realized that it had already exhausted the 
usual methods of raising funds: no more would be forthcoming from the state, 
the company had already spent all the money generated by the sale of stock 
under its charter, and it despaired of selling yet more stock to an unenthusiastic 
public. Accordingly, the company board turned to yet another method of raising
^May 25,1821, MG-311 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company Records, Roll 1, Minutes of the Stockholders, 
1821-1831, Pennsylvania State Archives.
97Calculated out of a total capitalization of $500,000.
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money pioneered by British internal improvement companies, in this case the 
Manchester New Ashton Canal in 1797 and the Grand Junction Canal in 1798: 
the loan convertible to stock.98 The Board negotiated a series o f loans from the 
ever-adroit Girard amounting to a to ta l o f $230,850, an incredible sum for one 
individual to be able to offer.99 The fina l agreement was structured first as a 
mortgage on the entire navigation paying Girard six percent interest annually; 
however, he reserved the option to convert any value of the loan into company 
stock at par value. By coming in at a  particularly vulnerable juncture for the 
company and by being able to com m it a princely amount of money, Girard had 
wrangled fabulous terms that nearly guaranteed him a profit a t the expense of 
previous investors, regardless of the com pany’s ultimate fate. Should the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company go bankrupt, Girard would own all its land and its 
water rights, whose value far exceeded the amount he had put in. Furthermore, 
the whole navigation could probably b e  finished with limited additional 
investment, so he would get a corporation potentially worth a million dollars or 
more at a bargain price. Should the com pany be successful and start to issue 
substantial dividends, he could convert his loan into stock at par— probably well 
below the market price— and he could then either sell the stock at a handsome 
profit or collect the dividends. Som ewhere in the middle, that is, were the 
navigation to be finished but be only m arginally profitable, Girard could sit back 
and receive the interest due on the loan. Girard had found a way to ensure that 
he would profit in any given scenario, while previous stockholders could be hurt
"Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act. 1720-1800 (New York: 
Octagon Books, 1971), 372, 429.
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in several ways: loan payments or dividend payments to Girard would cut into 
their dividend payments, and if the project failed Girard would be the beneficiary 
of their total investment. The ability to lend a large sum at a particularly 
vulnerable moment fo r the company gave Girard the chance to dictate favorable 
terms and considerable say in company affairs because he also retained the 
option of calling in his loan. Through his use of capital, one man owned the 
Schuylkill River.
For the internal navigation companies in coal-producing regions and for 
the corporation of Philadelphia, the late 1820s brought spectacular increases in 
business and profitability. In 1823, the completion o f the water-powered 
waterworks at Fairmount drastically reduced operating costs compared to the old 
steam-powered system just as the city corporation completed a campaign to 
double the extent of the distribution system through the introduction of large iron 
water mains. The expansion of system capacity and the elimination of fuel costs 
finally put the annual waterworks budget into the black for the first time. From 
then on, the waterworks’ annual surplus contributed to the sinking fund rather 
than the other way around. In the fall of 1824, Josiah White convinced the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company to bring more than two thousand tons to 
market, several times the amount sold there the previous year.100 The resulting 
abundance of anthracite in the city led consumers to the conclusion that 
Philadelphia’s supply would be reliable enough fo r them to install the proper 
grates to burn stone coal in their furnaces rather than wood, charcoal, or
"Schuylkill Navigation Company Board of Managers to Stephen Girard, February 5,1823, Letter Books,
Box 1, June 5, 1816-Nov 25, 1824, MG-110, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
100Josiah White's History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 53.
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bituminous coal. City bonds had sold well for some time, and in the late 1820s 
Schuylkill Navigation Company and Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company stock 
prices came into demand too, beginning to sell above par. The hopes for 
steady, long-term profits had been realized fo r both city investors and for 
investors in the two coal navigations.
The move into the black allowed corporations such as banks, insurance 
companies, the City of Philadelphia, and finally the inland navigation companies 
to act as a medium for an exchange of financial power over the course of the 
early decades of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the investment 
benefits of these corporations were distributed widely, at least among the 
wealthiest quarter of the population. By the late 1820s, thousands of 
Philadelphia residents owned stock in one or more companies, city bonds, or 
both. By buying these financial instruments, they were investing in their own 
futures a well as in the future of the city. The average taxpayer, too, got 
something: a better regional transportation network and city-wide fresh water 
supply system with little cost in terms of increased state taxes. The state had 
contributed little o f the funds for the construction of the coal canals and none of 
the expenses for the waterworks: stock and bond investors had put in the lion’s 
share of the principal. In terms of city taxes, as long as Philadelphia continued 
to grow, the increased taxpayer base and those who used the new technologies 
most intensively— either by transporting goods along the navigations or by 
getting water piped directly to their homes or businesses—would pay off the 
interest and eventually much of principal for building the waterworks and the
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internal navigations. Meanwhile, once the coal trade took off, tolls covered the 
maintenance, upkeep, and interest on the inland navigations.
Despite such benefits, the users, taxpayers, and smaller investors did not 
get something fo r nothing. Rather, the use of private corporations and the 
floating of public debt amounted to a shell game that merely hid the unpleasantly 
high costs of infrastructure projects necessary to the economic and urban 
development nearly unanimously desired in the early republic. The cost of 
heating fuel decreased in Philadelphia in the late 1820s because of the 
availability of cheap anthracite coal that traveled down the Schuylkill and Lehigh 
navigations at no cost to the taxpayer. So far so good. But those prices, low as 
they were, still included large profits to investors in the companies administering 
those navigations, especially the big investors who had gotten their shares on 
such fabulous terms. The waterworks, too, provided the city a necessary service 
for its continued success but disproportionately rewarded those who had the 
wherewithal to buy municipal bonds. Meanwhile, everyone’s taxes paid for the 
interest support and the maintenance of the sinking fund that paid off bond- 
owners. The waterworks not only redistributed water; they redistributed wealth 
as well. The individuals in control of capital had devised institutions and 
methods that guaranteed their ability to skim off the cream of economic 
development.
The general public also ceded control o f these technologies and the 
institutions that administered them to a small group of men who would direct 
much of Philadelphia’s economic growth. These men, on the City Councils o r on 
the boards of various corporations year after year, determined the routes and
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capacities of the navigations and the c ity  water mains and what to charge 
consumers. They made decisions involving hundreds of thousands of dollars—  
huge sums at the time— with little or no input from the electorate or, in the case 
of business corporations, any public authority. So for the public, the price of 
cheap access to water, transportation, and credit was the loss of control over the 
corporations responsible fo r those technologies and services. The following 
chapter will examine how corporation insiders, especially those in internal 
navigation companies, explained and justified the distribution of the benefits of 
these technologies along with the concentrated control o f the institutions they 
used to run them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Evolution of Corporate Ideology
From the early 1790s until 1830, inland navigations boosters found myriad 
terms to promote their projects to different groups in d ifferent places. Their 
arguments partly reflected their own motives, but even more, a perceptive 
estimation of the desires o f potential investors and various groups in the 
communities through which proposed projects might run. Throughout the period, 
they pushed canals and river navigations as wonderful vehicles of economic 
growth, but as the economy of the Delaware valley expanded and changed, so 
did the economic vision offered by promoters, from one primarily of land 
speculation and development to one in which manufacturing and mineral 
extraction played a significant, even leading, role. Once growth intensified, 
company directors shifted their rhetoric to stockholders from  an appeal to 
community interest to one of direct profit. Inland navigation boosters composed 
their appeals to match the rhythm of the changing economy, and learned to alter 
their ideological tune as the Revolutionary generation’s fears for the success of 
the republican experiment became overwhelmed by their children’s enthusiasm 
for getting ahead and staying there. Thus, Philadelphia-area promotional 
literature before the turn o f the nineteenth century emphasized the ways that 
canals and river navigations could help keep the union together, but later 
appeals increasingly highlighted the potential economic benefits to particular 
communities and groups. By the late 1820s, inland navigation proponents 
touted the beginnings of industrialization, the prospect of profitable investment, 
and the pursuit of ever more narrowly defined interests to create a new ideology
175
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that both invoked a need fo r their projects and provided a credo for the most 
aggressive actors in the Philadelphia region’s growing economy.
Only a few years after the Grand Procession celebrated the birth of the 
federal union in Philadelphia, a group of prominent Philadelphians embarked on 
a trio of related projects intended to help provide structure and direction to the 
infant nation. They also hoped to make a good deal of money. Mainly 
merchants, mainly wealthy, and mainly Federalists, they included among their 
number Ebenezer Hazard, erstwhile postmaster o f the United States; John 
Nicholson, future treasurer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Robert 
Morris, revolutionary financier; Samuel Wetherill Sr., an oil and dye merchant; 
David Rittenhouse, a scientist and instrument-maker; and William Smith, the 
president of the University of Pennsylvania. They also had something else in 
common: they all owned great tracts of uninhabited real estate in central and 
western Pennsylvania that they had acquired cheaply in the previous decade in 
the expectation of great profits as settlers moved west. However, these 
speculators quickly realized that no one would pay for land unless able to afford 
to transport their produce to market. Land transportation remained too 
expensive. So, these wealthy Philadelphians set out to erect the transportation 
infrastructure that would make their main investments profitable.
Many of these men had entered into various syndicates to buy large 
parcels of land; they also associated in three organizations to bring those 
properties into Philadelphia’s economic orbit. The first was the Society for 
Improvement of Roads and Inland Navigation, founded in a meeting at 
Carpenters Hall in 1791. The Society advocated state funding for the other two
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schemes, both established to accomplish more concrete tasks: the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal Company and the Delaware and Schuylkill 
Canal Company, both routed to connect the rivers after which they were named. 
Combined, the two canals would allow water transportation from the entire 
Susquehanna valley in central and western Pennsylvania all the way to 
Philadelphia’s wharves on the Delaware River.
The appeals o f the Society and the two canal companies emphasized one 
great goal: according to Robert Morris, “to combine the interests of all the parts 
of the  state, and to cement them in a perpetual commercial and political union, 
by the improvement of [Pennsylvania’s] natural advantages.”1 Apparently, the 
Pennsylvania legislature agreed, for the preamble to the charter granted the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal Company asserted that “the opening of a 
communication by water... will greatly tend to strengthen the bands of union 
between citizens inhabiting distant parts” of the state.2 The theme of uniting 
disparate economic and geographical interests was one inland navigation 
boosters returned to constantly. In 1795, W illiam  Smith optimistically predicted 
th a t the two canals would bind Pennsylvania “together in one flourishing and 
civilized whole, sensible of a common interest, and rejoicing in the common 
prosperity.”3 Proponents recycled this argument whenever they applied for 
charters, asked the legislature for funding, solicited investment, or addressed
’William Smith, An Historical Account of the Rise. Progress and Present State of the Canal Navigation in 
Pennsylvania. With an Appendix. Containing. Abstracts of the Acts of the Legislature Since the Year 1790. 
and the grants of Money for Improving Roads and Navigable Waters throughout the State: to Which is 
Annexed. “An Explanatory Map" (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1795), 3.
“An Act to enable the Governor of this commonwealth to incorporate a company, for opening a canal and 
lock-navigation between the rivers Schuylkill and Susquehanna, by the waters of the Tulpehoccon, 
Quittapahilla and Swatara, in the counties of Berks and Dauphin.” Smith, 23.
3Smith, iii.
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their stockholders. Governor Simon Snydor claimed in his annual address of 
1811 that a state-funded canal system could “form an indissoluble bond of 
union...forever banish the idea of a severation of the States...create new and 
strong ties and dependencies...and excite new sympathies and affections among 
the children of the same American family.”4 The very next year, the Union Canal 
Company’s petition fo r state aid reminded the legislature that “the strength of the 
individual members of the union demands imperiously a proportionally powerful 
cement to bind them together.”5 Clearly, they hoped for the canal to serve as 
that adhesive. As late as 1825, a subcommittee of the Philadelphia city councils 
endorsed a plan to cut a canal across the city connecting the Schuylkill and 
Delaware rivers by claim ing that it would “give a stimulus and activity to those 
parts now stationary— will make a unity of interest between the east and west 
[city wards]...and make the city united in all its great interests of trade and 
commerce.”6 That canal was never built, but the sentiment that inland 
navigations could unite disparate interests remained. Canal boosters suggested 
that internal navigation had nearly magical, inherent qualities guaranteeing 
prosperity and union, with the alternative being an undeveloped, fragmented 
economy eventually leading to social and political chaos.
The purported ability of institutions or technologies to shape the polity and 
the society formed rather typical threads in the cloth of political economy in the
“Address of Governor Simon Snydor to the Legislature, December 5, 1811, in George Edward Reed, ed.
Pennsylvania Archives. Series IV, (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1900), 752. 
a Report and Memorial of the President and Managers, of the Union Canal Company, of Pennsylvania- 
Made and Presented to the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, at Their Session 1812-13 
(Philadelphia: John Binns, 1812), 9.
Report of the Watering Committee, on the Disposal of the Surplus Water Power of the River Schuylkill, 
and the Construction of a Canal Between the Schuylkill and Delaware (Philadelphia: Councils of the 
Corporation of Philadelphia, 1825), 12.
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early republic.7 W hether one had an optimistic view of the abilities and merits of 
the commonfolk or a darker opinion, nearly everybody believed that the creation 
of a proper framework of laws and institutions could contribute greatly to the 
survival of the new nation.8 For Republicans, confidence usually lay in strictures 
limiting government, such as the federal Bill of Rights and state guarantees of 
religious freedom. For Federalists, society’s salvation lay in strong political and 
financial institutions that could in turn restrain social entropy. During the 
Federalist era, the intensity of debate over the federal and state constitutions as 
well as over policy showed that Americans of all political persuasions took 
controversies over political and economic structure extremely seriously, both 
because they understood the ir actions to be perhaps irreversible precedents and 
because they saw those issues as being inextricably connected to social 
concerns such as economic opportunity.9 This intuition for the interconnection of 
political, economic, and social problems— and the quest to solve those 
problems— had evolved from the Enlightenment tradition of political economy, a 
tradition permeating eighteenth-century American thought through sources as
7For a discussion of the relation between republican ideology and manufacturing technology, see John F. 
Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America. 1776-1900 (New York: 
Grossman Publishers, 1976).
8For the intellectual background of the belief in the efficacy of political and legal structures to influence 
social structure in the Constitutional period, see Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic.
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969) and Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo 
Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985). For an 
analysis of the continuing confidence of the American people in such institutions in the following decades, 
see Daniel Feller. The Jacksonian Promise: America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995).
9For the best account of the ideological zeal of the 1790s and the political and personal bitterness that such 
fervor engendered see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).
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diverse as Tom Paine’s Common Sense. Cato’s Letters, the Federalist Papers, 
and countless newspaper entries.10
Canals and river navigations offered a possible solution to one of the most 
vexing philosophical and political problems facing the new nation. The 
conundrum of conflicting interests had played a central role in political economy 
for centuries; the notion that a republic could survive only through at least some 
modicum of public virtue and the occasional placing o f the common weal above 
private interest form ed a cornerstone of American political economy.11 In the 
minds of many, the divergence of American interests with Britain’s had 
precipitated the Am erican Revolution. A number o f the men involved in the 
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal and the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal had 
served in the Continental Congress or under W ashington in the Continental 
Army and thus had first-hand knowledge of the numerous ways that sectional, 
class, state, and occupational interests could threaten the young republic’s very 
survival. In Federalist #10, James Madison assuaged some anxieties over the 
disparate interests o f a far-flung population by turning plurality into a virtue, 
arguing that no single interest would be able to dominate the federal 
government. Nonetheless, the revolutionary generation, perhaps mindful of the 
national government’s dysfunction under the Articles of Confederation and the
10The literature concerning republican ideology is vast. The seminal works include Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); J.G.A.
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Republican Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in 
Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); and Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); for a  
summary, see Robert E. Shalhope, “Republicanism and Early American Historiography,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 3d Ser. 39 (April 1982), 334-356.
11For an extensive discussion of the origins of arguments relating to the role interest in eighteenth-century 
political economy, see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Cathy D. Matson and Peter S.
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raucous free-for-all that routinely characterized state legislatures, remained 
apprehensive that if the population’s concerns diverged enough, the fractious 
states and the federal union would be endangered.
Many Americans thus deemed any projects that could join people from 
different areas as especially felicitous to the republican experiment. In Federalist 
#11, Alexander Hamilton lauded the merits of “a unity o f commercial, as well as 
political, interests” that would result in “one great American system.”12 Canals 
and river navigations seemed to fit the bill perfectly, even according to Madison: 
in Federalist #14, he pointed out that the fragility of the large republic would be 
mitigated by “an interior navigation...throughout...the thirteen states. The 
communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between 
different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous 
canals.”13 He pointed out that “intercourse throughout the Union... [would] be 
facilitated by new improvements,” and help to keep Americans forever “knit 
together as they are by so many cords of affection.”14 The man who had the 
greatest single influence on the Constitution spoke for many when he argued 
that internal navigation would contribute greatly to the success of the federal 
union.
Meanwhile, Philadelphians who put a high premium on social and 
economic stability, including men such as Ebenezer Hazard, George Clymer, 
and John Nicholson, had immediate proof that intra-state unity was as fragile as
Onuf provide a more specific analysis of American political economy in A Union of Interests: Political and 
Economic Thought in Revolutionary America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #11," in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin, 
1961), 90-91.
13James Madison, “Federalist #14,” 102.
u Madison. Federalist Papers. 102-3.
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the national compact. In the early 1790s western Pennsylvanians protested, 
sometimes violently, the federal excise tax on whiskey, leading to the federal 
march to put down the “whiskey rebellion” in late 1794.15 At the same time, 
settlers and two groups of speculators— one from Pennsylvania, the other 
representing Connecticut claimants to the same territory—continued wrangling 
over disputed land titles in central and western Pennsylvania. Neither of these 
types of extended conflict, moreover, was limited to the Keystone state. Maine 
settlers and speculators would fight over land claims for at least another 
decade.16 The Green Mountain Boys managed to carve themselves a new state 
by exploiting the conflicts between New York and New Hampshire claimants, 
perhaps flirting with joining Canada in the process.17 A group of Appalachian 
settlers seceded from North Carolina in the late 1780s to found the short-lived 
state of Franklin and made overtures to Spain before the area came under 
federal control. These fears took years to dissipate; even Aaron Burr’s bizarre 
1807 schemes— though completely unrealistic— were widely perceived to be 
serious threats to federal cohesion. To many Philadelphia Federalists, the 
message must have been clear: that Pennsylvanians in the mountains and 
beyond perceived the ir interests as being at odds with those of east-coast 
speculators and governments. Something was needed to establish the loyalty of
15Thomas Slaughter, in The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987) argued that Western Pennsylvanians, at least partly because they sent their 
goods west down the Ohio River to the Mississippi and on to New Orleans, had different economic interests 
than did Philadelphians.
1BWhile Alan Taylor, in Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Main 
Frontier. 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American 
History and Culture, 1990) argued that settlers and speculators had differing views of the nature of 
property—based on labor and law, respectively—at bottom, their conflict was over who owned particular 
plots of land and often pitted local settlers again Boston-based speculators, and thus boiled down to a 
direct conflict of interest.
17See Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the 
Early American Frontier (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
westerners, and the integration of western areas intto the economic fabric of the 
Atlantic ports seemed to be the best solution. In th* eir desire to bring unity to 
their state and to the union, Pennsylvanians did nott stand alone in their positive 
view of the beneficial effects of canals.
Both in other states and at the national leveL, Americans of nearly all 
political persuasions held lofty opinions of the potemtial influence of internal 
navigation upon the economy and the polity. In ressponse to an 1807 
congressional request for a comprehensive review • on internal navigation, 
Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, in his welll-received and much-praised 
report on roads and canals, predicted that better in la n d  transportation “will 
shorten distances, facilitate commercial and persomal intercourse, and unite by a 
still more intimate community of interests, the most remote quarters of the United 
States.”18 In Gallatin’s opinion, “no other single operation... can more effectually 
tend to strengthen and perpetuate that union, w h ich  secures external 
independence, domestic peace, and internal liberty'.”19 An open letter from 
Robert Fulton, added as an appendix to Gallatin’s n'eport, put the Cabinet 
member’s sentiments in more practical terms: “wha -t stronger bonds of union can 
be invented,” the steam-boat entrepreneur rhetorica lly asked, “than those which 
enable each individual to transport the produce of hnis industry [1,200] miles fo r 
60 cents the hundred weight?” He answered that “ffiere then is a certain method 
of securing the union of the states, and of rendering it as lasting as the continent
18[Albert Gallatin], Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Smbiect of Public Roads and Canals; 
Made in Pursuance of a Resolution of Senate, of March 2. 1807. Apnril 12. 1808 (Washington: R.C. 
Weightman, 1808), 8.
19Gallatin, 8.
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we inhabit.”20 Henry Clay’s American System, too, and the passage of the 
Bonus Bill in 1817 demonstrated national support for projects that could integrate 
the interests of w est and east. Madison vetoed the measure not out of 
disapproval for such projects— indeed, he had written and spoken in favor of 
better transportation as a national cement fo r three decades— but because of 
scruples over the constitutionality of federal funding for them. Philadelphia area 
canal boosters d id not exaggerate much when lauding “the wish at this time so 
universally expressed, in favour of internal improvement.”21
While early Pennsylvania project boosters were most likely sincere in their 
desire to keep the  union together, they had another, far more immediate reason 
fo r using communitarian arguments: an appeal based upon individual interest 
had little potential fo r success. The companies simply could not raise enough 
money from private investors to complete the ir canals. Both the Delaware and 
Schuylkill canal and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill canal did enjoy an initial 
flurry of subscriptions, but they had trouble collecting further installments, a 
problem exacerbated by construction costs fa r exceeding original estimates.
Because they could not raise enough money from individuals, officials of 
the two companies constantly lobbied the state government for funds, or at least 
fo r better circumscribed exclusive lottery rights in the state. However, the areas 
through which the canals were routed were still sparsely populated, and as yet 
the western part o f the state was not developed to the point that transportation 
from one end of the  state to the other formed a top priority for western residents.
Z0Robert Fulton to Albert Gallatin, December 8, 1807, as quoted in Gallatin, 123.
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Furthermore, a potential rise in taxes of any kind continued to be an especially 
touchy subject in the very districts that might profit most in the long run from the 
canals: those that had experienced unrest during the 1780s and 1790s, including 
the Whiskey Rebellion Fries Rebellion.22 Company boosters shrewdly 
calculated that fewer citizens would benefit from the canals than were not 
completely opposed to any use of state tax money; that minority would not net 
them enough political leverage fo r the necessary legislative majority. They had 
to find some wider, more compelling reason for legislators and their constituents 
to vote for state funding. Therein lay the practical reasons fo r using the potential 
union of the state as their rhetorical paradigm: company backers then could 
portray the canals as projects that would benefit everyone in the state by 
strengthening the body politic. Throughout the period, inland navigation boosters 
knew that neither party would oppose projects for ideological reasons; public 
improvements did not become a partisan issue in Pennsylvania because 
everyone supported the idea of better transportation, at least in the abstract.23 If 
company officials could convince a majority of legislators that the canal would 
help all districts, rather than a privileged few, then crucial state aid would come 
their way.
21 Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania: to the Stockholders. 
Made in Compliance with the Provisions Contained in Their Act of Incorporation (Philadelphia: John Bioren, 
1818), 3.
^See Terry Bouton, “A Road Closed: Rural Insurgency in Post-Independence Pennsylvania," Journal of 
American History Dec 2000 <http://www.historycooperative.Org/joumals/jah/87.3/bouton.html> (2 Mar. 
2001).
23Although partisan bickering in the Pennsylvania legislature was highly contentious at times, internal 
transportation—like defense or education in later times—was a principle general enough for all to claim 
support it without necessarily actually funding it. See Douglas E. Bowers, “From Logrolling to Corruption: 
The Development of Lobbying in Pennsylvania, 1815-1861,” Journal of the Early Republic, 3 (Winter, 1983), 
439-474; Philip Shriver Klein, Pennsylvania Politics 1817-1823: A Game Without Rules (Philadelphia: The 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1940), 357; and Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the 
Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics 1800-1816 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, 1952), 304.
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Before the 1820s, few contradicted the claims that inland navigations 
brought people of disparate interests together. Just about every community, in 
fact, did want a canal or river navigation running through its backyards because 
the alternative, poor transportation, hurt a locality in a variety of ways. Most 
obviously, it meant being shut out of economic development. Pamphlet after 
pamphlet touting the benefits of inland navigation projects compared the costs of 
water transport to overland transport, a difference that could affect a farmer’s 
bottom line significantly. That in turn influenced property values, sending land 
prices in canal-fed areas skyward and depressing those in land-locked localities. 
Compounding matters, some of the taxes local residents paid to the state might 
go to projects that helped other areas connect to Philadelphia. No locality 
wanted its state tax dollars to pay for farmers living in some other area to be able 
to undercut their ability to sell their produce profitably. Consequently, the 
Pennsylvania legislature tended to distribute money to very small projects fairly 
equally across the state, but was often stingy with major projects that would only 
benefit one portion of the state.24 Even the arguments against many projects 
reinforced the rhetoric of unifying effects: the projects most likely to be defeated 
were those that tunneled Pennsylvania goods to seaports in other states.
The theory that canal and river navigations united interests had special 
resonance because, as both contemporaries and historians have noted, there 
was much truth to the general assertion that good canals made good neighbors. 
Inland navigation companies detailed the goods that traveled up and down their
24That is, until the Pennsylvania Canal, a public project so huge that it promised something to nearly every 
county, and eventually almost bankrupted the state in the process. See Robert McCulloch, The 
Pennsylvania Main Line Canal (York, PA: American Canal and Transportation Center, 1976).
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projects. In 1829, fo r example, the Schuylkill Navigation Company bragged that 
21,329 tons of goods had been shipped upstream in the previous year, including 
all sorts of manufactured items under the rubric of “merchandise"; building 
materials such as plaster, marble, and cement; and a new delicacy for people 
living inland, fresh saltwater fish, the appearance of which “had such an effect 
upon the visages of [inland residents] that it would have been a fit subject for the 
pencil of a Hogarth to imitate."25 Philadelphians not only sold finished goods 
upstream, but also bought tons of commodities from the hinterland coming down 
the navigation: in the same year, 84,133 tons had descended the river, more 
than half of it anthracite, but also other extracted products such as iron, lead, 
and lime; manufactured items including flour, hats, and whiskey; and agricultural 
products like grain, hogs, and butter.26 A contemporary pamphlet corroborated 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s boasts, with merchant after merchant 
testifying to the thousands of barrels of goods they had shipped up and down the 
r ive r27 Like other cities in the same period, Philadelphia’s economy expanded 
both figuratively and literally as an ever-greater physical area became more 
closely integrated into the city’s economic fabric.28 The hinterland benefited at 
least as much or possibly more than the city; despite the greater bulk of
25 Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January 
5. 1829 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1829), 10. Pottsville Miner’s Journal, October 31, 1829 as quoted in 
J. Bennett Nolan, The Schu''lkill (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 29.
26 Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January 
5.1829 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1829), 11. My understanding of flour as a manufactured good 
comes from Brooke Hunter, “America’s First Industry: Flour Manufacturing in the Lower Delaware River 
Valley, 1750-1800,” presented at the McNeil Center for Early American Studies, November 3, 1999; cited by 
permission of author.
7Naviaat?on and Advantages of the River Schuylkill for Foreign Trade. Established bv Affidavits 
([Philadelphia], 1829).
See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978), 111-112. Lindstrom’s central argument is that improvements in 
transportation led intraregional specialization, which in turn fueled the economic expansion of the North in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Francis X. Blouin, Jr., identified the same phenomena farther
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downstream traffic, upstream traffic was actually higher in terms of dollar value.29 
Both Philadelphians and the people living in its growing economic orbit could see 
the mutual benefits of inland navigation in their pantries and their account books.
By the 1820s the more pompous strains of “uniting the union” tended to 
be relayed in a shorthand in which Philadelphia-area boosters needed only to 
mention the connection between two specific geographic areas to imply the 
commingling of interests tha t would occur should a given project be completed. 
Popular familiarity with both the projects and the terms of the debate certainly 
played a role. For thirty years, beginning with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company and the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Company and continuing 
with their successor the Union Canal Company, boosters had bombarded the 
public and the legislature w ith pamphlets and petitions. The Schuylkill 
Navigation Company, Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, the Delaware and 
Hudson Canal Company, the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, and a host 
of others later took up the same refrain. As of 1822, Pennsylvania had chartered 
eighteen canal companies, some of which had applied to the General Assembly 
in more than one legislative session and nearly all of which were the subjects of 
multiple acts of the legislature over several sessions.30 Perhaps equally 
important, by the 1820s the men proposing, administering, and legislating such 
ventures thought Pennsylvania’s polity to be far less fragile than had their fathers 
in the 1790s. They felt less self-conscious about appealing to the interests of 
different groups and regions, knowing that their audiences did not fear for the
northward in The Boston Region. 1810-1850: A Study of Urbanization (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 
1980).
29Lindstrom, 102-105.
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state’s fragility.31 Nonetheless, the repetition of their message and its 
undertones left no doubt that the great majority of Pennsylvanians considered 
inland navigation projects to be a  uniting influence.
In his study of Virginia and central Pennsylvania internal improvements, 
economic historian John Majewski suggested that early corporate transportation 
project boosters engaged in two levels of discourse. Privately, corporate insiders 
professed their motivations to be those of communitarian values: that is, that 
they engaged in such activities out of strong patriotism and selfless concern for 
the community’s overall economic wellbeing. Meanwhile, their public 
pronouncements— petitions and annual reports—also emphasized potential 
profits, often in the very same documents that actually revealed staggering 
budget shortfalls, discouraging engineering setbacks, and ponderously slow 
rates of construction progress. As Majewski pointed out, the internal 
improvement companies’ difficulties in raising funds testified to the fact that few 
investors took these rosy predictions seriously; Philadelphia-area turnpike and
32inland navigation companies experienced the same fund-raising travails. Most 
people who bought stock did so in expectation of the appreciation of real estate 
values or to get goods to market more cheaply. Perhaps Majewski drew too fine 
a  line between the public and private discourse in that companies’ public 
literature also often testified to how internal improvements could “go far towards
30Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822), 
18.
31 Many Americans remained concerned about the strength of the union, as Henry Clay demonstrated with 
the popularity of his ideas concerning the “American System.” However, Pennsylvania was far more stable 
in the 1820s than in the early 1790s, not long after the Pennamite-Yankee conflicts and during the Whiskey 
Rebellion.
32John D. Majewski, A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the 
Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 54-55.
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realising the enlightened views of the patriotick statesman,” as an 1812 petition 
in favor of granting a charter to the Schuylkill Navigation Company stated.33 Still, 
he rightly argued tha t the constant claims of profitability were attempts to 
legitimate private and governmental investment in these projects.34
Boosters further argued that, even should they not make money directly 
from their investment in inland navigations, they would still recoup their outlays. 
An anonymous January 1812 letter to a popular Philadelphia newspaper offered 
exactly the same reasoning to answer his own question, “W ho, then, will invest 
his money in this stock, when not half the income can be derived from it which he 
can acquire in any other way?” Touting “the immense importance of public 
improvements,” a w riter identifying himself only as “PENN” urged greater public 
and private funding of turnpike and navigation companies as the solution to the 
money problems of inland navigation projects. He considered the answer to his 
rhetorical question “obvious”: that “years must elapse before an adequate rise in 
the value of the lands will take place, yet... the improvements will at last so 
enhance the value o f the lands as to yield more than the requisite sum to secure 
the holders of stock against loss.” He added another reason that Majewski did 
not identify. For an individual or the state to invest in a project that admitted 
financial futility was difficult; if the companies at least gave lip service to 
dividends, investors would be assured that their dollars would be handled wisely 
once in the companies’ coffers. Perhaps taking their cue from Adam Smith, 
petitioners to the state government already complained about the inefficiency of
^Josiah White, petition to legislature, December 5, 1812, Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania.
^Majewski, 56.
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publicly supervised projects, specifically pointing out that they spent taxpayers’ 
dollars foolishly. As “PENN” wrote, “the public never has been...so capable of 
having work well and expeditiously done as companies of individuals, deeply 
interested in the issue, and devoting every requisite personal attention.”35 
Navigation company pamphlets argued that because governments gave up on 
any pretense to profit they might spend taxpayers’ money wastefully, but a 
corporation that at least retained the goal o f going into the black reassured 
potential stockholders that their money would be used constructively.
Boosters worked and reworked the argum ent that the private interest of 
investors and company officers would ensure tha t boards of managers built 
quickly and efficiently. In a deft flip, company promoters also reversed the logic. 
If the profit motive inherent in incorporated companies legitimized those 
corporations, then any profits turned by internal improvement companies, too, 
were proper gains as long as the pursuit of them did not conflict with the public 
interest. Petitioners to the Pennsylvania legislature “[did] not hesitate to avow... 
that views of individual profit had a share in the motives of inducement” to  found 
and invest in internal improvement companies. Nonetheless, they only gained 
“individual profit connected with public advantage, — the pursuit of a lawful, a 
necessary, and a laudable end, by fair, lawful, and honourable means—  
persuaded...that their efforts were in accordance with the views of the
36Pennsylvania legislature." According to internal improvement company 
investors, the possibility of profits made internal navigation companies good, and
35Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, January 24, 1812.
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the lofty goals of internal improvement companies made profits good— too bad, 
they privately lamented, that the companies rarely made good profits.
Using the corporate profit motive to promote internal improvement 
corporations met with mixed success, but appeals to individual profit proved 
better at catching public attention. The changing appeals of the Union Canal 
Company to potential investors— including individuals, town governments, and 
the state legislature— before the War of 1812 showed a subtle shift from playing 
on anxieties over the republic’s fragility to extolling the virtues of economic 
development through the collected strivings of individuals. That change partly 
reflected changing economic factors. The Susquehanna and Schuylkill and the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal companies floundered for over a decade because 
of financial and technical setbacks despite an initial flurry of activity in the early 
1790s. In 1807, with Jefferson’s Embargo looming, Philadelphia merchants 
began to look more carefully for domestic outlets for investment and 
development. A syndicate comprised of some of the original investors as well as 
speculators new to the projects decided that the inland navigation idea still held 
merit. This group sought to combine the two companies and their assets under 
a new charter from the state legislature, naming the amalgamation the “Union 
Canal Company.” The company’s public petition for a charter parroted the old 
lines that “the facility o f transportation by water not only encourages agriculture, 
manufactures, and commerce, but greatly tends to strengthen the bands of union 
between citizens inhabiting different parts of a country,” a self-conscious
^Citizens of Philadelphia, Petition to Pennsylvania General Assembly, House File, 49th Session-1, 1824- 
25, Folder 5, Pennsylvania General Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7, 
Pennsylvania State Archives.
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paraphrase of the original charters.37 Furthermore, they blamed the failure of the 
first two companies at least partly upon “the  baleful effects o f local interests.”38 
These included the “short sighted individuals, and their neighbours, affected by 
the same errors, [who] have concurred in exacting unreasonable prices for slips 
of land, far exceeding the proportional value of the remainder of the farm.”39 A 
letter to the Philadelphia Aurora exhibited the same logic, tracing canal troubles 
in general to “various efforts of speculation and the influence of private over 
public interests... and the infidelity and artifices of persons who sacrificed every 
principle of public duty to an unjustifiable selfishness.”40 The canal company and 
its friends suggested that by asking exorbitant amounts for real estate through 
which the canal would travel, the property owners put their own interests ahead 
of the greater good— represented by the canal’s potential to bring better 
transportation and higher overall real estate prices for everyone. Union Canal 
Company backers claimed to represent the public against the unseemly pursuit 
of individual interest.
Those same men were not above manipulating that line of reasoning in 
creative ways. The Union Canal Com pany’s 1811 petitions to the legislature for 
state aid hinted at the justification of private interest while using the old familiar 
terms. When “the powerful motive of individual interest is combined and united 
with the more exalted sentiment which Patriotism and Public Spirit inspire to 
hasten its completion,” company officials argued, their canal would provide great
37Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application for a Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal 
Company" Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 2.
Paleske, 3.
39Paleske, 3.
40January 15, 1812, Philadelphia Aurora General Advertiser.
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service to the commonwealth.41 In other words, canal backers were once again 
asking for state investment to supplement funds raised through the sale of stock 
to individuals in the building o f the canal. The harnessing of “the powerful motive 
of individual interest’ to promote the general good did not represent a new idea, 
at least to anyone who had read David Hume, Adam Smith, or the many 
newspaper editors and politicians influenced by their ideas. Also, the Union 
Canal Company officers still characterized “Patriotism and Public Spirit’ as being 
a “more exalted sentiment’ than the desire for private gain. However, unlike in 
previous lobbying efforts, this tim e boosters were not warning of the divisive 
dangers of interest and the subsequent need to unite potentially disruptive 
private ends. Instead, they portrayed individual economic efforts as potentially 
valuable when properly directed. Naturally, they considered their own project a 
proper direction. Private interest, these petitioners implied, was not an inherently 
disjunctive force, separating individuals from society so as to pull it apart; rather 
it represented a neutral impulse, one that could be either positive or negative 
depending upon how it was channeled. The authors of the Union Canal 
Company petition argued that internal improvement would point private interest 
in a constructive direction. However, before the project gained momentum, the 
W ar of 1812 pushed discussions of private interest and o f big construction 
projects to the bottom of the political agenda.
Wars always disrupt economies, and the United States’ second struggle 
against the British proved no exception. Especially because Philadelphians put
41 Report and Memorial of the President and Managers, of the Union Canal Company, of Pennsylvania.
Made and Presented to the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, at Their Session 1812-13 
(Philadelphia: John Binns, 1812), 8.
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much money and energy into building defenses for the city, the W ar of 1812 
interrupted significant canal activity while at the same time indirectly providing 
the impetus for increased development along different economic and ideological 
tracks. The steep wartime rise in fuel prices prompted city residents to search 
for alternate sources of energy, a quest that would eventually result in the push 
to find ways to use anthracite and to bring it to market. Ideologically, the 
ultimately successful prosecution of the war—or at least, the United States’ 
ability to survive the British onslaught until peace came in Europe— helped put to 
rest many Americans’ fears about the ability of the Union to stay together in 
times of crisis.42 Combined with the Louisiana Purchase, the W ar of 1812 gave 
Americans the confidence that their country would not be torn apart either 
through British conquest from the north and east or through French or Spanish 
seduction from the south and west. Furthermore, by the time the war was over, 
a younger generation began to drive national politics. Men such as Henry Clay, 
John Calhoun, Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson held 
widely differing views about the government’s role in the economy, but they all 
appeared to take for granted the primacy of economic development in civic 
policy.43 DeWitt Clinton certainly had practical commerce as much on his mind 
as political philosophy in his nearly evangelical fervor for New York State’s Great 
Western, or Erie, Canal.44 The issue of finding institutions or technologies to
42See Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America. 1790-1820 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
43The literature on these men and on the role of development in national politics is vast. For a summary, 
see Daniel Feller. The Jacksonian Promise: America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), 53-75. The best one-volume work on national politics in this era is Harry L. Watson, Liberty 
and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill & Wang, 1990), which places differing 
concepts of economic development and growth as the central political debate of the time.
^See Ronald Shaw, Erie Water West: A History of the Erie Canal 1792-1854 (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1966).
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bind the nation together suddenly seemed much less pressing— indeed, nearly 
superfluous— compared to the desire for more goods, better markets, and the 
institutions and technologies that could make them more easily and more widely 
available.
In and around Philadelphia, too, a younger generation of men became 
the most energetic actors in local affairs, less anxious about the fate o f the 
republic but with an even keener interest in encouraging Philadelphia’s growth 
than their predecessors. They were men like Samuel Wetherill Jr., the son of a 
prominent local paint and dye manufacturer, who pioneered the manufacture of 
white lead and mined much of his ore in the Schuylkill Valley; Josiah White, 
whose experience owning a wire-pulling manufactory led him to experiment with 
anthracite; Joshua Gilpin, a Delaware paper mill owner; and Mathew Carey, the 
political economist who built the United nation’s first printing and publishing 
empire. Their interests often contradicted those of their merchant predecessors 
(and, for that matter, contemporary merchants, too), in a number of issues 
ranging from tariffs to credit accessibility. These men wasted little time worrying 
about the fragility of the nation but gave much thought to Philadelphia’s 
economic prospects and how to push the city in directions that would ensure 
their own fortunes as well as their community’s. They saw that Philadelphia’s 
future lay in economic expansion inland rather than toward the Atlantic, and that 
manufacturing would form a crucial component of that growth. Furthermore, they 
thought that the best way for Philadelphia to reach its potential was to unleash 
the talents and drive of every citizen, and to do so required the ability of
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tradesmen and manufacturers to pursue the ir own interests, adding to the whole 
city’s economy.
In addition, the boosters who launched internal improvement projects in 
the late 1810s and the 1820s had much m ore particular goals than the Delaware 
and Schuylkill and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill partisans, and they 
articulated those goals in far more specific term s. While pamphlets and 
petitions for the earlier projects usually included long reveries on the intangible 
benefits that internal navigation could bestow upon the society and the body 
politic, later ones were more likely to be filled with concrete calculations 
estimating savings on transportation costs from  locations along the proposed 
navigation to Philadelphia’s warehouses. This shift in emphasis reflected more 
than a greater accumulated mass of available economic information. It also held 
two profound implications. First, economic growth— in this case, through lowered 
transportation costs— could now be advanced as a sufficient condition for 
economic activity, regardless of any possible hypothetical bonus fo r the polity. 
Second, while these pamphlets would often show savings to the whole 
community in terms o f time and money fo r w ater travel as opposed to overland 
transport, they also pointed out the savings to individuals. Canal companies in 
effect made a subtle but personal sales pitch: support the canal, invest in it, get 
your representatives to vote for its charter, and you will be rewarded in gold. The 
men who wrote these company publications would use the same kinds of 
arguments in favor of the adoption of anthracite coal, or in fact any of their 
ventures. They were now making an appeal less directed to patriotism or the 
greater good and more focused on economic expansion and personal interest.
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The use of an argum ent placing the welfare of the community first held 
serious drawbacks particularly fo r the Schuylkill and Lehigh navigations and the 
Delaware and Hudson Canal. While each project had a metropolitan area as its 
downstream terminus, they all started as near as possible to the coalfields of 
eastern Pennsylvania. That is to say, they began in regions that were sparsely 
settled in the 1810s and early 1820s, dotted with occasional villages and with 
farms that barely generated enough cash to pay taxes. Even in 1832, Josiah 
W hite of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company frankly admitted that “our 
canal terminates in a  complete barren wilderness.”45 The area of Pennsylvania 
bordered by New Jersey on the east, New York on the north, the Susquehanna 
to the west, and Philadelphia to the south boasted only one town, Reading, 
larger than 2,500 people. The coal-related projects could not connect the great 
northwest to the eastern seaboard, the northern cities to the southern cities, or 
even highly developed hinterland with the nearest city. A t least the Schuylkill 
navigation would pass by Reading and eventually have the Union Canal as a 
feeder. That was barely enough to convince the state legislature to purchase 
$100,000 in Schuylkill Navigation Company stock after the Panic of 1819, a 
measure intended to create temporary employment rather than a grand 
commitment to the project’s completion. With that exception, however, direct 
state investment in Philadelphia-region canals ended. Inland navigation 
company officials would have to find private sources of investment. The 
Chesapeake and Delaware Company, in 1823, tried canvassing the various 
wards of Philadelphia, inducing city residents to invest “for the purpose of
4SJosiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 6.
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completing a work of g rea t national importance, w ithout regard to any pecuniary 
advantage which might possib ly accrue to the stockholders.”46 Such efforts 
yielded little success, so cana l backers knew they would need some reason 
more compelling than the greater good to attract money from individuals.
Another issue, dam ages, directly belied the assertion that canals were 
universal instruments of communion and hastened Philadelphia-area residents 
to consider that canal com panies represented one among many competing 
interests. River navigations and sometimes canals required dams that could 
flood surrounding fields e ithe r permanently or on a semiannual basis. Company 
officials found themselves continually dragged into county courts to settle claims 
for inundated property. T h e  vicissitudes of owning land along the route proved to 
be extremely annoying a nd  contributed to the high costs of canal building.
Having extensive experience with English canals, Benjamin Henry Latrobe 
related that the "proprietor who sells land to a Canal Company, independently of 
dissevering his property, exposes it to the depredations of boatmen, who at a 
distance from their homes,, are often in want of fru it and poultry, and fence-rails 
for fireing." Consequently, “he therefore demands a price which will cover the 
land lost, perhaps the destruction of his meadows, the inconvenience, and the 
nuisance, and also an insurance from depredations.”47 The question of 
damages pitted the interests of those who used a navigation, represented by the 
company that owned and operated it, against the interests of the people who
46Charles Biddle to Mathew Carey, April 29, 1823, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence 
on Internal Improvement, Edward Cary Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
47B. Henry Latrobe, Remarks on the Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company to the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, as Far as It Notices the “View of 
the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with Wholesome Water. Printed by order 
of the Committee of the Councils (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 6.
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lived directly along it; in 1822, Southwark residents petitioned against a canal 
from  the Delaware to the Schuylkill cutting through their neighborhood because it 
would be “destructive to the best interests of your Memorialists.” Pointing out the 
“inconvenience and destruction to public and private property, in making a Canal 
through a thickly settled district,” they further wrote that they were “fearful [that] 
any attempt to recover damages by the tedious and expensive process of law, 
will not compensate the sufferers fo r the injuries they will thus sustain.”48 
Although many people benefited from the extension of inland navigations, those 
who lived along the routes testified tha t canals and river navigations were a 
decidedly mixed blessing.49
Ignoring the complaints of local property owners, canal company 
supporters applied the ideology of community interest to defend themselves 
against local property owners in the court of public opinion. They employed a 
tactic of which business leaders became especially fond: identifying the public 
interest with their own. It was an easy leap for them to make. Having already 
posited that economic growth inherently contributed to the greater good, they 
argued that they, as the agents of tha t growth, therefore represented and indeed 
even guarded the public interest. Under this rhetorical twist, “damages...to be 
assessed by men, either locally interested or biased by other causes” could then 
be denounced as the obstacles that greedy individuals put in the way of the 
whole society’s goals. Company officials eventually used such language in
“^ Petition to General Assembly, House File, 46th Session-1, 1821-22 (Canal and Navigation Companies, 
Roads, Turnpikes), Pennsylvania General Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7, 
Pennsylvania State Archives.
49For an examination of the ambivalence toward internal improvements and the changes they brought, see 
Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress. 1817-1862 (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1996).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
201
nearly any instance of opposition to the wishes o f internal improvement company 
boards. George Paleske, one of the men behind the merger that resulted in the 
Union Canal Company, went so far as to argue that the state should exempt 
canal companies from property taxes, “which would of course oblige them to 
raise the tolls, evidently to the disadvantage of the public, for the benefit of 
perhaps one county."50 Paleske’s bold suggestion— that county property taxes 
enacted by publicly elected officials operated against public interest— never 
made its way into any navigation company charters, because every locality 
wanted to reserve the right to tax whomever it wanted. Besides, counties 
clamoring for better transportation had no desire to alienate internal 
improvement companies and certainly would not raise local taxes simply to 
gouge only one of its taxpayers. Still, Paleske’s attitude and rhetoric typified 
much internal improvement company posturing.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company in particular did not hesitate to claim 
that any threat to the company inherently jeopardized the public interest. In 
March 1826, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act with sixteen clauses 
listing possible infractions against internal improvement companies along with 
the legal remedies.51 For the most part, these measures reflected practical 
concerns; for example, the prohibition against boatmen's use of iron-tipped poles 
protected canal beds from repairs that could both be costly and potentially shut 
down the waterway during the busy season. The law also authorized internal 
improvement companies to build and maintain towpaths. That July, Richard
^Paleske, 14.
51 Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia: 
Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 28.
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Peters, Jr., the bridge-builder's son, wrote to the company protesting their 
construction a towpath on his property, and disputed the company's rights under 
the law. Schuylkill Navigation Company president Joseph S. Lewis curtly replied 
that the "provisions are such as are indispensable to the security of the works, 
and to the public enjoyment o f the ir benefits." Lewis had inserted "public 
enjoyment" for what clearly was the company's bottom line. He further asserted 
that Peters had nothing to complain about because “before the navigation was 
made, the advantages you suppose to be lost... were enjoyed by the mere 
permission of the commonwealth. If they exist at present, they have been 
created by the Company."52 In other words, Peters once may have been able to 
use the river because it was a public, but once the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company began building, it could only be used through the company's good 
graces. According to Lewis's reasoning, what belonged to the public belonged to 
the company, and what belonged to the company also belonged to the company. 
Internal improvement company boards did not hesitate to claim that their 
interests ipso facto not only coincided with the public interest, but also actually 
were the public interest.
Beginning in the 1820s, inland navigation boosters began to shift from the 
rhetoric of projects’ potential uniting influence to appeals to more locally defined 
interests. Yes, canals could still unite people, companies' pamphlets 
acknowledged, but promoters began to argue that the issue at hand had become 
exactly whose interests would be united. Although they had voiced such 
concerns in the 1790s, by the third decade of the nineteenth century
52 Joseph S. Lewis to Richard Peters, Jr., July 29, 1826. Richard Peters Correspondence, 1821-1839,
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Philadelphia investors became increasingly adamant that state-chartered 
projects should unite parts of the state to each other rather than linking 
Pennsylvania hinterlands to the markets in Baltimore or New York. In doing so, 
canal promoters recognized that groups in different regions of Pennsylvania 
would lobby for projects tha t would reflect local interests, rather than some ever- 
more-elusive general good.
Internal improvement boosters had learned that their unifying rhetoric was 
a double-edged sword, and they found a way to use the second blade 
constructively: they warned Pennsylvania investors and legislators that if canals 
did not link Philadelphia with the rest of the state, aggressive Baltimore and New 
York City would eventually have more in common with rural Pennsylvania than 
the state’s own metropolis. The Susquehanna River flowed southeast from north 
of Harrisburg to the top o f the Chesapeake; counting the river’s eastern and 
western branches and m ajor tributaries such as the Juniata River, it was the 
highway to the ocean fo r a broad swath of central Pennsylvania and even 
western New York. Tha t highway's terminus was Baltimore, and in the closing 
years of the century, Baltim ore’s foreign trade exceeded that o f Philadelphia’s. 
Contemporaries attributed much of Baltimore’s growth to its acting as an 
entrepot for the increasingly profitable trade of the Susquehanna Valley. 
Philadelphians thought tha t because Baltimore’s Susquehanna traffic originated 
in Pennsylvania, the profits rightly belonged to Philadelphia and therefore was
Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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gained at the Quaker City’s expense.53 After the W ar o f 1812, Philadelphia 
canal boosters became ever more shrill in their pronouncements “that the future 
existence of Philadelphia, as a commercial town, depends upon her opening a 
water-route to the Susquehanna.”54 One pamphleteer warned that the city “will 
cease to flourish; that she will deteriorate and fall to ruin” without a path to the 
Susquehanna: “w ithout that remedy the trade of the interior will flow into other 
channels, and leave her in a  few years neither produce fo r her exports, nor buyer 
of her imports.”55 In 1799, Philadelphians even managed to get a state measure 
passed prohibiting anyone from removing impediments to navigation along the 
lower Susquehanna, and they continued to stymie any legislation on that front for 
decades.56 Meanwhile, what Baltimore had by the grace o f nature, New York 
eventually gained through the vision and ambition of DeW itt Clinton: a waterway 
flowing westward, the Erie Canal. Thus, Both Baltimore and New York 
threatened to beat Philadelphia in the grand race to capture the future markets of 
the Great Lakes region, a competition that many observers thought would end in 
fabulous riches for the winner and stagnation and decline for the loser.
That sense of competition for the western trade at first had little basis in 
reality: the trade of the old northwest would not be profitable for decades, both 
because of a sparse population and because of the technological and
“ See James Weston Livingood, The Philadelohia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry 1780-1860 (Harrisburg:
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), and Hartz, 42-51; for Baltimore in particular, see 
Gary Browne, Baltimore in the Nation. 1780-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
“ Samuel Breck, Sketch of the Internal Improvements Already Made bv Pennsylvania: with Observations 
Upon Her Physical and Fiscal Means for Their Extension: Particularly As They have Reference to the 
Future Growth and Prosperity of Philadelphia. 2d edition (Philadelphia: M. Thomas, 1818), 43.
“ Breck, 43.
“ Livingood, 33.
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geographic limits to canal building.57 Nonetheless, Philadelphians clamored for 
waterways to the west. ‘The spirit fo r Inland Navigation is so general throughout 
our country,” a  desperate petitioner pointed out, “that if advantage is not taken by 
our own State o r its Citizens,” Philadelphia would “become in a greater or lesser 
degree insulated o r locked up from a market by more enterprising neighbours.”58 
According to one pamphleteer, “two thirds of the trade of the western [states] 
must pass through the middle eastern states and it of course becomes an object 
of the greatest interest on the part of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New-York, to 
secure this valuable commerce to their respective capitals.”59 W hichever of the 
three cities “which should by its improvements first fix the trade in its own 
channel would naturally for a long time retain it, notwithstanding the exertions of 
its neighbours to interfere with it.”60 The contest with Baltimore and New York 
lent extreme urgency to debates about how Philadelphia should improve itself 
and its fortunes: the question never became whether to go ahead but in which 
direction and how quickly. Merchants still dominated Philadelphia, and their 
experience with international trade had shown them that successful trade was 
based upon building up personal relationships with merchants, agents, and 
suppliers in other markets. They thought that if they did not make contacts with 
western farmers first, merchants in New York and Baltimore would gain and 
forever keep those customers in their orbit. So they pressed for projects that
57See Diane Lindstrom, “American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions” 
Journal of Economic History 39 (March 1979), 289-301.
58Petition to Pennsylvania House of Representatives, March 24, 1825, House File, 49th Session-1, 1824- 
25, Pennsylvania Canal Folder, Pennsylvania State Archives.
59[Samuel Mifflin], Observations on the Importance of Imorovino the Navigation of the River Schuylkill, for
the Purpose of Connecting it with the Susquehanna, and Through that River Extending Our Communication 
to the Genesee Lakes and the Ohio ([Philadelphia?], 1818), 13. 
bUMifflin, 13.
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could facilitate the ir efforts to entrench the hinterland trade for Philadelphia 
before their rivals could, enabling their city to continue growing. The men who 
proposed canal and river navigations were only too happy to oblige.
Not only did inland navigation promoters increasingly play on city 
boosterism, but also they began to emphasize mining and new kinds of industrial 
production rather than simply farming, flour milling, and commerce as keys to the 
success of their projects and economic growth in the Philadelphia area. Leaders 
o f earlier efforts, fo r example the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal Company, 
had emphasized the usefulness of their project for “a Commercial and 
Agricultural people,” noting “the immense quantity of Produce raised from the 
Farms bordering on the Susquehanna and the Schuylkill Rivers.”61 Not 
surprisingly, the newer, explicitly coal-related projects— the Schuylkill and Lehigh 
navigations and the Delaware and Hudson Canal— made the promotion of 
anthracite their top priority. First, of course, they had to promote the product: 
Pennsylvania anthracite burned differently from “British” or “V irginia” coal— the 
contemporary terms for the bituminous coal shipped into Philadelphia— and so 
required a consumer education campaign. Time after time, companies reprinted 
pamphlets touting all the advantages of anthracite coal as opposed to 
bituminous coal, charcoal, and wood~in cost, in the amount of heat generated, in 
the level of care required to tend fires, and in the quality and quantity of soot 
created. These publications usually included testimonials from various users, 
demonstrating “the importance and value of this Coal to the manufacturer as well 
as for domestic purposes.” The pamphlets also reprinted statements chosen
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from a range of tradesmen showing the black stone’s versatility in the workplace 
“for nailing, for the rolling and slitting of iron, malting, distilling, evaporation of 
salts, [and] for steam engines,” and included instructions for constructing grates 
for household and trade use as well as for lighting and tending anthracite.62 
Sometimes these publications suggested that one Pennsylvania region’s coal 
possessed better qualities than others; Lehigh-area coal, for example, 
purportedly made fo r "the most durable fire, creating an intense, but regular and 
steady heat, without disagreeable smoke or unpleasant smell, and producing no 
soot.”63 Canal investors promoted the use of anthracite coal with a nearly 
evangelical fervor.
Furthermore, boosters connected the use of anthracite to Philadelphia’s 
continued economic expansion, growth that depended upon manufacturing 
growth; the black stone would be “the inexhaustible sources of its future 
prosperity.”64 They stressed “the importance o f opening a communication with 
these mines, rendered the more necessary by the rapid disappearance of wood 
from all the streams connected with Philadelphia.”65 The iron industry, 
especially, would benefit from the availability o f this new heat source that one 
Union Canal Company pamphlet cheerfully prophesied “will render this state the 
most productive in the Union.” The writer further predicted that the Philadelphia 
region’s mineral bounty and hard work would propel the United States to
61 Broadside of Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation ([Philadelphia, 1796]), Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania.
^Charles Miner, ed. Lehigh Coal. Certificates from a Number of Persons. Shewing the use and Value of the 
Lehigh Stone Coal, with Some Prefatory Remarks (Wilkes-Barre. PA: Charles Miner, 1815), 1.
0JFacts Illustrative of the Character of the Anthracite, or Lehigh Coal. Found in the Great Mines at Mauch 
Chunk, in Possession of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, with Certificates from Various 
Manufacturers, and Others. Proving its Decided Superiority over Every Other Kind of Fuel (Philadelphia: S. 
W. Conrad, 1827), 3.
“ Breck, 17.
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“become one of the greatest iron countries on the globe.”66 Because they would 
“decrease the expense o f fuel” and thereby “encourage all manufactories,” 
canals to coal country could “increase our inland and foreign trade, restoring us 
in all probability, to the rank which our capital and resources entitle us to hold.”67 
W hat would help the city grow would also redound to the benefit of investors, as 
well; after all, “experience has shown that all canals, which supply large 
communities with so essential an article as fuel, have invariably yielded large 
profits to the stockholders.”68 Boosters were quick to make the connection 
between the consumption of coal, the success of their projects, and the city’s 
continued economic development.
At the same time that they promoted coal, inland navigation partisans also 
offered another source of energy for manufacturing: water power. Among the 
companies in the Philadelphia region, the Schuylkill Navigation Company had 
the largest stake in the promotion of water power both because of its proximity to 
the city and because, of all the projects, in the Schuylkill River it had by far the 
most reliable source of constant flow pressure.69 Even before the founding of 
the company, mills dotted the river’s banks in such places as Norristown,
Reading, and Mill Creek, and the first petitioners fo r incorporation to improve the
65Mifflin, 17.
66Annual Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania, to the 
Stockholders. November 15. 1825 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1825), 12.
°'Mifflin, 20-21.
“ Mifflin, 21.
69One of the greatest technical problems facing canal-builders was ensuring an adequate flow and water 
supply merely for navigation. That eliminated the possibility of selling waterpower for the Chesapeake and 
Delaware Canal Company, the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, and especially the Union Canal 
Company; for the last, water supply proved continually acute, limiting the use and profitability of the Union. 
The Lehigh River proved difficult to control because of the ferocity of its spring freshets, one of the reasons 
that the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had to adapt a special kind of lock, a “bear trap,” merely to 
ensure the safety of the barges. By the mid 1830s, however, the company’s land development efforts 
began to pay off, and it was selling waterpower to millers in the company-owned towns of South Easton,
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river for navigation asked for the right to rent or sell the river’s power, a right that 
the General Assembly granted to the Schuylkill Navigation Company in its 
charter.70 The City o f Philadelphia soon became the company’s largest single 
customer. In agreements signed from 1819 through 1824, the company leased 
to the city corporation enough water to supply the city waterworks along with the 
power necessary to raise it to a reservoir in exchange for a payment of $26,000 
and an arrangement by which the city would maintain the company’s installations 
through city property.71 The city government, in turn, quickly set out to sublet the 
excess power from the river once the waterworks were properly supplied. The 
Philadelphia Councils put “disposal o f water power for manufactories” as a 
primary reason fo r purchasing the waterpower, because of the “facilities thereby 
afforded to a branch of industry deserving of encouragement, as a means of 
employing a vast number of our people, and of increasing the wealth” of 
Philadelphia.72 The city government and the company had thus become 
partners in their efforts to foster industrial growth.
Meanwhile, in August of 1816, company officials optimistically estimated 
the waterpower above Manayunk— about seven miles north of the city, but still in 
Philadelphia County— sufficient to “turn day and night, about one hundred and
Mauch Chunk, White Haven, and Nesquihoning. See History of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company 
(Philadelphia: William S. Young, 1840), 47.
°“Original Draft Bill for Improving the River Schuylkill Presented in 1812-1813 by Josiah White & others,” 
Schuylkill Navigation Company Folder, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania. Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
(Philadelphia: Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 3.
’See Agreements of June 3. 1819. July 20. 1820. and June 14. 1824. Between the Mayor. Aldermen & 
Citizens of Philadelphia, and the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Relative to the Water Power. &c- at 
Fairmount (Philadelphia: F. C. Markley & Son, 1869).
'‘’Report of the Watering Committee, on the Disposal of the Surplus Water Power of the River Schuylkill. 
and the Construction of a Canal Between the Schuylkill and Delaware (Philadelphia: Councils of the 
Corporation of Philadelphia, 1825), 5.
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forty overshot mill wheels, grinding wheat.”73 Although that extravagant goal was 
never quite realized, the Schuylkill Navigation Company did nurture the 
development of Manayunk, to the point that, in 1827, one local characterized it 
as “one of the greatest manufacturing establishments in the vicinity of 
Philadelphia.” Indeed, by the 1830s it had became one of the nation’s foremost 
textile manufacturing districts.74 Company boosters and investors could see that 
such growth in the Philadelphia area provided revenue fo r the canal in a variety 
of ways: the renting of water power, the renting of property, the transportation of 
goods to and from the factories, and the transport of goods to and from the 
growing town surrounding the mills. The exploitation of waterpower, they 
realized, would be good for the company and for the Philadelphia region, and 
they continued to promote “Valuable W ater Powers, Mills, Furnace[s], Wood 
Land &c. On and near the River Schuylkill” along the length o f the navigation.75
Reinforcing the rhetorical themes of uniting interests and industrial 
development, Inland navigation companies also generated a large portion of their 
revenue from the transportation of both manufactured goods from Philadelphia 
to the hinterland and of raw materials to the city. As “valuable as [the coal trade] 
is, there is yet another source for the augmentation of the business,” the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers told its stockholders.76 
Although more coal traveled downstream than any other product— indeed, it
73Breck, 17.
74Democratic Press, September 24, 1827, as quoted in Cynthia J. Shelton, The Mills of Manayunk: 
Industrialization and Social Conflict in the Philadelphia Region. 1787-1837 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 88. Shelton puts the Manayunk district just below Lowell in terms of textile 
manufacturing output during this period.
7SBroadside, Schuylkill Navigation Company, “Valuable Water Power, Mills, Furnace, Woodlands, &c.” 
(Philadelphia: J.P. Justice, 1831).
Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January
7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 5
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remained the raison d’etre fo r several of the projects long after their initial 
construction— a host of other commodities floated down to Philadelphia fo r use 
in the city’s workshops and building trades. Canal companies boasted about 
“iron, coal, lead, zinc, marble of great beauty...many sorts of lime stone including 
that with which hydraulic or Roman cement is made, soap stone, sand stone, for 
ornamental buildings, granite for flag pavements and curb-stones.”77 Some 
annual reports to stockholders enumerated the commodities transported by type 
and by quantity, thus giving a manifest of local production. Coal, of course, 
topped these lists, but lumber, stone, limestone, iron, iron blooms, iron ore, nails, 
and sawed marble also went down to Philadelphia in significant quantities.78 The 
cheap availability of these commodities in large quantities contributed 
significantly to the ability of Philadelphia craftsmen and manufacturers to step up 
production, especially in the crucial iron-working trades that produced the tools 
and engines necessary to so many of the city’s and region’s manufacturing
7Q
enterprises.
Just as boosters promised, the growing population of the city and the 
region formed an ever-greater market for local tradesmen and manufacturers. 
“The increase in the return [ascending] trade has exceeded that of the 
descending navigation, and forms a source of revenue not much calculated upon 
at an early stage of our work,” the Schuylkill Canal Company board cheerfully
^Annual Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania, to the 
Stockholders. November 15. 1825 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1825), 5.
/dSee for example Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the 
Stockholders. January 7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 11. Lumber, wood to be used in crafts 
and construction is listed here to distinguish it from cordwood, which was used as fuel.
79See Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia. 1800-1885 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Paul E. Paskoff, Industrial Evolution: Organization. Structure,
and Growth of the Pennsylvania Iron Industry. 1750-1860 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1983).
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reported to stockholders in 1827. What was more, the navigation promised "to 
be of great importance; for as the population of the country bordering on the 
Navigation increases, their demand of supplies must also increase.”80 Though 
downstream traffic on all the inland navigations in the Philadelphia region 
exceeded upstream traffic by weight, the return traffic of finished goods was of 
greater value.81 Tradesmen and manufacturers in Philadelphia gained at least 
as much from the canals and rivers navigations as did the people who lived 
along their banks.
Accordingly, inland navigation supporters increasingly espoused the 
cause of industry, and vice versa. As early as 1812, Josiah W hite’s first 
proposal to improve the Schuylkill River promised that the waterway would “be 
made subservient to the most valuable purposes of manufacture and inland 
navigation.”82 Mathew Carey wrote and rewrote scores of pamphlets supporting 
protective tariffs for native manufacturing; he also promoted the value of internal 
navigation in creating a domestic market for the city's manufactured goods and 
the countryside’s agricultural output.83 Canal company pamphlets constantly 
predicted that internal navigation would provide a great boon for Philadelphia 
because, as a Delaware and Raritan Canal publication read, “from her will be 
drawn the supplies for the western world, of merchandise and manufactures, 
which the capital of our citizens, and the skill and industry of our artists and
^Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January 
1. 1827 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1827), 6.
Lindstrom, Economic Development. 106.
“ josiah White, petition, Decembers, 1812, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania.
83See Kenneth Rowe, Mathew Carev: A Study in American Economic Development (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1933).
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mechanics, can always furnish.”84 Inland navigation supporters argued that by 
giving Philadelphia workshops the opportunity to fulfill the demand o f a  growing 
hinterland, canals would ensure the city's continued growth and wealth.
The emphasis on mining and manufacturing proved to be ideologically 
profound in that it implied a different view both of American development and of 
the role of the individual within that growth.85 Early canal boosters had 
formulated their appeals in terms of America’s past economic development.
They did not claim tha t their canals would change either the overall economy or 
the way that people behaved in it. Rather, they argued that inland navigations 
would allow the republic to expand spatially while still remaining predominantly 
rural: an early Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company called internal 
transportation “one o f the first objects to a Commercial and Agricultural 
People.”86 The vision they offered was essentially conservative, one based upon 
replicating prevailing rural community structures ever further west by allowing 
new settlements to become economically viable by virtue of their ties to coastal 
cities and thus to the market at large through the availability of cheap 
transportation. Those boosters held rather static assumptions about the city as 
well: that it would continue to act merely as an entrepot for exporting hinterland
^Considerations on the Proposed Canal to Connect the Rivers Delaware and Raritan (Philadelphia: Joseph 
R. A. Skerrett, 1825), 5.
85For a discussion of the ideology of manufacturing, see Larry Peskin, “To ‘Protect and Encourage’ 
American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of Industrialization, 1763-1830,” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Maryland, 1998).
86Broadside of Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, 1796, Society miscellaneous Collection,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
Drew McCoy, in The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1980), argued that Jeffersonian Republicans envisioned the republic expanding 
through space but not time; in other words, that territorial growth would forestall industrial development. 
However, in Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation. 1789-1812 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), John Nelson, Jr. more convincingly demonstrated 
that Federalist merchants were as much or even more dedicated to traditional, agriculturally- and
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produce and importing finished goods. The biggest early canal boosters were 
merchants, and they had made the ir fortunes in exactly that sort o f city. For 
them, an ever-expanding, primarily agricultural republic was a most wonderful 
fantasy: it meant more profitable land speculation, more grain and flour to sell 
overseas, and greater demand fo r the products they shipped in from foreign 
ports.
The second generation of Philadelphia-area canal boosters, however, 
dreamed different dreams for the future of America. Perhaps the different 
outlook should have been expected: the previous generations had grown up as 
subjects in the provincial outpost of a worldwide empire, while those of the new 
generation came of age as citizens under an American flag. True, some of these 
younger men, too, had first made their money in mercantile pursuits spanning 
the Atlantic world. Most of them, however, had invested time and money in 
various manufacturing ventures as well and many had done so exclusively.
W hile the younger men certainly supported better access to a wider agricultural 
hinterland, they also espoused production of American manufactured goods 
rather than importation from Europe. Furthermore, because manufacturers and 
mine owners had greater difficulty getting access to bank loans than did 
merchants, they were much more likely to demand w ider access to credit and a 
larger money supply than the older men.87 Thus, the new generation of canal 
promoters imagined Philadelphia’s future quite differently than the men who had 
founded the Delaware and Schuylkill and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill canal
commercially-driven economic growth while many urban Republicans actually supported a more diversified 
economy with domestic manufacturing as a central component.
87See Chapter 4 for discussion of credit.
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companies. These younger men’s hopes for the city dovetailed perfectly with 
Clay’s, Calhoun’s, W ebster’s, and John Quincy Adams’s hopes for the nation in 
the years after the W ar of 1812: a republic connected by a network of interior 
waterways that fostered the creation of a self-sufficient national market fueled by 
equal economic opportunity— read: access to credit— fo r all (white) men. Thus, 
not only did they picture Philadelphia proper as a center for trade, but also they 
began to see the greater Philadelphia region, including manufacturing districts 
such as the Northern Liberties, Manayunk, and the Brandywine Valley, as part of 
a varied, integrated economic machine with a vital manufacturing sector. 
Agricultural land speculation in eastern Pennsylvania, with its agricultural 
emphasis, had become passe: coal now fueled Philadelphia’s economic
QQ
engine.
The young entrepreneurs had a new blueprint fo r the city’s economic 
growth, and they emphasized the importance of the profit motive in that process. 
Coal, credit, and corporations formed the cutting edge of economic activity in 
1820s Philadelphia. The men who engaged in these avenues of endeavor 
placed themselves at the forefront of the creative destruction of old traditions
89governing economic and legal relations in the marketplace. Accordingly, they 
espoused an idea that implicitly supported more aggressive behavior in the 
marketplace: that the pursuit of individual interest was a positive good unto itself,
88 This is not to say that all land speculation in the area was over: the possibility of big coal-mining profits 
led to a frenzy of speculation in potential anthracite-bearing lands in the 1820s and 1830s.
89Joseph Schumpeter, the first economist to concentrate on the effects of entrepreneurship upon economic 
growth, argued that new economic activities created paths of economic development while destroying older 
economic structures. See Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry 
into Profits. Capital. Credit. Interest, and the Business Cycle. Revers Opie, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1934).
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leading not only to personal wealth but also to regional and national wealth, and 
that public economic policy should reflect the sum of individual interests.
While men such as Josiah W hite and Joseph S. Lewis introduced 
significant economic innovations, their unabashed espousal of individual interest 
did not represent a sim ilar philosophical innovation; rather, it reflected the 
maturation of an ideology that had its American roots in the colonial era.90 Just 
as some colonists had pointed to what they (accurately) perceived as the self- 
serving aspects of the British Navigation Acts, others had suggested that 
enlightened self-interest formed the best argument fo r independence. Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776, but it was a brilliant 
summation of ideas that had already circulated widely, hinted at by both 
philosophes and Scottish political economists whose works had made the ir way 
across the Atlantic. Because their livelihoods depended upon the overseas 
markets, after the Revolution merchants and farmers alike took up the banner of 
free trade to keep tariff barriers low. But, whether or not its proponents were 
willing to admit as much, championing free trade implicitly justified the 
enlightened pursuit of self-interest: the doctrine of free trade was based upon the 
assumption that the aggregate of all individuals, making their own decisions in 
the marketplace, will create a strong national economy more efficiently than any 
appointed or eiected body. Ironically, from the late 1810s on, many of the same 
men who campaigned for high protective tariffs for industry—the very negation of
^See Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary 
America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), and Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social 
Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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laissez-faire—also used appeals to the genius of self-interest to sell an agenda of 
internal improvement.
In atypical example, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company 
supporters shifted the ir emphasis from one of union and agriculture to one of 
manufactures and interest by the 1820s. In the 1790s, or perhaps before, many 
people in southern New Jersey, southeastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, 
and northern Maryland had recognized the potential utility of a navigable 
waterway connecting the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay across a thin 
isthmus between the two bodies of water. However, the project faced even more 
obstacles than the Union Canal in that any route would have to travel through 
Delaware and Maryland, an especially sensitive point in the latter state because 
the proposed canal threatened to divert Susquehanna River tra ffic from 
Baltimore to Philadelphia. Nonetheless, particularly dogged lobbying in both 
state legislatures resulted in a Maryland charter in 1799 and a Delaware charter 
three years later. Company pamphlets and petitions extolled the same 
advantages as did other contemporary inland navigation efforts: that the canal 
would form “the great link of an inland navigation of six or seven hundred miles, 
and thereby establish a perfect, safe, easy and rapid transportation...which 
would ever tend to operate as a cement to the Union between the States.”91 
They also suggested that “the prosperity and the agricultural interest” of 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware depended upon connecting the two
91 “A Supplement to an Act to Incorporate a Company for the purpose of cutting and making a canal 
between the river Delaware and the Chesapeake Bay,” March 25, 1813, Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, No. 
5, Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
218
major waterways.92 Such appeals pushed all the usual buttons: linking great 
expanses of territory, uniting the states, and promoting agricultural production.
Like other projects in the area, the Chesapeake and Delaware canal 
remained only partially completed because of both technological and financial 
problems after its first few years.93 However, in the early 1820s a group of 
Philadelphia and northern Delaware entrepreneurs revived the company. These 
men typified the shift in Philadelphia's economic leadership. In the first decade 
of the nineteenth century, merchant princes such as Andrew Bayard, James C. 
Fisher, James Vanuxem, and Thomas W illing had been the company’s most 
active stockholders. Former shot manufacturer Paul Beck Jr., who helped found 
the Franklin Institute, and Mathew Carey, the printer, pamphleteer, and patron 
saint of American manufacturers and internal improvement, led efforts to 
resuscitate the company beginning in 1821. They allied themselves with Joshua 
Gilpin, a northern Delaware paper miller whose father had been associated with 
the project since its inception. This time, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal 
promoters emphasized the importance of manufacturing to the canal as well as 
the centrality o f manufacturing to Philadelphia’s continued growth. As Gilpin 
explained to Beck about choosing the best route for the canal, of primary 
importance was “the supply of the manufacturing district of Christiana with raw 
materials such as wheat, tobacco, cotton and above all coal, [which] offered a
92“A Supplement to an Act to Incorporate a Company for the purpose of cutting and making a canal 
between the river Delaware and the Chesapeake Bay,” March 25, 1813, Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, No. 
5. Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
Progress on the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal as well as others in the Philadelphia region followed 
closely the chronological pattern identified for canal investment by Harvey H. Segal in “Cycles of Canal 
Construction,” in Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals and American Economic Development (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), 169-207.
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source of revenue to the canal more effective than any other.”94 Just as 
importantly, Gilpin pointed out, “there is produced in [Wilmington and] this district 
annually in flour, paper, gunpowder, cotton and woollen articles, barley, iron, and 
agricultural products, between one & two millions value, every particle of which 
centers in Philadelphia.”95 Consequently, “if the city attends to the sources of its 
own prosperity, there is no one which more demands its attention” than the 
Christiana valley 96 Gilpin later emphasized that the relationship between 
Philadelphia and the manufacturing districts was reciprocal. “Except for the 
manufacturing people & the mercantile men in this part of [Delaware], whose 
interests centre in the city, there is a very little knowledge or attachment either to 
the city or canal itself,” the paper miller explained.97 “Below Christiana they are 
all farmers, every one of whom would make a noise about the canal to suit their 
own interests, tho none of them would give it any aid.”98 Gilpin, Beck, and Carey 
agreed that integrating industrial districts would be Philadelphia’s path for growth, 
internal transportation was necessary for that consolidation, and interests— in 
this case those of manufacturers and merchants— were legitimate economic 
pursuits.
The earliest efforts of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Company (later to 
become, confusingly enough, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company) also 
reflected the shift from an emphasis on union and agriculture to one of
^Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10, 1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence 
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
95Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10,1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence 
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
^Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10, 1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence 
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
97Joshua Gilpin to Mathew Carey, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence on Internal 
Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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manufactures, markets, and interests. The charter, passed on March 20, 1818, 
moved straight to Section 1, giving Josiah White, George Hauto, and Erskine 
Hazard permission to work on the river, foregoing any preamble with flowery 
paeans to the inherent glories of internal navigation." Thus, even from the start, 
the mere improvement of the river allowing coal and lumber to travel down the 
Lehigh clearly was justification enough fo r the legislature without the possibility of 
the commingling of interest. Apparently, in W hite’s words, the possibility o f “a 
more active enterprise” proved sufficient.100 The company’s first pamphlet more 
forcefully set forth the same change in agenda. After a brief review of the terms 
of the charter and its benefits for the company, the pamphlet listed “the 
advantages to be derived from the navigation of the Lehigh, improved on this 
plan.”101 First, the company promised tha t “Philadelphia can be supplied with 
coal... 20 per cent, purer than any... which has come to this market from any 
other source, and at a less price.”102 The company also predicted that “a market 
will be opened for an immense body of tim ber on the Lehigh, which is now so 
completely locked up as not to be considered worth stealing, owing to the 
expense that would [currently] attend getting it to market.”103 Finally, the 
company touted the Lehigh’s proximity to the Susquehanna; it claimed that the 
navigation would benefit from traffic that would be diverted from New York’s
98Joshua Gilpin to Mathew Carey, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence on Internal 
Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
" “An Act to Improve the Navigation of the River Lehigh,” March 20,1818, Acts of the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania Concerning the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company; Together with the Bve-Laws. Etc. 
(Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. and Brother, 1837), 3.
"Eleanor Morton, Josiah White: Prince of Pioneers (New York: Stephen Daye Press, 1946), 133.
101Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock 
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 3.
" Statement of the Lehiah Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock 
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 6.
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Grand (Erie) Canal at its intersection with the Seneca, go down the 
Susquehanna, and be carried ten miles overland to the Lehigh at Berwick— a 
pipe dream, but then so were many other canal claims. Tellingly, the only 
mention of interest .was in conjunction with the quick dismissal of the charter’s 
potentially most expensive stipulation, that the legislature could require the 
company to make the river navigable upstream as well as downstream.
Because the construction of an upstream navigation would allow the company to 
charge high tolls to recoup the cost of building the locks, “the interest of the 
whole community would be opposed to the change.”104 In other words, even 
should members of the General Assembly decide that an upstream navigation 
would be in the interest o f the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—that is, the 
public good— local interests would be able to stymie any such proposal. For 
Lehigh Navigation and Coal Company boosters, coal, access to markets, and 
pursuit of interest formed a worthy trinity.
Justifying, encouraging, and indeed even celebrating the pursuit of 
individual interest proved to be a necessary ideological ingredient to the success 
of internal navigations in the Philadelphia area. Most obviously, the need for the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, the Union Canal Company, the Lehigh Coal and 
Navigation Company, and the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company to raise 
money from individual investors rather than gain state funding clearly indicated 
that the general public, a t least as constituted by the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly, did not consider these projects to represent the greater good of the
103Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock 
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 6.
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commonwealth. Therefore, the potential fo r return on private investment in 
internal navigations, finally a possibility with the new market for anthracite, could 
now become the selling point fo r new sources of funding. Even more 
significantly, these projects represented the means to create new directions of 
commerce and manufacture, ones that bypassed and thus weakened the old 
economic structure.
The examples of the careers of two sets of men closely associated with 
efforts to improve inland navigation in the Philadelphia area— Richard Peters and 
Robert Morris, and Josiah White and the Wurts brothers— put the transition from 
modest strivings to the unbridled pursuit o f self-interest in sharp relief.105 Morris 
and Peters demonstrated the ambivalence of the Revolutionary generation.
Born in 1744, Richard Peters in his long career served as a m ilitary officer during 
the American Revolution, as speaker of the Pennsylvania Senate, as the federal 
judge who presided over many of the Whiskey Rebellion trials, and as a 
boardmember of various Philadelphia social, charitable, and civil organizations, 
including his presidency of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture. 
When the Peters died in 1828 at the ripe age of 83, his friends remembered him 
as a wise, patient man with a quick tongue and a sharp sense o f humor.106 But 
Philadelphia residents best recognized him as having nearly single-handedly 
built the first durable bridge to span the Schuylkill River, thus better connecting
104Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock 
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 4.
05For an extended discussion of the ideological gap between those who came of age before the American 
Revolution and those after, see Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of 
Americans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
""Samuel Breck, Witty Savinas of the late Richard Peters. District Judge of the United States for Eastern 
Penna. Died in August 1828. aged 83. Collected, set down and arranged by Sami. Breck. who was his 
friend and neighbour in Blocklev township. Belmont District for Thirty Years, ms., Breck Papers, Case 25, 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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Philadelphia with its western hinterland and with Lancaster. They remembered 
him because he helped to  found the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, 
became its first president, designed the bridge, and closely supervised its 
construction. Peters’s financial involvement with the bridge company was limited 
to $100, an investment tha t in no way justified the time and effort he spent on the 
project.107 He did have land near the bridge that surely appreciated, and the 
improved transportation across the river may have marginally raised the value of 
other real estate investments farther afield, too. Nonetheless, he put into the 
project a tremendous am ount of energy that certainly could have been spent in 
fa r more remunerative ways.
Peters’s interest in  transportation remained strong after completion o f the 
bridge in 1803. In 1825, he and the tireless Mathew Carey founded the 
Pennsylvania Society to Promote Internal Improvement in order to lobby fo r the 
construction of a canal o r  railroad traversing the length of the state. He generally 
did not promote internal improvements in conjunction with particular investments. 
In fact, both the construction of the Schuylkill Navigation, in which he owned 
stock, and the consequent flooding damaged some of Peters’s property. He had 
considerable trouble collecting; the building of the navigation had actually hurt 
Peters’s property value more than helped it.108 However, the Schuylkill 
navigation was part of the  project that he had started as a Revolutionary soldier 
and continued as a federal judge, especially after his involvement putting down 
the Whiskey Rebellion: the  making of the American nation. Furthermore, the
107Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, List of Subscribers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
108 John C. Lowber, Report of the Case of Alexander and Others Against the President. Managers and 
Company of the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Instituted to Recover Damages for the Loss of the Bridge
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nation Peters envisioned was one in which men of proper standing— that is, men 
like himself—would run legal, political, and economic affairs in the name of all 
the people. For Peters, activities such as writing letters to the legislature in favor 
of canals and bridges even fo r the Schuylkill Navigation Company, whom he 
sued several times, represented the subordination of personal interest to the 
service of the common good.
Richards’ contemporary Robert Morris held a more nuanced position on 
the conflict between private and public service, or perhaps more accurately, 
often saw the two as being mutually reinforcing. Born in England in 1734, Robert 
Morris immigrated to Philadelphia with his tobacco-agent father in 1747. When 
the elder Morris died three years later, young Robert was left with a considerable 
sum. After an apprenticeship with prom inent Philadelphia merchant Charles 
Willing, he began a merchant career tha t by outbreak of the Revolution would 
make him perhaps the richest man in America. As a Pennsylvania 
representative in the Continental Congress, superintendent of finance under the 
Articles of Confederation, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and senator 
in the first Congress, Morris knew better than anyone the disarray of the 
Continental Congress and its finances during the Revolution and after. He 
acutely understood the various ways tha t all sorts of interest— private, regional, 
state, and class— could paralyze the new nation. Morris’s efforts during the 
Revolution and after to save the nation’s finances can quite accurately be termed 
heroic: in the late 1770s and early 1780s, the continental government
at the Falls of the Schuylkill. Purina the Fresh of the 21st of February. 1822 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 
1825),
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sometimes operated on his solid credit rather than its own shaky reputation.109 
Nonetheless, he never hesitated to seize the main chance even when in the 
service of the government, often even using his government-agent status to 
secure juicy contracts and commissions, in the 1780s and early 1790s when he 
helped found institutions such as the Bank of North America, the Susquehanna 
and Schuylkill Navigation Company, and the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Company, he emphasized their role “to combine the interests of all the parts of 
the state, and to cement them in a perpetual commercial and political union.”110 
At the same time, Morris was usually quick to defend his own enterprises: 
describing his actions in 1785 when a group of Philadelphia men lobbied to 
incorporate a rival bank, Morris frankly admitted on the floor of the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly that “if any set of men were to apply to the legislature fo r a 
charter, which I thought injurious to my private interest, I should, if I had 
arguments of sufficient weight to offer against it, make an appeal to the 
representative body.”111 Morris promoted canals both because they were good 
for the nation and because they would increase the value of his lands. For 
Morris, the pursuit of interest formed a necessary and laudable human impulse; 
the trick was to keep the great number of possibly competing or differing 
interests in harmony.
Unlike Peters and Morris, the generation that grew up after the 
Revolutionary War appeared to have few doubts about the strength of the
109See Clarence L. Ver Steeg, Robert Morris: Revolutionary Financier. With an Analysis of His Earlv Career 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954).
Smith, 1.
111 Matthew Carey, ed., Debates and Proceedings of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, on the 
Memorials Praying a Repeal or Suspension of the Law Annulling the Charter of the Bank (Philadelphia: 
Carev and Co.. 1786). 40.
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federal union, even few er hesitations about making a buck when they could, but 
many new ideas about how tha t money could be made. Josiah White was born 
of Quaker stock in M ount Laurel, New Jersey, in 1781. He worked hard, lived 
frugally, tried to set a positive example, and always considered the public interest 
as much as his own. A fte r an apprenticeship with a Philadelphia ironmonger, he 
went into the hardware business for himself and managed to beat by two years 
his boyhood goal of com fortable retirement at age thirty. Soon bored, he 
decided to get into the w irepulling business, buying land at the Falls of the 
Schuylkill. There, he built an ironworks, managed to dam the river—a feat which 
many had thought to be impossible— and even constructed a wire bridge across 
the broad waterway, bu t had trouble making money. The W ar of 1812 proved to 
be a mixed blessing: suddenly there was great domestic demand for his iron 
products, but British coal and Virginia coal became scarce and lumber costs 
skyrocketed. Like many others in the Philadelphia area, W hite began looking for 
alternative sources of fuel. W hite settled upon Philadelphia anthracite and 
realized that the best way to ge t it to market would be to invest in a company to 
render the Schuylkill R iver navigable. Such a venture would be both in the 
common interest and his own; he reasoned that “while I was carrying out so 
much good for the public, I would not impair my Estate, o r that it would increase 
as fast as if I done no business and allowed the interest to  accumulate.”112 Just 
as with his earlier projects, he encountered opposition, o r at least a lack of 
support, among a great many men with more conservative ideas concerning the 
direction of Philadelphia’s growth. At the same time, he knew on what terms to
112Josiah White, Josiah White’s History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation
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sell the idea to the general public, painting in huge letters on the outside wall of 
his wire manufactory on the Schuylkill the message that the navigation “means 
Ten Dollars in the Pocket of Every Citizen o f Pennsylvania,” ostensibly what 
each person would save as a result of cheaper fuel and lower transportation 
costs.113 White’s choice of words was significant; after all, he did not propose, 
for example, that the navigation would bring people together or enrich the 
commonwealth at large. That he chose to point out the potential benefits of the 
project in terms of its ability to fatten each individual’s wallet demonstrated 
W hite’s understanding that the public would be swayed by appeals to personal 
interest. White saw industry as Philadelphia’s future, and believed the best way 
to build that future would be to encourage individual interest in the marketplace.
While Josiah W hite held an harmonious view of the union of public and 
private interest, the W urts brothers never bothered to take the public good into 
consideration in their projects. Maurice (1783-1854), W illiam (1788-1858), and 
John (1792-1861) W urts were born in Flanders, New Jersey. As a teenager, 
Maurice apprenticed to a dry-goods merchant in Philadelphia, and in 1810 
William came to the big city to join his o lder brother as a partner in their own dry­
goods business; John arrived two years later to clerk in a law firm. During the 
W ar of 1812, the W urtses realized that whoever could bring an inexpensive, 
local source of energy to the market would make a pretty penny indeed. In 1814, 
William found anthracite in the far northeastern corner of the state, near the 
Lackawanna River in what would eventually become Carbondale, Pennsylvania. 
After several false starts, in 1822 they began mining in earnest, extracting over a
Company, 1909), 13.
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ton of the black stones, which they sledded to the Lackawaxen River and then 
rafted down the Lackawaxen and the Delaware to Philadelphia. Meanwhile, their 
careers progressed in lock step: John got elected to the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly, Maurice moved to New York, where he made valuable contacts in the 
financial community including banker Philip Hone, and William’s dry-goods 
business flourished in Philadelphia.
Together, the Wurts brothers masterminded the organization, chartering, 
and financing of the Delaware and Hudson Canal, designed to bring coal from 
the northern anthracite field to the Delaware River and from there downriver to 
Philadelphia and by canal to the Hudson River and thence New York City. If the 
public interest entered their minds during the chartering process in the 
Pennsylvania legislature, they made no mention of it in their letters to each other 
during the 1823 and 1824 legislative sessions. Because the Delaware and 
Hudson Canal Company would own mines in addition to the navigation, John 
successfully campaigned in the legislature for a rate of toll that the brothers 
calculated would be low enough to be acceptable to potential competitors but 
actually high enough for the Company to acquire a virtual lock on anthracite 
shipped along its route to the lucrative New York City market. In addition, the 
company’s charter, unlike otherwise sim ilar ones, would never have to be 
renewed. “Tho’ apparently for 20 years,” John gloated in a letter to Maurice, “it is 
in fact a perpetual grant, at such a rate of toll as makes it a complete 
monopoly.”114 The Wurts brothers considered the legislature in particular and
113Morton, 96.
114John Wurts to Maurice Wurts, March 10, 1823. Vanuxem Collection, Series 2, Maurice Wurts Papers, 
Hagley Museum and Library.
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the public in general as entities to be negotiated with at best and fooled if 
necessary. They showed no reluctance to use underhanded tactics on fellow 
investors, either. If Richard Peters represented the vestiges of an eighteenth- 
century sense of noble service to the cause and the nation, then the Wurtses, in 
their frank and ruthless pursuit of their own interests, best presaged the 
nineteenth-century phenomenon of the robber baron.
In 1828, already near the end of canal construction era in the Philadelphia 
region, the Schuylkill Navigation Company Board of Managers happily reported a 
surge in anthracite use, noting that “the great increase in the consumption of this 
valuable fuel is very important to the interest o f the company.”115 In doing so, 
they had taken another step in their mission to  control the direction of 
Philadelphia’s development: they asserted that, just like individuals, the company 
had interests to be nurtured and defended. In the same period, the City Councils 
began seeing areas in which the City Corporation’s interests needed to be 
watched. In the w inter o f 1832, the City Councils and the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company fought over rights to the river’s water: their interests, in this case, had 
diverged. Chapter Six will investigate how the men who ran private corporations 
established institutional independence from civil authorities and coordinated their 
efforts across corporations to create a corporate sphere beyond the reach of the 
state government, while Chapter Seven will show the result when the city’s 
corporate interests and the navigation company’s interests clashed.
11sReport of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. 
January 7.1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 4.
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The Philadelphia Associates
In the opening decades of the nineteenth century, the particularly anti-tax, 
anti-elite, and anti-Philadelphia bent of the Pennsylvania legislature rankled 
wealthy Philadelphians in the ir efforts to pursue business goals and to guide 
economic growth in the Delaware and Schuylkill river valleys. Pennsylvania had 
perhaps the most radical state constitution— even after its conservative 
makeover in 1790— ushering in universal white male suffrage and the 
accompanying political theater decades before Jacksonian politics demonstrated
such democratic fervor in the rest of the nation."I Finding the ir views, interests, 
and personal political influence increasingly pushed aside from  the rough and 
tumble of Pennsylvania politics, corporate officers and the ir friends endeavored 
to carve out an economic realm  beyond the reach of grasping politicians and 
hidden from the eyes of a suspicious electorate. To do that, they developed an 
administrative and legal fram ework within which to control and to run their 
various projects. In that vein, corporate leaders pursued two inter-related goals. 
First, boardmembers and o ther insiders worked to make corporations 
independent from the Pennsylvania state government. Second, corporate 
boards created structures to administer their tasks within the corporation and to 
coordinate policies between corporations. Their success in doing so allowed a 
small corporate oligarchy o f several hundred men to have great influence over 
economic development in the Philadelphia area, to put themselves in position to 
reap disproportionately the rewards of that growth, and to use their leverage to
230
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further their greater political-economic agenda. They carved out a separate, 
corporate sphere of activity.
Corporate boosters did not try to avoid the government altogether: they 
needed the legislature fo r authorization to build their internal improvements, for 
limited liability, and for banking privileges, and they used their leverage in the 
statehouse to pass laws that furthered or protected corporate activities.
Company officials did their best to manipulate the legislature to their own ends; 
previously chartered banks often allied with anti-charter factions to forestall 
competition and with internal improvement companies looking for emergency 
funds. Company officials sent letters and lobbyists to the state capital to 
negotiate terms, to make offers, and to cajole concessions from representatives 
whose interests, by electoral necessity, differed radically from those of wealthy 
Philadelphia company boosters. Elected officials did not necessarily or 
categorically oppose such entreaties, but they had motives beyond the mere 
encouragement of enterprise when they discussed and voted upon legislation. 
Accordingly, the men who ran big corporate businesses had an ambivalent 
relationship with the Pennsylvania General Assembly, one in which they 
considered the legislature far from a pro-active or even necessarily sympathetic 
partner. Most o f the time, though, the men who ran corporations did their utmost 
to keep civil authorities at arm’s length whenever they could, preferring to deal 
with the state as a separate entity rather than a controlling one.
 ^Although the Constitution of 1790 repealed the radical structure of the 1776 document, including the 
latter’s single legislative house and impotent executive branch, voting rights for all free men who paid taxes 
and were resident in the state for at least one year and their sons who were of age remained.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
Corporations soon grew deep roots in Pennsylvania, but the seeds had 
come from Britain. In eighteenth-century Anglo-American legal theory, the 
corporation served to harness the energy and resources of private citizens for 
the interests of the state.2 As its name suggests, a corporation was a body 
politic. The members of the corporation, generally defined by shareholding, 
composed their own by-laws and set up an administration—usually a board of 
directors or board of managers—whose decisions were to be legally binding 
upon all the shareholders. A corporate charter represented the granting of a tiny 
bit of sovereignty: a government-within-a-government endowed with certain 
privileges usually reserved to the state, such as the exercise of eminent domain 
or permission to print bank notes that passed for money. In addition, a 
corporate charter endowed the authority to act as a legal “person” because a 
corporation could sue and be sued, could own and alienate property, and could 
hire and fire employees and agents to carry out its mission. The state could then 
receive the benefits of the corporation such as improved transportation or greater 
availability of credit without having to spend public money on it. For their part, 
the owners of the corporation secured the privilege to profit from this 
arrangement as long as they kept to the bounds of the charter. Furthermore, 
charters tended to have finite time limits, after which the sovereignty and 
privileges they entailed would revert to the ultimate sovereignty, the state.
2See Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation. 1784-1855: Broadening the 
Concept of Public Service During Industrialization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). The Handlins 
argued that “the corporation was conceived as an agency of government, endowed with public attributes, 
exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social function for the state. Turnpikes, 
not trade, banks, not land speculation, were its province because the community, not the enterprising 
capitalists, marked out its sphere of activity.” While they were right in the former assertion, the latter
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Rarely acknowledged at the time, British influence pervaded 
Pennsylvania’s corporate charter-writing in the early nineteenth century. One 
reason fo r such broad and conspicuous transatlantic borrowing on the part of 
Philadelphians lay in the nature of all matters legal, especially in a system based 
upon common law. Lawyers recognized that the safest way to write any legally 
binding document was to use tested formulae possessing the power of 
precedent and successfully withstanding challenge. Furthermore, they had no 
reason to invent new structures when established forms were serviceable.
Those forms had been used and elaborated substantially in eighteenth-century 
Britain even after the South Sea bubble scandal in 1720, as British businessmen 
established companies for exploiting new technologies fo r canals, navigations, 
and waterworks and new actuarial methods for insurance. Pennsylvania’s 
corporations duplicated the structures established in Britain from the most basic 
elements, such as having an elected board, annual stockholders’ meetings, and 
the keeping of records to the smallest details, including provisions for dissenting 
directors to avoid potential liability by noting in the minutes their dissent from the 
majority, elaborate plans fo r changing by-laws, and the posting of security bonds 
by company em ployees.3 The powers, limits, and modes of Pennsylvania 
corporate behavior echoed those of British corporations even down to the titles, 
such as naming banks after geographic entities— Bank o f England, Bank of
statement is not borne out by the evidence of early republican Pennsylvania. Oscar Handlin and Mary F. 
Handlin, “Origins of the American Business Corporation,” Journal of Economic History 5 (May 1945), 22. 
3For surveys of British corporate forms in the late eighteenth century see George Heberton Evans, Jr., 
British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1936); Joseph Priestley, Historical Account of the Navigable Rivers. Canals and Railways 
throughout Great Britain (London. 1831); Armand Budington DuBois. The English Business Company after
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North America, Bank o f Pennsylvania— canals and navigations a fter the 
waterways they connected or improved— Mersey and Inwell Navigation, Delaware 
and Schuylkill Canal Navigation— and sometimes more fanciful names for 
insurance companies— the London-based Phoenix Fire Office and the 
Philadelphia-based Phoenix Insurance Company. As long as Philadelphia 
businessmen were going to adopt British technologies, strategies, and methods, 
copying of British legal forms to administer such projects seemed obvious.4
W hatever their theoretical justifications, British business corporations and 
their lawyers rarely addressed philosophical issues in the latter half of the
eighteenth century.6 From the very beginning, the men active in founding 
Pennsylvania corporations also exhibited little concern with thoughts of service to
the state when forming associations for which they sought state charters.6 
Rather, they wanted to avail themselves o f the services or investment 
opportunities that internal improvements, banks, and insurance companies could 
provide. Their motivations for seeking incorporation were so apparent as to 
rarely require explanation: one could hardly acquire all the land necessary to 
build a canal without eminent domain or expect a bank to succeed if its notes
the Bubble Act. 1720-1800 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); and Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development 
of the Business Corporation in England. 1800-1867 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 3-13.
4See Richard Nelson and Stephen Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Chanoe (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982). As the most prominent s of evolutionary economics, they argue that 
rather than efficiency-maximizing or inherently creative, businesses operate in learned, familiar routines 
until failure or until market circumstances force experimentation and change.
5Dubois, 281-284.
6This argument is a consideration only of business-oriented corporations; that is, ones which potentially 
could issue dividends. Other corporations, such as churches, schools, charitable organizations, and fire 
companies were treated much differently under law after measures passed in the 1790s standardizing such 
charters.
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were not legally binding upon the endorser.7 In addition, incorporation provided 
the legal structure for the easy alienability of shares and limitations of liability that
joint-stock companies did not.8 Before the Revolution, Parliament jealously 
reserved the right to grant corporate charters both at home and in the colonies, 
but once peace returned incorporation became the preferred framework for 
large-scale American projects that neither the states nor the federal government 
would undertake and that required more capital than only a few people could 
provide.
Would-be corporate boosters needed governmental authorization to 
proceed with their plans, but not to draw them up. The chartering process 
began with a group of private individuals gathering to create an association to 
pursue a given goal, whether it be bridging a river, building a turnpike, or running 
a bank. Those men then petitioned the legislature in the form of a bill 
enumerating the articles of the potential charter. Although the legislators 
negotiated with each other and with company backers over the language of 
particular provisions, they dealt with a specific document designed to be
7ln “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 50 (1993) 
51-84, Pauline Maier argues that the proliferation of corporate charters in the early republic was a 
“mystery,” because British corporate law had experienced incidental change since the aftermath of the 
South Sea Bubble in 1720 and the French revolution quickly did away with corporations because of their 
association with privilege in that country. Contrary to Maier however, the corporation was the preferred 
form of organization for banking (the Bank of England) and for internal improvements such as canals, 
turnpikes, and waterworks in eighteenth-century Britain, had been used and modified extensively during 
that period, and was the obvious business model for most Anglo-Americans who wanted to enter those 
lines of business. They did not even consider the French business environment, which, because of its 
tangle of corporations, entitlements, office-selling, mixed jurisdictions, and vestigial feudal privileges and 
prohibitions bore very little resemblance to that of either Britain or the United States. See Ted W. 
Margadant, Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
8A!though the ability of a company to levy its shareholders beyond their original subscription remained 
confused in English law throughout the eighteenth century, the issue of limited liability to company creditors 
appears to have been well-established by the early eighteenth century.; DuBois, 94-98. In Pennsylvania 
the same principal applied: although some internal improvement companies raised money from their
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accepted as complete upon application. Thus, while the numbers and a few of 
the words changed, the form of nearly every article of the charters eventually 
passed had been written into the bill by the  applicants, not inserted by 
representatives. As in Britain, those articles also encompassed clauses 
seemingly intended to be checks on corporate power and the influence of large
stockholders.0 Regardless of the purpose of the clauses, generally corporate 
promoters authored them.
Once a charter bill was written, Philadelphia’s corporate boosters 
attempted to secure its passage while preventing the incorporation of potential 
competitors. The extent to which businesses sought to manipulate the 
unpredictable Pennsylvania legislature was evident in the bitter opposition to 
certain charters, including the anticharter movements that had business-backed
support in the assembly.10 The Philadelphia Bank’s charter application 
floundered in Lancaster, the erstwhile state capital, for two years partly because 
of the general suspicion of banks and moneyed institutions, but largely because 
the Bank of Pennsylvania lobbied strenuously against it, offering the state
$200,000 in cash not to charter another Philadelphia-based bank.11 The 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, too, had problems acquiring a charter because a
subscribers beyond the original subscription, there is no documented case of creditors attempting to lay 
claim to the assets of company stockholders for a corporation’s debts.
9See for example J.R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Centurv England (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), and George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: 
A Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), 13-14.
10For a survey of the rhetorical character of anticharterists, see Maier, 51-84.
11 Stephen N. Winslow, Biographies of Successful Philadelphia Merchants (Philadelphia: James K Simon, 
1864), 167; according to one legislator in 1803, “the memorial from the Bank of Pennsylvania has had 
considerable effect upon the members, and in my opinion will prevent a charter to the Bank of Philadelphia 
[in this session].’’ Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30, 1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania.
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boardmember of the Union Canal Company held a General Assembly seat fo r 
Philadelphia County. The Union Canal Company, a successor to the assets of 
several failed canal efforts, had gotten a charter in 1811 to build a canal 
connecting the Susquehanna to the Schuylkill around Reading. Led by William 
Duane, the state representative from Philadelphia, Union Canal Company 
investors considered the Schuylkill Navigation a potential competitor, and 
opposed W hite’s efforts to  get a charter. Only in the next session, when 
Schuylkill Navigation Company backer Cadwalader Evans, Jr. replaced Duane
did the charter pass.12 Although anti-charterists took to the opposition when 
individual bank charters came before the General Assembly, they frequently 
supported omnibus bills funding internal improvement companies, especially 
ones that covered their districts. Much anticharter posturing in the legislature 
sought either to put a principled face on attempts to wring more cash out of 
banks or to represent already-chartered corporations trying to forestall 
competition.
The Farmers and Mechanics Bank’s struggle for its charter involved 
exactly the sort of haggling that led corporate leaders to th ink of the chartering 
process as a bothersome legislative hurdle and the legislature as an erratic and 
unreliable entity. Toward the end o f the 1807-1808 session signs increasingly 
suggested that the bank’s friends would not be able to muster a majority in favor 
of incorporation. Fortunately for bank partisans, the state senate’s committee on 
banking had given the institution a good report. The bank’s man in Lancaster
^Edward s. Gibbons, “The Building of the Schuylkill Navigation System, 1815-1828.” Pennsylvania History 
57 (January 1990), 17.
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that year, James Sharswood, wrote to Joseph Tagert, the bank’s president in 
Philadelphia, to tell him that they would be better off delaying a  move to bring the 
charter to the floor for a vote until the following session. This way, The public 
may be led to suppose that...the lateness of the session alone prevented [the 
charter’s] adoption," while the positive committee report and the absence of a 
measure preventing the bank from pursuing its operations would imply the 
legislature’s approval. Between sessions, the bank would “be in full operation 
and there cannot be a doubt but that the prudence of the Directors will conciliate 
in the public mind, gain many friends and convince even our opponents that we 
may be safely trusted with the privileges we asked for.” However, should the 
bank’s friends push for a charter and lose during the current session, “our 
opponents may take the advantage of this defeat to urge a law immediately to 
prevent our progress”; at the very least, their re-application in the ensuing 
session would be severely jeopardized. Sharswood warned direly that “the 
victory to our opponents would be so far complete and it is but fair to presume 
they would not stop untill they had accomplished our final ruin.” "13 Those 
opponents included both anti-bank factions and the partisans of existing banks. 
Over the long term, the legislature had no categorical opposition to banking.
The politics surrounding the omnibus bank bill of 1814 demonstrated the 
ways that various corporate interests intertwined with anti-bank sentiments. By 
1812, Pennsylvania had chartered only four banks, all based in Philadelphia. 
Partly influenced by the de-chartering of the first Bank of the United States, over
13James Sharswood to Joseph Tagert, March 13,1807, Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Accession 
1658, Farmers and Mechanics National Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the following three sessions the partisans of various associations vwanting to 
incorporate country banks swarmed the new state capital at Harrissburg, 
importuning representatives to expand the banking privilege quantfitatively and 
geographically. The majority opposed these bills individually, citini g what many 
argued would be the inevitably ruinous expansion of paper m oney’ . That 
majority, though, was a shifting one: the friends of the banks a lre a d y  chartered 
opposed the new banks as much out of fear of competition as feanr of inflation, 
and few representatives were willing to vote for a bank in so m e o n e  else’s district 
without getting anything in return. Finally, in the 1814 session, thee various 
applicants got together to put all their banks in one bill, one that p a ssed  by so 
large a margin that it overrode the threat of a gubernatorial veto.
Representatives did not oppose banks in general, merely other m a n ’s banks. 
After that act, the state legislature would not charter another bank for decades. 
Certainly the Panic of 1819, which many blamed upon banks, w as; one reason 
for the end of bank proliferation, but just as important, virtually evesry legislative 
district had a strong group with a vested interest in limiting b a n k in g  to those 
companies already chartered. While the public interest presum ablly formed part 
of the equation, corporate interests represented the crucial va ria b le .
The negotiation necessary to obtain charters amounted to  sa tollbooth on 
the turnpike of success for Pennsylvania corporations. Corporate leaders 
considered the acquisition of a charter as one of the tasks re qu ire d  for setting up 
a capital-intensive business, just as the election of a board, the ra is in g  of capital, 
and the hiring of employees were all necessary to the successful aadministration 
of their projects. The chartering process is most accurately descriHbed as one of
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authorization: permission from civil authorities fo r company officials to proceed 
with the activities they  had proposed, organized, and initiated.
Although as a  result of the chartering process the state often held stock in 
many corporations, tha t practice did not indicate a willingness on the part of 
corporate boards to include the government as a meaningful partner. 
Pennsylvania did own shares in many banks and internal improvement 
companies, but a close look at the timing and circumstances o f state acquisition 
of corporate shares suggests that this action did not constitute a true 
partnership. Depending upon the kind of corporation, the legislature’s reasons 
fo r owning company stock belied any deep sense of common mission between 
corporate boosters and the state government.
Neither a boon for banks and their private investors nor a sign of 
government-business partnership, the state’s ownership of bank stock was 
designed to tax bank profits. As a requirement of the Bank o f Pennsylvania’s 
first charter in 1793, the state government retained the option of investing up to 
an impressive $1 m illion in bank stock. The legislature intended to use United 
States bonds that the  state treasury had on hand to pay for a portion of the 
stock. The deal allowed the state to receive more than market value for its 
bonds while paying only par—the original issuing price— for bank stock, which 
was far less than m arket value. Thus, the bank performed the valuable service 
of taking on the state ’s poorly performing assets and replacing them with an 
investment that was expected to pay better dividends and to appreciate quickly. 
The state’s immediate market-value gain in the transaction, $54,187, amounted
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to a one-time bonus from the bank in exchange fo r receiving the charter.14 
Meanwhile, the state bought the rest of its bank stock, $250,000 worth, through a 
loan from the bank at an annual rate of six percent. In what would become 
standard practice for the purchase of bank stock, the stock itself would be the 
collateral for the loan. Legislators held the expectation that the Bank of 
Pennsylvania’s dividends would be similar to those of the previously chartered 
Bank of North America: ranging from eight to twelve percent a year. The 
practical effect of the bonus and the stock purchase was that the state would 
receive 15.7% of all the bank’s dividends up to 6%, and a total of 25.7% of all
dividends above 6% .15 No cash had changed hands, but the state received 
dividends on a large portion of the bank’s capital.
Other banks would face the same sort o f taxation. In legislative haggling 
over the Farmers and Mechanics Bank charter in the 1808-1809 session, the 
opponents of the bank clearly were the ones who wanted the state to have a 
higher stake in the institution’s stock. At one point the bank’s lobbyist reported to 
cashier Joseph Tagert that “an amendment passed the Committee which will 
prevent our accepting a charter; this amendment is that the Bank shall allow the 
legislature to subscribe on the part of the State $100,000 in the stock of the bank 
at par.” 16 In the end, the Farmers and Mechanics Bank compromised, issuing
14To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Memorial of the 
President and Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia. 1805), 6.
15The state received 942 shares in exchange for its United States bonds and 625 shares through its loan 
from the bank. Private subscriptions brought the total shares sold to 6,250, each worth $400.
16Joseph Clay to Joseph Tagert, February 17, 1809, Historical Records, Box 1,1807-1820, Accession 
1658. Farmers and Mechanics National Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the state $75,000 in shares in exchange for incorporation.17 The 
Commonwealth eventually owned stock in a num ber of banks, but from the 
bankers’ point of view state shareholding represented a regrettable cost to be 
paid for the opportunity to make handsome profits.
In 1814, the legislature began to forego stock purchases and instead 
required new banks to pay the state a certain percentage of their dividends, 
depending upon the individual charter. This change certainly did not help the 
new banks. First, they were giving up a higher percentage of their dividends to 
the state than previously chartered ones. Second, they no longer received 
United States bonds that they could use to back their note issues, and as a
result gross profits were lower.18 Thus, the legislature had streamlined the 
chartering process— the stock “purchases” had become increasingly 
convoluted— negotiating with new charter applicants an appropriate cash bonus 
and demanding a certain percentage of the institution’s dividends for the coffers 
in Harrisburg. The state had not acquired bank stock out of a magnanimous 
effort to help bankers and bank investors or because of any general desire to 
promote commerce: it did so strictly as a form of revenue generation, that is, as 
a way of taxing those institutions. By 1814 it had simply found an easier way to 
do so.
A major ingredient in the passage of bank charters, then, was the 
negotiation of the terms of taxation, an important matter for the legislature
17An Act to Incorporate the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809).
18The state generally took 8% of the dividends from the banks chartered in 1814. Thus, the percentage of 
their dividends paid in taxes was lower than the Bank of Pennsylvania’s, but the total dividends were lower 
in proportion to private investment because the banks received no United States bonds from the state, even
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considering that a large portion of the state’s revenue came from bank dividends. 
From 1796 to 1825, banks provided the state of Pennsylvania with at least 36%
and as much as 50% o f its annual income.19 From many politicians’ point of 
view, that income represented a comparatively painless opportunity to raise 
revenue while holding down constituents’ property taxes. From the bankers’ 
point o f view, the state’s taxing of banks in exchange for incorporation amounted 
to a  profit-draining annoyance, and did not endear the legislature to dividend­
conscious boardmembers. On the contrary: the bankers’ lesson from the 
chartering experience was that though the legislature could be influenced on 
occasion, the price was steep, the bargaining treacherous, and the outcome 
uncertain. Better to stay clear of the state legislature whenever possible rather 
than open bank business to public debate and risk humiliating defeat besides.
Other kinds of corporations such as insurance companies and coal mining 
companies generally did not face the same kind of legislative gauntlet, nor did 
the General Assembly ever invest in insurance or coal-mining company stock. 
The question often was one of profitability: if the applicant institution seemed 
certain to make a profit, then the legislature tried to find a way to tax it; if not, 
then the legislature did not bother. In between, firms involved in riskier activities 
such as coal mining, manufacturing, and insurance found themselves in a 
nebulous area where they hoped to avoid taxation.
Insurance companies in particular often walked a careful line, claiming in 
the statehouse that they would have difficulty eking out profits while courting
at below market value as had the Bank of Pennsylvania. From the new banks’ point of view, the change 
was a wash at best.
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investors in Philadelphia by emphasizing the likelihood of steady returns. 
Negotiations for incorporating the Phoenix Insurance Company in December 
1803 pivoted on exactly this tension. Representative Joseph Reed wrote to Paul 
Beck, Jr., a founding director o f the Phoenix Insurance Company, that “the 
idea...of raising a revenue from the Insurance companies is not altogether 
abandoned, and in this point o f view the [company's] offer to lend money has 
had, as I expected, an injurious effect’ on the company’s chances for
incorporation.2^ The company was arguing against the necessity of paying a 
bonus, offering a loan to the state instead. Hostile legislators pointed out that 
the ability to lend a large am ount of money demonstrated that the company 
could, in fact, yield handsome returns: as Reed observed to Beck, “it will be 
difficult to convince the Members that the business is not profitable when the
company can afford to lend $60,000."21 For their part, coal company promoters 
cheerfully predicted that they would develop coal regions while lowering the price 
o f fuel in more densely populated areas, but claimed that the necessity of limited 
liability and access to large pools of investment required incorporation for them 
to succeed in such beneficial endeavors.22 The state legislature did not tax 
these kinds of companies, partly because such institutions contributed to
19See Richard Sylla, John 8. Legler, and John J. Wallis, “Banks and State Public Finance in the New 
Republic: The United States, 1790-1860” Journal of Economic History 47 (June 1987), 401.
20Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30,1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
21 Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30, 1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
22The argument among business historians over the development of limited liability is considerably 
overblown: from the beginning, investors assumed that stock ownership in a chartered corporation did limit 
liability to level of subscription. Especially telling in this regard are the clauses in bank charters holding 
directors directly financially responsible for a range of potentially risky practices, clearly suggesting that 
stockholders would be in the clear should the bank fail. Furthermore, given the problems with debt 
collection and bankruptcy law in the early republic, any attempt to collect debts from hundreds of investors 
would prove insuperable, especially given the dilemma of who to charge when stocks changed hands. For
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economic growth but mainly because they performed poorly compared to banks 
as far as investor returns until at least the late 1820s.23
None of these corporations— banks, insurance companies, or coal mining 
companies— ever asked the legislature to buy stock or requested loans from the 
state. Company directors balked at yielding stock to the state because doing so 
cut into their profits. Furthermore, they knew that state stockholding opened 
corporate decision-making to the scrutiny of the legislature, especially if 
lawmakers demanded the right to appoint some of the boardmembers. Banks 
and insurance companies often found themselves oversubscribed rather than 
lacking investor interest. From the point of view of many bankers and insurers, 
government shareholding seemed akin to having an unwanted cousin not only 
stay with the family and eat its food, but also demand a say in what was served 
for dinner.
For some corporations, though, the Pennsylvania government appeared 
more like an occasionally overbearing, but nonetheless rich, uncle. Turnpike, 
canal, and river navigation companies, unlike banks and insurance companies, 
often solicited state aid and investment and received it in the form of loans, stock 
purchases, and direct grants. However, legislators never attempted to carve a 
pound of flesh from these fledgling companies, nor did project boosters try to 
wheedle money from a freewheeling General Assembly when applying for 
charters. Internal improvement company directors hesitated to include the state 
as a stockholder for the same reasons that bank officials tried to avoid having
the best discussion of the topic, see “Appendix: Stockholders’ Liability” in Edwin J. Perkins, American Public 
Finance and Financial Services. 1700-1815 (Columbus. OH, 1994), 373-376.
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the government as an investment partner: such relationships lowered potential 
returns to investors while making the management subject to the prying eyes, 
open hands, and loud mouth of every Pennsylvania politician. Banks did their 
best to minimize state investment; insurance, coal, and manufacturing 
companies avoided it at all costs; and internal improvement companies 
considered it the option of last resort.
Still, the state had an abundance of one crucial resource that inland 
navigation companies often lacked: money. A fter the initial high hopes of quick 
construction and grand profits were dashed, inland navigation company officials 
often appealed to the legislature for money, in the words of one supplicant, “to 
recover the affairs of the Canal Companies from the disorder and 
embarrassment into which they had fallen,” emphasizing how much these 
enterprises could contribute to the common weal.24 Taken individually, these 
appeals rarely succeeded. Because internal improvements were inherently 
local, even the most zealously enthusiastic of promoters faced great difficulties 
getting company subsidies past politicians who faced annual reelection in the 
counties where taxpayers would pay the brunt o f such largesse, but not reap the 
rewards. Meanwhile, legislators knew that internal improvement companies 
were risky enough. To require companies to give the state stock— as the 
assembly did with banks— might discourage the few investors those ventures 
could attract in the first place. Moreover, the intense negotiations over exact
23|_ouis Hartz. Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge. 1948), 
90-92.
24“Memorial to Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from the 
President, Managers and Company, of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation, and of the Delaware
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terms would not have been worth the General Assembly’s time. Given internal 
improvement companies’ minuscule rate o f success, for the state legislature to 
have devised tax schemes would have been pointless.
Supporters of internal improvement companies, however, had one 
weapon that bank directors lacked, a nearly unanimous support fo r the general
principle behind their project, better transportation.25 Projects whose legislative 
sponsors managed to befriend representatives from different districts but with 
similar causes found the state legislature a good place to look fo r capital.26 
State aid to internal improvement companies was considerable and generally 
came bundled in sprawling omnibus bills providing infusions of cash to projects
through almost every part of the state, sometimes every county.27 From 1791 
through 1817, the state allocated over $2.4 million for loans and stock purchases 
in various projects; by 1822, the state owned $2.4 million in internal improvement
company stock alone.28 In the aggregate, the Pennsylvania legislature 
expended considerable financial support to internal improvement companies.
The General Assembly voted to aid navigation and turnpike corporations 
for a variety of reasons, but the desire fo r these companies to make a profit, that 
is, to encourage corporate enterprise, was at the bottom of that list. While the
and Schuylkill Canal Navigation,” December 13,1810, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania.
25See Chapter 4 for ways that internal improvement boosters fostered that unanimity and put it to rhetorical 
and political use.
26 Hartz, 44-45.
27For a comparison of Pennsylvania’s and Virginia’s spending on internal improvements, see John D. 
Majewski, A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the Civil War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
28 Samuel Breck, Sketch of the Internal Improvements Already Made by Pennsylvania: with Observations 
Upon Her Physical and Fiscal Means for Their Extension: Particularly As They have Reference to the
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legislature granted money to many internal improvement corporations, it allowed 
an even larger number of turnpike and navigation companies to fail because they 
did not generate enough initial subscriptions for the charter to be patented by the
state.2^  More than anything else, the opportunity to provide fo r transportation to 
market, thus contributing greatly to  the overall economic development of their 
districts, remained the paramount objective for legislators in securing help for 
struggling local projects. Bringing state funds back home did not hurt, either: 
providing employment, especially during difficult economic times, gave 
representatives another way to please their constituents. At the height of the 
depression following the Panic of 1819, a committee of the Pennsylvania Senate 
proposed “liberal appropriations fo r internal improvements.” By doing so, the 
committee suggested, the state could “assist its citizens with the means of 
employment at a period of difficulty,” all the better to do “when labor can be 
commanded at half its customary rate," and Pennsylvania could build roads 
costing half what they did in other years. The committee declared that “this is 
the moment then for extraordinary exertion," that could “carry relief to the doors 
of thousands, and at the same time, increase the fixed wealth o f the state to a 
greater extent than can ever again be done by the expenditure of a similar
Future Growth and Prosperity of Philadelphia. 2d edition (Philadelphia: M. Thomas, 1818), 5; Report on 
Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822), 3, 5.
29As part of almost all charters, the state required that the company present a list of a minimum number of 
subscribers and subscriptions for the governor to authorize the letters patent to put the charter in force. As 
of 1822, of the 146 turnpike companies chartered by the state, 84 had acquired letters patent, 30 of 49 
bridge companies had acquired them, and 9 of the 18 inland navigation companies had gotten theirs; 
Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822), 
3, 5.
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sum.”33 As a consequence o f the  panic, the state accelerated its distribution of 
large sums, especially to turnpikes, in the early 1820s, and finally in 1825 the 
legislature approved the huge state-administered and -financed Main Line 
project. Any encouragement o f corporations in the funding of canal and turnpike 
companies was incidental; rather, the state supported internal improvement 
companies to foster the success o f non-corporate enterprise, much of which 
depended upon a better transportation network. Perhaps more to the point, 
legislators supported internal improvements as the most effective and prominent 
method of bringing home state money to their respective districts, a motive with 
that internal improvement com pany supporters were quite willing to identify.
Furthermore, although cash-strapped internal improvement companies 
showed a willingness to ask the legislature for money, the state usually provided 
only a  small fraction of those ventures’ overall capital. Rather, it provided a 
boost, a financial stopgap while companies scrambled to attract more private 
investment and to finish construction so that they could generate their own cash 
flow from tolls. State investment in Pennsylvania paled next to private 
investment in turnpikes, bridges, and internal navigations. Even when the 
legislature granted companies large sums, they were only a fraction of the total 
cost of construction.31 According to a Pennsylvania Senate report, as of 1822 
the state had invested $1,861,542 in turnpike stock, compared to $4,158,347 in 
private investment; $382,000 in bridges, compared to $1,629,200 in private
30Report of the Senate. Appointed to Enquire Into the Extent and Causes of the Present General Distress 
(Lancaster: Pennsylvania Senate, 1820), 15. William G. Shade declared Louis Hartz’s characterization of 
much internal-improvement spending as pump-priming “anachronistic,” but one would be hard-pressed to 
find any policy that embodies that principle more fully at any time before Maynard Keynes methodically 
delineated it in the twentieth century. Shade, 259.
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investment; and $130,000 in internal navigation companies, compared to 
$1,416,510 in private investment.22 Overall, then, the state provided 31% of 
turnpike funding, 19% o f bridge funding, and a  mere 8% of internal navigation 
funding. The corporate figures for private investment may well have been 
inflated: in some cases, they may have represented reported subscriptions, 
rather than money paid in. Nonetheless, the state was not involved in every 
corporate enterprise. It was only bailing out the ones that had the political 
wherewithal to cobble together an omnibus bill for public aid. Pennsylvania 
generally did not put up the bulk of the money for internal improvements, 
especially for those m ost likely to succeed. Private investors supplied all 
$465,00 for the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike, all $285,000 for the 
Germantown and Perkiomen Turnpike, all $300,000 for the Schuylkill Permanent 
Bridge, and all but $100,000 of the nearly $2,000,000 for the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company, each among the period’s most expensive and the
Philadelphia area’s most used improvements.22 The larger the corporation, the 
less it asked of the Pennsylvania legislature and the more fiercely it guarded its 
financial independence from public authorities.
Whether or not they received money from  the legislature, companies 
resisted the state’s attempts to set conditions on board elections, chafing under 
rules that limited boardmember tenure or dictated boardmember eligibility. For 
example, the original charter of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank stipulated that
31Hartz, 84-85.
32Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry,
1822), Tables 4, 5, and 6.
33lbid., Table 4, 5; Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the 
Stockholders. January 2. 1826.(Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1826), 10.
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a majority of the boardmembers had to be either farmers or mechanics, which, 
given the fluid meaning o f “mechanic” in the early republic, was especially vague
and proved impossible to  enforce.3^  in 1817, Joseph Tagert, lifelong merchant 
and longtime bank president, suddenly became a “farmer,” an occupation he 
somehow managed to fo llow  despite his bank duties in Philadelphia. Tagert had 
appealed to farmers’ aspirations to get his charter through the legislature, and 
now he played fast and loose with the very definition of the term. When the bank 
received its new charter in 1824, part of the bargain included new clauses 
stipulating that only three quarters of the incumbents could be reelected to the 
board in any given year and that no boardmember except the president could 
serve more than three years in any four-year period. Nonetheless, only in 1826 
and 1827 did the stockholders replace the minimum four incumbents required by 
law. The board eventually sent a petition to protest these limits, weakly arguing 
that they had “been productive of great inconvenience to the Bank and of no sort
of benefit.”35 Corporate officers knew the letter of the law, but found ways to 
subvert it or to get it changed.
Banks in particular tried to minimize public influence in the boardroom. In 
the first negotiations for chartering the Farmers and Mechanics Bank during the 
1808-1809 legislative session, its Philadelphia promoters explicitly instructed 
their lobbyist in Lancaster to make sure that any clauses allowing the state to 
appoint members to the board be stricken from the bill. In the end, their efforts
34See Larry Peskin, “To 'Encourage and Protect' American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of 
Industrialization, 1763-1830," (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1998).
35“Petition to Pennsylvania Legislature, “February 9,1827, Historical Records, Box 2, 1821-1863, Farmers 
and Mechanics National Bank records, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
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were r e w a r d e d . 3 6  The Bank o f Pennsylvania had not gotten off so easily, 
ending up with a charter that allowed the state legislature to appoint six of the 
twenty-five boardmembers, three by the Senate and three by the House of 
Representatives. Nonetheless, the stockholders’ representatives held a clear 
majority and excluded state appointees from membership on the all-important 
discount committee, the body that evaluated loan applications. In 1829, the 
legislature-appointed directors publicly disputed the shareholder-elected 
majority’s contention that the bank could not lend more money to the state, to no 
avail. In its rechartering the following session the bank managed to have the 
number of seats reserved for the state reduced to four. Regardless of the 
number, the state’s block of seats remained a distinct minority, and therefore 
could not restrict the board or shape bank policy as long as the shareholder- 
elected boardmembers kept the ir ranks closed. In an 1829 incident revealing the 
impotence of state directors, the Bank of Pennsylvania’s shareholder-elected 
boardmembers rejected a proposal to lend the state a significant amount of
money over the loud and public protests of the publicly appointed directors.37 
The public representatives were allowed into the boardroom, but only as 
spectators.
Boardmembers and associated large stockholders did their best to limit 
oversight from within as well as from outside the company. Despite their 
apparent design to put large and small shareholders on an equal footing,
36February, 1809 (?), Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Farmers and Mechanics National Bank 
records, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
37For both sides of the tangled issue, see An Address to the Stockholders of the Bank of Pennsylvania. 
December 22.1829 (Philadelphia: Clark & Raser, 1829) and Report of the Committee of State Directors, of
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corporate structures minimized the influence of all but the most vocal 
stockholders. A lm ost every charter included a system of graduated stockholder 
voting for both director elections and changes in company by-laws— that is, the 
internal rules for the company’s operations as written by the stockholders and 
the board—a practice directly derived from British precedent. For example, the 
1804 Phoenix Insurance Company charter allowed one vote for every three
shares owned, with a maximum of 15 votes.33 The Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company’s 1822 charter granted one vote for any number of shares owned up to 
ten; another for each ten if holding between ten and 100 shares; one more vote 
for each twenty shares up to 500; and three more votes for every 100 shares
above that.39 Banks tended to have the most circumscribed voting rules: the 
1809 Farmers and Mechanics Bank charter allowed each stockholder one vote 
for each of the first two shares owned, another vote for every pair of shares up to 
ten owned, a vote fo r every four shares between ten and 30 owned, a vote for 
every six shares between 30 and 60 owned, a vote for every eight shares up to 
100 owned, and a vote for every ten shares owned over 100. No stockholder 
was allowed to have more than thirty votes.49 Corporate rules also discouraged 
or prohibited the use o f proxies and forbade shareholders from voting unless 
they held their shares fo r at least three months.
The inclusion of such clauses in many company by-laws as well as 
corporate charters suggests that they reflected the intentions of corporate
the Bank of Pennsylvania. Appointed November 14. 1829. Upon the Loans of 1828 and 1829 (Philadelphia, 
1829).
38An Act to Incorporate the Phoenix Insurance Company of Philadelphia (fPhiladelphia?!. 1804), 13.
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founders and of the board of directors as much as those of cautious or perhaps 
hostile legislators. In addition to being welcomed by legislators as apparent 
attempts to limit the influence of large capital, these measures had the collateral 
effect of securing control of the corporation fo r the founding group. Small 
shareholders rarely worried over who ran the company or how, desiring rather 
what they had invested for: the building of the internal improvement or the
issuing of dividends.41 For their part, corporate boardmembers and their 
associates cared greatly that their command of the company remain 
unthreatened. Because stockholding in m ost corporations was broad, low 
turnout at annual and even emergency stockholders’ meetings ensured that 
boardmembers and their friends could muster enough votes to quell any
potential investor rebellion.42 Thus, the rules against proxy voting and the 
exchange of stock for voting purposes immediately before stockholder meetings 
functioned to prevent outsiders buying stock in the shortterm or acquiring 
proxies in order to change the company’s management or direction. In short, 
they kept the affairs of the company in the same hands that had first shaped it.
Some company boards even enacted rules that, whatever their design or 
motivation, clearly limited the participation and influence of the body of 
stockholders. In 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Company amended its by-laws 
to allow the board of directors to call a stockholders’ meeting at only five days’
39Act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania Concerning the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company; 
Together with the Bve-Laws. Etc. (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. and Brother, 1837), 25-26.
40An Act to Incorporate the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809), 7.
41 Robert E. Wright, “Bank Ownership and Lending Patterns in New York and Pennsylvania, 1781-1831," 
Business History Review 73 (Spring 1999), 47-48.
42See Chapter 5 for discussion of investor motives.
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notice.43 The intent may have been to allow the board to consult with the 
stockholders on a timelier basis, rather than the thirty days previously required. 
However, for an enterprise administering an unfinished internal improvement 
project stretching through 108 miles of occasionally rugged country, five days 
was not enough for people far up the river to receive notice, make arrangements, 
and travel down river to Philadelphia. If travel were th a t easy, no navigation 
would have been needed in the first place. Thus, the change essentially limited 
stockholder participation in potentially important em ergency meetings to 
Philadelphia-area investors. Those Philadelphia stockholders would be more 
likely to sympathize with the Philadelphia-dominated board in potentially 
controversial votes over the allocation of resources to  the upper or lower section 
of the navigation. Through a seemingly innocuous by^-law change, the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company board consolidated its control ove r the company.
Establishing administrative and financial independence from the state—  
and, in some cases, from their own stockholders— w as no easy task, but having 
done so, corporate leaders also had to figure out how to run the organizations 
and technologies they had brought into being. At first, corporate boards did their 
best to administer their projects on their own, often depending upon one or a 
small number of their members to do most of work. Internal improvement 
companies in particular usually relied upon their presidents to do much of the 
necessary work to keep the business going through th e  construction phase and 
beyond. The Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company succeeded almost solely
430ctober 17, 1823, Schuylkill Navigation Company Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov. 26, 1849, Box 1 , 
Pennsylvania State Archives.
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through the efforts o f Judge Richard Peters, who helped to organize the 
company in 1798. He came up with the idea of covering the bridge, thus greatly 
increasing its building costs— totaling about $235,000— but also reducing future 
repair expenses and contributing to the structure's longevity.44 Attracting capital 
as well as acquiring plots o f land on either side of the river fo r the entrances and 
tollbooths, Peters closely supervised the construction from the laying of the 
cornerstone in October 1800 through the bridge’s official opening on January 1,
1805. Stretching across the wide river, the bridge was 552 feet long and 42 feet 
wide, and became a source of civic pride and traveler compliments in addition to 
steady toll revenue well into the 1830s.45 Although the company had a full 
board of managers, administration remained primarily Peters’s responsibility until 
his death in 1828. Eventually such concentration of tasks in one person became 
the exception rather than the rule. In the case of the Schuylkill Permanent 
Bridge Company, Peters had the political acumen, the financial connections, the 
energy, the time, and the facility with mechanics and design to be able to hand 
the varied tasks required. No other project would be so fortunate to have a 
leader with such varied competencies.
The deciding factor in who would hold ultimate power over a given internal 
improvement usually hinged upon that most basic of business principles: capital. 
Erskine Hazard, the son of Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company boardmember 
Ebenezer Hazard, teamed with Josiah White to supervise the construction and
44John Melish, Travels in the United States of America, in the ears 1806 & 1807. and 1809. 1810. & 1811:
Including an Account of Passages Betwixt America and Britain, and Travels Through Various Parts of Great 
Britain. Ireland, and Upper Canada (Philadelphia: Thomas & George Palmer, 1812), 165.
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much of the early administration and financing of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company. White had mechanical talent and drive in abundance and Hazard 
great meticulousness, but neither had the political sensibilities o r financial touch 
Richard Peters did. Compounding their problems— or perhaps symbolizing 
them— neither W hite nor Hazard had been elected to the board o f the company 
they had founded. Peters’s corporation, the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge 
Company, had attracted a large body of small investors who wanted as little 
involvement as possible in the actual management of the project. White and 
Hazard’s company started as a three man undertaking— the third, George Hauto, 
was a confidence man who, upon being discovered, was subsequently bought 
out by the other two. Eventually it attracted a large infusion of capital from big 
investors. Having great sums invested, these later entrants demanded control 
over the management of their funds. They did not worry over precise technical 
details: they could pay W hite and Hazard to oversee construction while keeping 
the overall direction of the company in their own hands.
Other company boards were more explicit about choosing men with 
expertise in account books rather than engineering diagrams. The Schuylkill 
Navigation Company’s board of managers chose a new president in 1825, and 
the explanation of their decision process included an explicit admission that the 
need to pursue class interest rather than guarantee technical competence 
informed their decision. W ith Cadwalader Evans, Jr.’s resignation from the 
presidency, the company’ board of managers looked for a replacement. Evans
45For the years 1830-1835, the bridge averaged $20,832 in toll revenue. Calculated from data in Memorial 
of Richard A. Gilpin. Relative to the Construction of a Tunnel Under the River Schuylkill: Presented to the 
Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia (rPhiladelphial. 1836), 3.
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had divided his time among many pursuits and projects, but now that the project 
was substantially operational the board wanted someone who would work full­
time for the company. They first considered hiring an engineering expert, but 
competent engineers were in short supply, and furthermore the navigation’s 
impending completion somewhat obviated their need for a full-time engineer. 
They also thought about employing a superintendent for the works, and admitted 
that “it is possible that such an officer may be found necessary, as well as 
inferior superintendents, limited to portions of the line over which they should 
maintain a continual personal inspection." Their main concern, though, was not 
with minor technical matters or everyday operations. Rather, “the capital 
invested is large, the navigation is of great and increasing importance,” reasoned 
the managers, “and the public have in various ways an interest in preserving its 
activity and usefulness, which, no less than the interest of the Stockholders, calls 
for continued & even increased watchfulness and care.” In other words, they 
feared that improper management of the navigation might give “occasion to great 
public complaint” with concomitant political consequences along with raising their 
own ire. Besides the assumption that an engineer might not be politically adept, 
the objection to hiring an engineer to run the company would be that “his 
inferiority of station... would prevent him from having the needful freedom in 
communicating with the Board, and from having the requisite weight and
authority in his intercourse with o t h e r s . ”4 ^  Boardmembers wanted someone 
who could deal with public pressures, but even more, someone who would be
460ctober26, 1825 Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov. 26, 1849, Box 1, Schuylkill Navigation Company 
Papers, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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their own equal, who would defend the board’s interests as if they were his own. 
So they picked one of their own, to the unanimous affirmation of stockholders: 
Joseph S. Lewis, who had helped negotiate the company’s $230,000 loan from 
Stephen Girard, served on the boards of various insurance companies, and had 
been president o f Philadelphia’s Watering Committee. The selection of Lewis 
signified the  board’s desire that the company put their economic and political 
goals ahead of its desire to provide efficient transportation along the Schuylkill 
River.
Banks and insurance companies, too, kept important leadership positions 
in fam iliar and trusted hands. While internal improvement companies often 
required the  services of an engineer, financial corporations had the ir own 
technical specialists: for insurance companies, an actuary, and fo r banks, a 
cashier. The  actuary consulted and constructed mortality statistics, lists of ship 
casualties, reports of fires, property values, and any other relevant information 
needed to decide upon premiums for whatever kind of insurance his company 
issued. The cashier oversaw account keeping— a major task for banks with 
hundreds o f active customers— and the issuing of notes. Both supervised the 
clerks, o the r employees, and routine bookkeeping and were responsible fo r day- 
to-day management decisions. A close circle of men dominated these positions, 
both by necessity and by board preference. Nobody in Philadelphia had run a 
fell-fledged corporate bank or insurance com pany before, and the cities most 
accomplished businessmen were the best a t keeping track of complicated 
projects. Jacob Shoemaker, related to city council member Abraham 
Shoem aker and prominent merchant James Vanuxem, was a merchant and a
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founding member of the Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania in 1804. 
In 1809, he became an original director o f the Pennsylvania Company for 
Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, and upon its chartering in 1812 was
appointed its first actuary.47 Even those who worked their way up the ranks did 
so through family and professional connections, joining the corporate oligarchy 
as they climbed the corporate ladder. Quintin Campbell, a Scottish orphan who 
immigrated to America as a cabin boy, served as a clerk in for Levi Hollingsworth 
and became a virtual member o f the powerful Hollingsworth flour merchant clan. 
His master got him a job as a clerk with the Bank of Pennsylvania, in 1804 he 
became the first teller for the Philadelphia Bank, and, when cashier Joseph Todd 
died, replaced him and kept the position well into the 1830s.48 Once ensconced 
as cashier or actuary, men tended to stay fo r a long time, lending stability to the 
institution while ensuring that the interests of the board remained primary.
The composition of corporate boards also embodied stability, with most of 
the incumbents getting returned to their seats year after year. From 1810 
through 1830, the Pennsylvania Company fo r Insuring Lives and Granting 
Annuities averaged an 85% retention rate fo r boardmembers, meaning that in a 
typical year only two of the fourteen incumbents did not return. The most that 
ever left the board was six, in 1823, but of the fourteen directors from 1822 six 
still sat on the board in 1824, ensuring continuity amid the comparatively high 
turnover. Banks tended to be even more static. From the Farmers and
47“Petition from Delaware Insurance Company to Pennsylvania Legislature/ February 13, 1804, McAllister 
Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Stock Subscription Book, 1809, Pennsylvania Company for 
Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
48Winslow, 55.
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Mechanics Bank’s 1807 inception until 1830, its board had a annual 90% 
retention rate, most often losing only one incumbent and never more than four of 
the thirteen members from the previous year. Even this low rate of change 
exaggerated turnover because some boardmembers left only to return a year or 
two later. Internal improvement company board turnover could be high in the 
first few years of operation but generally settled into the same pattern as did 
financial corporations. Beginning in 1815, the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
returned twelve or more of its fourteen boardmembers in every election but one 
during its first fifteen years o f operation. The other year, 1817, nine of the 
fourteen incumbents retained their seats, keeping a strong majority. With rare 
exceptions, boardmembers held their seats until they retired from all business 
pursuits or until they died.
Incumbent boardmembers even outlasted the direst company crises and 
general economic downturns. In 1815, the board of the Pennsylvania Company 
for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities lost five of its thirteen members. 
However, several took up seats on other boards the same year, suggesting 
voluntary departures rather than a purge of upper management, especially given 
that the company was on the verge of issuing its first dividends. Most telling, the 
company never failed to reelect a  majority of the sitting board, a clear indication 
that the dominant group stayed firmly in control of company policy and 
administration. The Farmers and Mechanics Bank returned most of its directors 
every year, despite the normal vicissitudes of banking and the upheavals of the 
Panic of 1819. Notwithstanding chronic money problems before the late 1820s, 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company did the same. Regardless of companies’
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fortunes on the unpredictable economic seas of the early republic, they kept the 
same hands at the tiller year-in and year-out.
Boards’ continuity of composition, combined with the longevity of many 
seatholders, demonstrated the degree to which a small group of men could 
dominate Philadelphia-based corporations. To some extent, board membership 
was self-selected: the vast majority of stockholders invested in corporations 
precisely to be able to reap steady profits while minimizing their own active 
involvement in business affairs, and perhaps few were willing and able to spend
the time to sit on a company board.49 Even annual stockholders’ meetings 
generally did not attract a majority of the investors. Widespread stockholder 
lethargy contributed to the ability of men with energy and connections to get on 
the board, and once there, to stay in as long as they wanted. Stockholders threw 
out few boardmembers, but a number of board minute entries declared feelings 
of sympathy for the families of members who died in office. By then, of course, 
even unrelated boardmembers may have felt like family to each other, having 
gathered together so many times over a period of years or even decades. And 
like family, they were quick to defend their common interests and fight for 
common goals.
If an individual corporation could be considered as a family, then they all 
belonged to the same exclusive and cohesive Philadelphia clan. The 
interlocking of corporate boards resulted in a small community of men 
dominating Philadelphia-area companies. Although most banks had articles in 
their charter that forbade the holding of seats on other bank boards, insurance
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and public im provem ent company charters had no such strictures prohibiting the 
holding of seats on the boards of potential competitors, and none of the charters 
addressed the question of holding seats on the boards of businesses that would 
not compete directly with the company in question. As a result, the same men 
got on the boards of multiple corporations, allowing inter-corporation 
communication and cooperation.
The level o f coordination among the Philadelphia corporate business 
associates resembled that of previous elite commercial groups in other Atlantic 
port cities. Through his analysis of a community of eighteenth-century London 
merchants, David Hancock demonstrated the extent to which those businessmen 
held common views, followed a common economic program, and even entered
into many short- and long-term mercantile partnerships and joint ventures.50 
Although they did not articulate it as such, these men conceived of their 
commercial activities as leading to and aided by the integration of the British 
Atlantic world; they pursued that goal together through both business and 
political activities. They were typical in this regard: other scholars have shown 
that similar groups in other Atlantic cities, including Philadelphia and New York,
did much the same.51 Such informal organization and activity was not limited to 
English speakers, as John Garretson Clark’s work on both New Orleans and La
49See Chapter 3 for an extended discussion of the motivations of investors.
^D avid  Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic 
Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
®1See Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in 
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) and Cathv Matson. 
Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
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Rochelle during the same period has demonstrated.52 In all of these cities, 
among all of these communities, men pooled their energies and sometimes their 
resources to pad the ir own profits in conjunction with political and legal efforts to 
further and guide economic growth.
The same would be true of the Quaker City corporate entrepreneurs. 
Indeed, from the very beginning of Philadelphia corporations the men who sat on 
the boards of the canal companies were often bank or insurance boardmembers 
as well. Robert Morris and his associates not only founded Pennsylvania’s first 
bank, the Bank of North America, in 1781 but also its first internal improvement 
companies, the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation Company in 1791 and 
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation Company in 1792. A t any given 
time from 1800 to 1830, about a quarter of the men sitting on the boards of 
Philadelphia-based corporations held seats for multiple c o rp o ra t io n s .5 5  Some
5^John Garretson Clark, New Orleans. 1718-1812: An Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1970), and La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy During the Eighteenth Century
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
53These and the ensuing statistics and analysis of board memberships derives from a database compiled
from the following directories: James Hardie, The Philadelphia Directory and Reoister...1793 (Philadelphia:
T. Dobson, 1793); Thomas Stephens, Stephens’s Philadelphia Directory, for 1796 (Philadelphia: Thomas
Stephens, 1796); Cornelius William Stafford, The Philadelphia Directory for 1797 (Philadelphia: William W.
Woodward, 1797); Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory, for 1798 (Philadelphia, 1798);
Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory, for 1799 (Philadelphia: William W. Woodward, 1799);
Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory for 1801 (Philadelphia: William W. Woodward, 1801);
James Robinson, Philadelphia Directory. City and County Register, for 1803 (Philadelphia: William W.
Woodward, 1803); James Robinson, Philadelphia Directory for 1804 (Philadelphia: John H. Oswald, 1804); 
James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory for 1805 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1805); James
Robinson. The Philadelphia Directory for 1806 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1806); James Robinson, 
The Philadelphia Directory, for 1807 (Philadelphia: T.S. Manning, 1807); James Robinson, The Philadelphia
Directory for 1808 (Philadelphia: W. Woodhouse, 1808); James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory of 
1809 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1809); James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory of 1810
(Philadelphia: James Robinson, 18101: Census Directory for 1811. Containing the Names. Occupations. &
Residence of the Inhabitants of the City. Southwark & Northern Liberties (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811); 
John A. Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for 1813 (Philadelphia: B. & T. Kite, 18131: Kite's
Philadelphia Directory of 1814 (Philadelphia: B & T Kite, 1814); James Robinson, The Philadelphia
Directory for 1816 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1816); James Robinson, Robinson’s Original Annual
Directory for 1817 (Philadelphia: Whitehall, 1817); John Adems Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and
Register for 1818 (Philadelphia: E. R. Parker, 1818); John Adems Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and
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sat on many at once, men such as Jacob Downing, who in 1814 sat on the 
boards of the Bank o f North America, the Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike 
Company, the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, and the Pennsylvania 
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire.
In addition, a t least a sixth of the men had relatives sitting on boards of 
other companies. John Nixon served as president of the Bank of North America 
from 1793 to 1808 and his son Henry served as a director from 1804 until the 
1830s; the younger Nixon also sat on the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania’s 
board from 1804 to at least 1830, the Ridge Turnpike Company’s board in the 
late 1810s and the Lancaster Schuylkill Bridge Company’s board in the early 
1820s. Brothers Robert and Jesse Wain shared a merchant b u s i n e s s . 5 4  Jesse 
held seats on the boards of the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania and the 
Germantown and Perkiomen Turnpike, while Robert held seats at various times 
on the boards of the American Insurance Company, the Bank of North America, 
and the Philadelphia Insurance Company. Their cousin Jacob, who eventually 
took over the business, was also a boardmember o f the American Insurance 
Company, the Bank o f North America, and the Insurance Company of North 
America. Relative W illiam  Wain also helped to direct the Bank of North
Register for 1819 (Philadelphia: John Adems Paxton, 1819k The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for 
1821 (Philadelphia: M’Carty & Davis, 1821); The Philadelphia Index, or Directory, for 1823 (Philadelphia: 
Robert Desilver, 1823); Thomas Wilson, The Philadelphia Directory and Stranger’s Guide, for 1825 
(Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1825); Robert Desilver. Desilver's Philadelphia Directory and Stranger's Guide, 
for 1828 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1828); Robert Desilver, Desilver's Philadelphia Directory and 
Stranger’s Guide. 1829 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1829); Robert Desilver, Desilver's Philadelphia 
Directory and Stranger’s Guide. 1830 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1830). Other sources of data include 
the Farmers and Mechanics Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library; Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov.
26, 1849, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives; Minute Books, Pennsylvania 
Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Hagley Museum and Library; and various newspapers. 
54Winslow, 132.
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American and the Philadelphia Insurance Company. Whether for inland 
navigation companies or other corporations, blood was thicker than water.
Many board members had close business associates as officers in
various corporations.55 Henry Drinker, the cashier of the Bank of North America 
from 1805 to 1821 and an early director of the Susquehanna and Schuylkill 
Navigation Company speculated in lands together with Samuel W. Fisher, a 
director of the Germantown and Perkiomen Turnpike Company from 1805 to 
1814 and the president of the Insurance Company of North America until 1805, 
when he became president of the Philadelphia Insurance Company, an office he
held for over a decade.55 Both Manuel Eyre, longtime director of the Delaware 
Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, the American Fire Insurance Company, 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and second Bank of the United States, and 
Abraham Kintzing, who at various times sat on the boards of the Pennsylvania 
Insurance Company, the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, and the Bank of 
North America through the 1810s, had apprenticed together for merchant Henry
Pratt in the late 1790s.57 Pratt, who took Kintzing into his firm as a partner, later 
sat on the boards o f both the first and second Banks of the United States, the 
Commercial Bank, the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, the Insurance 
Company of North America, the Bustleton and Smithfield Road Company, and 
the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Company. Joseph Evans and John
55 These are relatives with the same last name, not counting those so common, such as Smith, that were 
less likely to be related. This number is actually under-representative because of the great number of men 
related by marriage, who thus had different last names but shared family interests.
56Henry Drinker to Samuel W. Fisher, June 8, 1814, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
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Welsh not only sat together on the boards of the Philadelphia Bank and the 
Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania: Welsh took Evans into his firm,
and Evans married W elsh’s wife’s younger sister.55 Whether through birth, 
brides, or business, the men on Philadelphia boards were bound together in 
myriad ways.
This interconnection meant that more than a third of the seats of 
Philadelphia corporations were held by men who individually or through familiar 
or business connections represented their concerns in multiple companies. In 
1821, fo r example, Schuylkill Navigation Company president Cadwalader Evans, 
Jr. also sat on the board of the Bank of the United States; he was a form er 
boardmember of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, his father still 
held a seat on board of the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities, and he had friendly dealings with Henry Drinker, the cashier 
of the Bank of North America, and Joseph Ball, a form er president and current 
director of the Union Insurance Company. Three other members of the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers also sat on the board of at 
least one insurance company and a fourth had a brother on the boards of two
insurance companies and the Bank of Pennsylvania.59 This core of men who 
sat on several boards or who had families or associates on various boards 
formed the nucleus o f influence and opinion guiding Philadelphia’s growth.
57Abraham Ritter, Philadelphia and Her Merchants. As Constituted Fifty @ Seventy Years Ago. Illustrated
by Diagrams of the River Front, and Portraits of Some of its Prominent Occupants (Philadelphia: Abraham
Ritter, 1860), 57.
58Stephen N. Winslow, Biographies of Successful Philadelphia Merchants (Philadelphia: James K Simon,
1864), 107-110.
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That influence extended to the City Corporation of Philadelphia, as well, 
and often concentrated in the Watering Committee. For the city’s first bond 
issue to raise funds for the waterworks, the C ity Councils named commissioners 
to sell the instruments.60 Among the twelve-man list were eight men active in 
business corporate circles, including notables Jacob Shoemaker, Edward 
Tilghman, and John Inskeep. Many men alternated between sitting on the city 
councils and sitting on corporate boards. James Vanuxem, for example, who 
served on the Watering Committee for several years of its first decade and as its 
president in 1806, sat on the boards of the Union Insurance Company, the 
American Fire Insurance Company, the Germantown Turnpike and the Delaware 
and Schuylkill Canal Company. Some families had connections in both the city 
councils and corporate boards: Jacob Shoemaker’s brother Abraham sat on the 
city councils off and on from 1801 to the early 1820s. Samuel Wetherill would 
become head of the Watering Committee in 1824 once Joseph S. Lewis left that 
position to assume the presidency of the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Others 
extended their influence even further: Cadwalader Evans, alongside his tenure 
as Schuylkill Navigation Company president, sat for several years in the 
Pennsylvania legislature. Robert Wain, on the boards at various times of the 
Bank of North America, the Philadelphia Insurance Company, the American 
Insurance Company, and the Insurance Company of North America, not only 
held a seat on Philadelphia’s Common Council in the early 1790s and Select
59Compiled from The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for 1821 (Philadelphia: M’Carty & Davis, 1821) 
and Minutes, Board of Managers, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Roll 1, Oct 7,1815-January 5,1846, 
Pennsylvania State Archives.
S^An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the 
City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 3.
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Council in the early 181 Os but also was elected to the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives fo r  two terms in the 1790s and the United States House of 
Representatives in 1798; John Sergeant, council fo r and boardmember of the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, the Union Canal Company, the second Bank of 
the United States, the American Fire Insurance Company, and the Pennsylvania 
Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, gained a seat in the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives and sat on its Roads and Inland 
Navigation Committee fo r the 1807-1808 term before serving four consecutive 
terms in the United States House of Representatives beginning in 1815 and
being Henry Clay’s  running mate in the 1832 presidential election.61 The 
Philadelphia corporate community was both connected well and well connected.
The practice of multiple seatholding by individuals and families created a 
dense web of relationships among all Philadelphia corporations. The directors of 
banks, insurance com panies, and internal improvement companies formed a 
tight community in which the general project o f orderly regional economic growth 
along controlled lines could be carefully coordinated. No corporations had direct 
contacts with every other company, but all had boardmembers or relatives of 
boardmembers who held seats on the boards of other concerns and so could be 
kept abreast of general trends and the policies of the others through only one or 
two degrees of separation. Such interconnections were rampant and consistent 
throughout the firs t three decades of the nineteenth century, and, if anything, 
slightly increased over the period (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). Although
William Meredith, Euloaium of the Character and Services of the Late John Sergeant (Philadelphia:
Crissy & Markley, 1858).
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corporations may have competed fo r individual customers, boardmembers were 
sure to keep informed on issues that affected them and when necessary to take 
concerted action even without formal institutional ties.
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Figure 3
Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1811
BPHILLY
C&WT
PHOENIX
PCON
FARMECPCILGA
ICNA
One individual or familial connection 
Multiple individual or familial connections
B&SR - Bustleton and Smithfield Road Company; BNA - Bank of North America; BPA - Bank 
of Pennsylvania; BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States; C&WT - 
Cheltenham and Willow Grove Turnpike Company; D&S - Delaware and Schuylkill Canal 
Navigation Company; DIP - Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; F&BT - Frankford 
and Bristol Turnpike Company; FARMEC - Farmers and Mechanics Bank; GTP - Germantown 
and Perkiomen Turnpike Company; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA - 
Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike Company; 
MAC - Mutual Assurance Company; MFC - Marine and Fire Insurance Company; PCILGA- 
Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia 
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance 
Company; PIC - Philadelphia Insurance Company; S&LT - Susquehanna and Lehigh Turnpike 
Company; S&S - Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Navigation Company; SPBCO - Schuylkill 
Permanent Bridge Company; UIC - Union Insurance Company; USIC - United States Insurance 
Company.
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Figure 4
Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1819
AFIC B&SRUSIC
UNION
BNOLI
BPHILLY
BSCHUY
C&WT
PHOENIX
PCON
PCILGA
ICPA ICNA
One individual or familial connection 
Multiple individual o r familial connections
AFIC - American Fire Insurance Company; B&SR - Bustleton and Smithfield Road Company; BNA - 
Bank of North America; BNOLI -Bank of the Northern Liberties; BPA - Bank of Pennsylvania; 
BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BSCHUY - Schuylkill Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States;
C&WT -Cheltenham and Willow Grove Turnpike Company; CB - Commercial Bank; DIP - 
Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; F&BT - Frankford and Bristol Turnpike 
Company; FARMEC - Farmers and Mechanics Bank; GTP - Germantown and Perkiomen 
Turnpike Company; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA - Insurance 
Company of Pennsylvania; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike Company; MIC - 
Marine Insurance Company; PCILGA- Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss 
by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance Company; PIC -  Philadelphia Insurance Company;
RIDGE - Ridge Turnpike Company; S&TR - Susquehanna and Tioga Turnpike Company; SNC - 
Schulkill Navigation Company; SPBCO - Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company; UIC - Union 
Insurance Company; UNION - Union Canal Company; USIC - United States Insurance 
Company.
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Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1830
P H O E N IX
P C O N
P C IL G A
U N IO N B N A
B N O L I
B P H IL L Y
B P T
B S C H U Y
B S O U T H
P A F IC
B U S
C A M D E N
D IP  
F A R M E C
L& P  ^  '  IC N A
K B A N K  IC P A
One individual or familial connection
Multiple individual or familial connections
AFIC - American Fire Insurance Company; AIC - Atlantic Insurance Company; BNA - Bank 
of North America; BNOLI -Bank of the Northern Liberties; BPA - Bank of Pennsylvania; 
BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BPT - Bank of Penn Township; BSCHUY - Schuylkill Bank; 
BSOUTH - Southwark Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States; CAMDEN - Camden Bank;
CB - Commercial Bank; DIP - Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; FARMEC - 
Farmers and Mechanics Bank; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA - Insurance 
Company of Pennsylvania; KBANK - Kensington Bank; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia 
Turnpike Company; LC&N - Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company; MB - Mechanics Bank;
MIC - Marine Insurance Company; PAFIC - Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company; PCILGA- 
Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia 
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance 
Company; PIC - Philadelphia Insurance Company; RIDGE - Ridge Turnpike Company; SNC - 
Schulkill Navigation Company; UIC - Union Insurance Company; UNION - Union Canal 
Company; USIC - United States Insurance Company.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
274
The interconnection of boards allowed the corporate community to 
allocate funds from money-rich companies to cash-poor projects. The Schuylkill 
Navigation Company in particular benefited from  such coordination. In August 
1817, Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities 
boardmember Cadwalader Evans, Sr. convinced his colleagues to approve 
purchasing thirty shares in the navigation company, notwithstanding that it was 
far riskier than the usual insurance-company investment.62 Evans could at 
least vouch for the quality of the navigation com pany’s management, because 
his son and namesake was the president. In 1821, W illiam Boyd suggested that 
the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities invest 
$20,000 in the Union Canal Company, a motion that the finance committee later
approved.62 It was no coincidence: Boyd was on the boards of both companies. 
Three years later, because the Schuylkill Navigation Company was still 
desperate for cash despite having opened the waterway in July, the navigation’s 
board of managers authorized a $180,000 loan negotiated from a group of 
bankers, insurance company officers, and the organizations they represented. 
The men who eventually took up subscriptions did so on the condition that they 
would hold a mortgage (subject to the prior claims of Stephen Girard, to whom 
the company already owed $230,000) and that they would only be obligated to 
pay in if the entire subscription were filled. The largest investors included the 
American Marine Insurance Company subscribing fo r $5,000 and the Marine
62August 20, 1817, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1. Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
63 Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1., 4/13/1821. Accession #1476, Pennsylvania Company for Insurance 
on Lives and Granting Annuities, Hagley Museum and Library.
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Assurance Company subscribing for $10,000.64 As Josiah White recounted, a 
circle of men associated with the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities was responsible for the funding that got the Lehigh Coal and 
Navigation Company o ff the ground: Joseph Shoemaker arranged fo r W hite to 
meet him and his partners “at the Life insurance Co. office on the subject, when 
fo r 20 shares of stock he agreed to give us his weight and influence to get our
Stock subscribed.”65 In this way, the corporate community supported local 
economic development by funding internal improvement projects fo r which they 
may not have expected any direct returns.
A confluence o f the interconnections of corporate boards and corporate 
lobbying in the statehouse occurred in the 1823-1824 Pennsylvania legislative 
session. Eager to renew their charter, Philadelphia Bank partisans considered 
several offers to the legislature in exchange for re-incorporation. Eventually, 
they negotiated with the legislature for the bank to make a one-time purchase of 
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company stock amounting to $100,000 rather
than the bank giving its own stock or a cash bonus to the state.66 Legislators 
could justify the deal by pointing out that the bank was paying for its new charter 
by supporting an important internal improvement. Compared to earlier charters, 
though, the legislature had come away with relatively little: rather than getting 
either cash to relieve the immediate tax burden or bank shares to relieve the
64Subscription book for loans of 1823 and 1824, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Accession #1215, Hagley 
Museum and Library
65Josiah White’s History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27. 
66The bank was to receive any canal company dividends for the following fifteen years, after which it was to 
transfer the stocks to the state at no cost. The Philadelphia Bank: Containing the Articles of Association, 
the Original Charter, and All the Acts of Assembly Extending and Relating to it. with the General Banking 
Law of April 16. 1850 (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Murphy & Sons, 1859), 40.
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long-term tax burden, representatives mysteriously settled for a transfer of 
wealth from one corporation to another. The men on the boards of the bank and 
the canal company had used the chartering process to get something both 
wanted: in the bank’s case, a low price fo r the charter, and in the canal company' 
case, a useful infusion of cash. In essence, these men saved the bank 
$100,000 because they might have made the sam e transaction anyway, even 
had the state required a cash bonus for the bank charter. George Gillaspy, one 
of the Philadelphia Bank’s founding members, sa t on the Chesapeake and 
Delaware Canal Com pany’s Board of Managers and at least three men currently 
or formerly on the bank’s board were related to m en on the canal board. They
easily could have gotten the bank to buy the shares.67 The state’s endorsement 
made the exchange easier, because now the bank’s board did not even have to 
justify the its investment in the struggling canal company. By coordinating their 
lobbying efforts, the two boards had paid less to the state while transferring 
funds from a company that easily attracted investment, the bank, to one that had 
more trouble doing so.
Although no corporations were more continually desperate for cash than 
internal improvement companies in their construction phase, insurance 
companies sometimes needed liquid capital to tide them over until more 
premiums came in. Here, too, on occasion the close relations between 
corporate boards cam e in handy for businesses down on their luck. Beginning in 
the spring of 1822, the Pennsylvania Company fo r Insuring Lives and Granting
67The Philadelphia Bank: Containing the Articles of Association, the Original Charter, and All the Acts of 
Assembly Extending and Relating to it. with the General Banking Law of April 16,1850 (Philadelphia: Wm.
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Annuities suddenly faltered: after having issued dividends of at least six percent 
and as high as ten percent for the previous seven years, it failed to issue 
dividends that July. By the fall the company was running dangerously short o f 
operating capital. The board of directors turned to the Philadelphia Bank fo r a 
short-term $2,000 loan that the bank quickly approved, merely confirming a
history of friendly relations between the two boards.®8 The insurance company’s 
longtime actuary, Jacob Shoemaker, had been a director of the bank, and Jacob 
Sperry and John Bohlen sat on the boards of both companies. Former bank 
directors John Welsh, Augustine Bousquet, and Lewis Carpentier had all been 
active in the insurance company’s founding, and the Newbold family had at 
various times had seats on both boards.69 Corporate boards willingly bailed out 
the companies of their associates.
Even banks, most of which had strictures in their charters forbidding their 
directors from holding seats on other banks, managed to keep their lines of 
communication with each other open. Occasionally they simply flouted their 
charters. In 1818, Joseph Lisle sat on the boards of both the Bank of the United 
States and the Commercial Bank, despite the letter’s prohibition against its 
directors holding seats on the boards of other banks. Such blatant disregard for 
the law was the exception rather than the rule because boards found other, legal 
lines of communication. Many brothers, fathers and sons, and business
F. Murphy & Sons, 1859), 15; Thomas Wilson, The Philadelphia Directory and Stranger’s Guide, for 1825 
(Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1825).
680ctober 3,1822, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1. Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
69Stock Subscription Book, 1809, Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, 
Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library; The Charter and Bv-Laws of the Pennsylvania Company for
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associates sat on different bank boards and so could discuss the policies of their 
respective institutions in an informal manner. Some men hopped from board to 
board. John Barclay, an early president of the Bank of Pennsylvania later served 
the Bank of the Northern Liberties in the same capacity, and Joshua Lippincott 
sat on the board of the Schuylkill Bank before joining the board of the second 
Bank of the United States. Nonetheless, longevity with a single board remained 
the norm. Several men declined the opportunity to  switch while still keeping 
cordial relations with the directors of other banks. In 1829, Robert Patterson 
confided to a friend that he had “been solicited by my friends to go into [Bank of 
North America]. I believe it would give great satisfaction to the Directors if I 
were appointed, but I would not leave the Philadelphia Bank. I am at home there
- with uncontrolled influence.”70 The prohibition against sitting on more than one 
bank board did little to stop banking associates from communicating when their 
common interests were at stake.
In addition to aiding each other’s corporations, members of the 
Philadelphia corporate business elite benefited personally from cross-corporate 
lending arrangements. Corporations were not the only backers of the big 1824 
Schuylkill Navigation Company loan; Joseph Norris, a Bank of Pennsylvania 
director, subscribed for $15,000, Henry Nixon of the Bank of North America 
subscribed for $8,000, and Joseph S. Lewis of the Philadelphia Contributionship
Insurance on Lives. Granting Annuities, and Executing Trusts (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Brother, 
1836), ,3 .
70Robert B. Patterson to General Barnard December 25,1829, Robert Patterson Folder, Historical Society 
of Pennsylvania
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subscribed for $10,000.71 These men could avail themselves of such a good 
investment opportunity because o f their insider status. Furthermore, they had 
access to large sums because they knew that through the ir ties to financial 
institutions, they could afford to tie up capital fo r long periods without the fear of 
insolvency: should one run short o f cash, he could always take out a loan from 
the company on whose board he served. They were also using their corporate 
links to aid companies in which they owned stock privately or stood to gain in 
increased property values upon the completion of the various improvements. 
Thus, through their ties to other financial institutions, an increasingly smaller 
group of men held an increasingly larger portion of corporate stock and debt and 
thus an even greater say in how corporations would be run.
Bank officials coordinated their activities and policies through methods 
o ther than interlocking their directories. Eventually, the largest Philadelphia- 
based chartered banks held jo in t meetings, usually sending their cashiers as 
representatives. These men gathered at the behest o f any one of their number 
in regard to particular issues that might require the cooperation of banks across 
the city. One such set of meetings took place in 1814 a t the suggestion of Henry 
Drinker, the Bank of North Am erica’s cashier, after the legislature chartered forty- 
one new banks. He wrote to the boards of the city’s three other established 
chartered banks, the Bank of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Bank, and the 
Farmers and Mechanics Bank, proposing that they adopt a joint policy on the 
acceptance of these new banks’ notes. Eventually, the group decided to accept
71 Subscription book for loans of 1823 and 1824, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Accession #1215, 
Schuylkill Navigation Company Records, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the notes only of those banks in Philadelphia city o r county and, fo r the satellite 
branches of the Bank o f Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia Bank, to accept only
notes from banks in the sam e location as the branch.72 On another occasion, 
the same group agreed not to issue or accept any note with a face value under 
five dollars despite the state ’s vacillation over its restrictions on low-denomination 
issues.73 The prohibition on interlocking directories did not inhibit the big 
Philadelphia banks from acting in concert on issues that affected them 
collectively.
The coordination o f bank policies showed the extent to which Philadelphia 
corporate associates extra-legally controlled banking and monetary policies for 
the Philadelphia region and indeed for the entire state. Their decision to accept 
only the notes of some rather than all of the banks chartered in 1814 revealed 
that bank directors held fa r more sway over money policy than did public 
authorities. For better or worse, the banks whose notes the long-established 
Philadelphia banks refused to honor had obtained charters every bit as legitimate 
as the ones granted to the big city institutions. The big-city bank directors were 
doing their best to keep the money supply at safe levels, thus limiting inflation 
and the chance of a run— a point they would bring up during the Panic of 1819, 
which many observers blam ed upon the excessive issues of the forty-one banks 
chartered five years earlier. If the government would not or could not rein in the 
excessive printing of bank notes with its inherent danger fo r the entire economy,
72June 17,1814, Excerpt of Minutes of Board of Directors, Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Farmers 
and Mechanics Bank, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
73The legislature forbade and then allowed the issuing of notes below 55 at least twice in between 1814 
and 1820. An Act to Re-Charter Certain Banks. To Which Are Added the Several Acts of Assembly
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at least Philadelphia banks tried their utmost to give Pennsylvania’s economy a 
solid foundation while providing capital for growth. The big city banks also had to 
deal with the practical problem of redeeming the notes of non-Philadelphia 
banks. Many of the new banks were quite remote, making redemption o f their 
notes fo r specie and communication on a regular basis extremely challenging; 
the communication lag time particularly exacerbated the big banks’ chronic 
difficulties with counterfeiting, a widespread practice damaging banks and the 
population at large. As for the issuing of notes below five dollars, Philadelphia 
bankers provided the discipline that elected representatives and shady country 
banks could not. The big banks were protecting themselves, their customers, 
and the greater public by getting together and acting in concert on such issues.
Certainly, some kind o f financial regulation was necessary and the 
legislature’s sporadic, occasionally strict, but invariably toothless measures 
proved inadequate. However, no matter how much the banks’ collusion may 
have been motivated by the desire to follow sound financial policy, it also 
reflected the clout of the Philadelphia banking community and its ability and 
willingness to use that power without submission to public scrutiny and debate. 
They did not hold open meetings or publicize their decisions, nor did they petition 
the legislature for more effective legal changes or governmental oversight 
accomplishing the same ends. Rather, they held their own private meetings and 
made their own decisions mostly free of the input or influence of the citizenry or 
its elected representatives, keeping their own counsel and running the state’s
Relative to Banks, and the By-Laws of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: R. Desilver, 1824), 
36;
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economic policy from cozy bank offices in Philadelphia. Regardless of the 
wisdom or effectiveness o f the ir efforts to manage banking and the economy, 
manage it they did.
Furthermore, while none of them were as bold or as foolish to admit as 
much openly, Philadelphia bank officials had some inkling of the implications of 
their regulatory efforts fo r the ir own political and economic power. By denying 
country banks the ability to  have their notes honored in Philadelphia, the big-city 
bankers ensured that the metropolis between the Schuylkill and the Delaware 
would remain the financial capital of the state. They were also protecting their 
own profits while threatening those of the country banks. Country bank notes, 
because they were not accepted in Philadelphia, circulated at a heavy discount 
beyond the vicinity of their respective institutions, meaning that their bearers 
could not get face value fo r the notes. Customers who were already paying the 
legal rate of 6% interest on a country bank loan might receive only 75 cents or 80 
cents on the dollar for the notes they tried to spend outside their local area, 
making their de facto interest rate approach 30%. Therefore, anyone in 
Pennsylvania who had Philadelphia connections would try to get loans with the 
Philadelphia banks, whose notes were accepted close to par value everywhere 
in the state. City banks could thus be much more selective about their 
customers, only accepting the  ones that seemed the least likely to default while 
denying the riskier others, who would have to resort to the country banks. The 
Philadelphia banks were created a vicious cycle in which the people who were 
greater credit risks increasingly turned to country banks that would only be able 
to attract less desirable customers and whose notes became increasingly
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suspect. In effect, the Philadelphia banks’ non-acceptance of country bank 
notes because of lack o f faith in those institutions became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy whereby the city banks profited at the expense of their country cousins. 
W hether or not Philadelphia bank directors expected such results, they certainly 
did not hesitate to reap the rewards of their policy.
During this era, the number of corporations— and thus the number of men 
running them— increased only slightly while the population whose economic 
activities those companies influenced increased dramatically, thus ensuring 
those few men proportionately ever-greater influence. In 1811, 292 men out of a 
Philadelphia County population of over 110,000 held the 384 seats available on 
the various boards of Philadelphia business corporations, so that one individual
held a seat for every 380 residents.74 Nearly twenty years later, influence was 
even more concentrated: in 1830, when the Philadelphia County population had 
risen to 188,797, 336 men held the 416 available seats, meaning that there were 
now 561 residents fo r each boardmember. The consolidation of power becomes 
even more stark when the greater geographic area of impact comes into 
account: Philadelphians’ dominance of the boards of the Lancaster and 
Philadelphia Turnpike, the Union Canal Company, the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company, and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company translated into great 
economic influence not only in Philadelphia County but also in Berks, Lancaster, 
Chester, Montgomery, Northampton, Schuylkill, and Lehigh Counties. Counting 
a population of 571,840 in those areas in 1830, the ratio o f outsiders to
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boardmembers reached 1,701 to one. Such ratios of constituents to 
representatives may have been lower than those of the state legislature, but with 
one crucial difference: Pennsylvania voters elected their legislators, while 
Philadelphia boardmembers appointed themselves through their capital and their 
energy.
Just as the Philadelphia corporate community was composed of self­
selected men who coordinated economic growth following the practice of 
mercantile cooperation of men before them, they set examples for their cohorts 
in other American communities. Historian Robert Dalzell, in his examination of 
the “Boston Associates”— a term coined by scholars, not the men themselves—  
examined the extent to which a group of merchants cooperated to foster and to 
control the development of Massachusetts textile manufacturing from the 1810s 
on.7® They borrowed some of the technology from Britain and hired men to 
design and build the rest, just as Philadelphians did with canals and river 
navigations. Their use of the corporate structure suggests British or perhaps 
even Philadelphia’s influence in legal and organizational matters, as did their 
formation of the Suffolk Bank to help finance their efforts and to stabilize the
New England money supply.7® As other scholars have noted, the same 
phenomenon occurred on a smaller scale in such manufacturing areas as the 
textile districts of Rockdale and Manayunk and the papermaking region of the
74The population statistics used are from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 
Historical. Demographic. Economic, and Social Data: The United States. 1790-1970 [computer file] (Ann 
Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research).
75 Robert Dalzell, Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987). Dalzell credited Vera Shlakman with first using the term "Boston 
Associates” in The Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee. Massachusetts 
(Northampton: Smith College Press, 1935).
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Berkshires, where capitalists cooperated to promote common economic 
objectives.77 The Philadelphia associates placed themselves a t the forefront of 
the formation of a new corporate class in the industrial cities of America.
A t the same time, Philadelphia’s corporate leaders were not running a 
malevolent oligarchy silently trampling the rights and will o f the people, all for a 
small thrill and an extra half-cent on the dollar. On the contrary: they fulfilled a 
variety of functions that state and local governments were either incapable or 
unwilling to perform. Corporations provided a framework to mobilize credit for 
economic development, raise funds for internal improvements, pursue rational 
money-supply policies, and provide a safety net for struggling projects. In 
husbanding Philadelphia’s economic expansion from the 1790s to 1830, the 
city’s corporate business elite kept the city’s economic and population growth on 
a pace only exceeded by New York and Baltimore, both of which had already 
been growing faster in the 1780s and had better harbors and easier geographical 
access to their hinterlands. Still, the Philadelphia associates proceeded largely 
on their own and preferably with as little public input and comment as possible, 
and while the whole city grew company partners profited disproportionately from 
economic expansion and integration. Boardmembers did not duck the 
responsibilities that came with their influence, but they minimized the burdens
76Dalzell, 94-95.
^ S e e  Anthony F. C. Wallace, Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial 
Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 73-123; Cynthia J. Shelton, The Mills of 
Manavunk: Industrialization and Social Conflict in the Philadelphia Region. 1787-1837 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Judith McGaw, Most Wonderful Machine: Mechanization and 
Social Change in Berkshire Paper Making. 1801-1825 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 117- 
157.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
286
when they could and were not reluctant to grab the rewards when opportunity 
called.
Therein lay the ultim ate irony of the Pennsylvania electorate’s 
overwhelming aversion to  centralized authority in general and the caricature of 
money-grubbing speculators in particular. The great concern with the issues of 
the moment— keeping taxes low while providing transportation and credit as 
quickly as possible— came at the expense of considering broader, more 
sweeping policies such as the ultimate social effects of different kinds of 
economic development. This myopia played right into the hands of corporate 
boosters. The general opposition to public projects or even to the oversight of 
privately financed ones m ay have lowered the tax burden, but it also resulted in 
the state’s inability to generate consistent or meaningful leadership in economic 
policy.78 Philadelphia’s corporate leaders were only too willing to step into the 
policy arena and once there to make it their own, planting their flag, expanding 
their territory and vigilantly guarding their perimeter. Even if from the windows of 
Philadelphia company offices, Pennsylvania politics had become alarmingly 
chaotic, the men who ran Philadelphia-based corporations worked to order the 
economy to their own liking. While pandering politicians and the tax-aversive 
and anti-elitist voters over-ran the Keystone State’s political landscape, the 
Philadelphia associates removed economic policy from the political realm, 
separating as best they could the economy from the political economy of early 
republican Pennsylvania.
78lndeed, even the assertion that the state ultimately saved money by having private investors put up the 
capital for banks and internal improvements calls for examination: given the profitability of well-run banks
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and the public costs of the failures of others, the state may have saved taxes in the long run by 
administering its own banks and internal improvement projects.
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Diffusion, Consolidation, and the Corporate Sphere
Used separately, technology, finance, and ideology could be potent 
weapons. When company officers managed to coordinate all three, they 
exhibited the extent to which rich, well-run and well-connected corporations could 
control local economies and local resources. Two generations of Philadelphia 
associates spent the half-century after independence building their corporate 
empires. Despite the growing strength o f Schuylkill Navigation Company and the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, in the early 1830s both still faced 
challenges to their future ability to grow and to profit. Two particular incidents in 
which they successfully defended their interests demonstrated more than the 
power of the individual companies. Those two affairs showed that the 
Philadelphia associates, with their great sway over local and regional economies, 
had established their domain over broad issues of resource allocation and 
economic development. In so doing, they created a corporate sphere with 
profound consequences for the American polity and for the legacy of the 
American Revolution.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company flaunted its dominance of local affairs 
on February 4, 1833, when Philadelphia county constable William Simpson 
evicted John Gotwalt and his family from the home they had lived in for eight 
years. Through no fault of Gotwalt’s, the house he occupied lay at the epicenter 
of a dispute between the City of Philadelphia and the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company, two of Philadelphia’s corporate behemoths. Their argument 
concerned the one resource that both corporations depended upon for the vast 
majority of their operating revenue: the waters of the Schuylkill River. The nature
288
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of the conflict and the way that the Schuylkill Navigation Company moved to 
further its interests implied that its board considered the river, which was a 
crucial regional economic resource, to be under the company’s domain.
The first official dealings between the company and the Watering 
Committee occurred largely because of the efforts of none other than Josiah 
White. In 1810, he purchased a set of properties at the Falls of the Schuylkill, 
several miles above Philadelphia.1 Along with land on both sides of the river, 
the purchase included an 1807 law from the Pennsylvania legislature authorizing 
the owner to dam the river and to make a lock navigation around the dam— a 
right that the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s 1815 charter did not supersede. 
Although the Schuylkill originated in rugged country, closer to Philadelphia the 
land was more flat, requiring a dam to raise the level of the water enough to 
ensure enough pressure to  turn water wheels. The river was commonly thought 
to be undammable at the Falls because in the spring, with the first thaws, great 
freshets of water careened down the river, carrying with them huge sheets of 
crushing ice. Either too brave or too foolish to be daunted by such barriers, 
White bought the site and within two years managed to dam the river. He also 
built a lock for navigation on the west side of the Schuylkill and a millrace to 
power a nail and wire mill near the river’s eastern banks. W hite soon realized 
that the cost of constructing his strong, heavy stone dam fa r exceeded the 
returns from the lock and the mill. Finally, in 1819, he found an eager buyer for 
the property and the water rights: the Watering Committee. Wanting to expand
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the reservoir capacity of the waterworks and unsatisfied with “the constant and 
great expense attending Steam Engines, and the vexation occasioned by 
repeated accidents,” the Watering Committee and especially waterworks 
superintendent Frederick Graff saw W hite’s improvements and the land attached
to them as a godsend.2 The new site gave the city corporation an opportunity to 
secure a seemingly limitless quantity of water and pay next to nothing in annual 
energy costs.
Many early corporations chartered to administer inland navigations 
encountered opposition, and used their power most openly, in conflicts 
concerning waterpower and eminent domain. The Watering Committee’s 
purchase of W hite's property and the subsequent construction of the Fairmount 
waterworks and reservoir at the site required the cooperation of the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company. The city would be diverting large quantities of Schuylkill 
River water both fo r the new reservoir and for the new works to pump the water. 
The navigation company, for its part, wanted to ensure that it would be able to 
collect tolls and retain enough water for the locks to be operable. Accordingly, 
the two corporations arranged a complex contract in 1819 to govern their sharing 
of the river and its banks. In 1820 and again in 1824, they clarified the first 
agreement. By the terms of the final deal, the city built and maintained a lock 
navigation around the dam according to Schuylkill Navigation Company 
specifications. The navigation was on city property— that purchased from
1The Falls of the Schuylkill was several miles above the city limits then, but was incorporated into the city 
along with its other Philadelphia County suburbs in 1854.
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White— and the city was to employ a toll-taker there. All tolls went to the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, as did a one-time payment of $26,000 that 
helped the cash-strapped concern complete construction elsewhere. In return, 
the city retained all the rights to the actual water of the Schuylkill not required for 
the navigation, a big concern for the growing city. The solution gave each side 
what it wanted: fo r the navigation company, cash and a proper facility at no cost, 
and for the city, a guaranteed supply of fresh water.
The agreement turned out to be short-lived because the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company’s spectacular success after 1825 had not been anticipated 
in the company’s original plans. Schuylkill Navigation Company officials had 
initially constructed locks 80 feet long and 17 feet wide, enough to fit four boats 
at a time. The daily possible traffic of those locks, given the time to fill and 
empty the locks, was about 95 boats a day, a more than reasonable capacity 
given the expected volume of shipping, the cost of construction, and the 
company’s resources. But by the early 1830s, traffic volume exceeded the 
grandest expectations of the company’s Board of Directors, reaching an amazing
327,921 tons in 1832 with no limits in sight (See Figure 7 A).3 Accordingly, in 
1832 the company began building a second set of locks at the navigation’s 
busiest points along the lower part of the navigation, putting in eight new locks 
alongside the original ones in order to double capacity. On October 2, 1832, the 
company, citing “the very great increase of trade along the Schuylkill,” informed
2“Report of the Watering Committee on the subject of obtaining Water power from the River Schuylkill, 
February 5,1819,” City Council 120.42 Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia
City Archives.
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the Watering Committee that they intended to do the same at Fairmount, the 
location of the city-built and owned locks. The new lock would be dug right a t the 
location of the current lock-tender’s house— John G otwalf s home as perk of his 
employment with the city.4 On December 8, 1832 Joseph S. Lewis, the 
president of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, wrote to Gotwalt instructing the 
city employee to vacate the premises so that the navigation company could build 
the new locks.5 The company wanted to be ready for even greater profits 
beginning with the 1833 season.
That the Schuylkill Navigation Company came into conflict with City of 
Philadelphia over the building of the new locks demonstrated many of the ways 
that the two corporations had grown in importance to the city and, indeed, to the 
region’s economy. The navigation company’s importance to the regional 
economy was even greater than the huge increase in tonnage indicated. The 
increase in availability of anthracite did more than benefit coal-mining areas: it 
contributed directly to the establishment of Philadelphia as a capital of steam- 
engine production in the 1820s and 1830s. Succeeding early steam pioneer 
Oliver Evans, men like Matthias Baldwin and W illiam  Norris, began making 
steam engines for locomotives, establishing Philadelphia as perhaps the world’s 
premier city for the manufacture of railroad engines. The building of those steam
^Schuylkill Navigation Company statistics compiled from Minute Books, Box 1, Oct. 5, 1815- Nov. 26,
1849, Schuylkill Navigation Company records, MG-110, Pennsylvania State Archives.
4John Gotwalt to Frederick Graff, November 2, 1825. Correspondence of the Watering Committee with the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Water Works: Together with the Reports of 
the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11.1832. and Feb’v 11.1833 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. 
Bailey, 1833), 4-5.
5Joseph S. Lewis to John Gotwalt, December 8,1832. Correspondence of the Watering Committee with 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Waterworks: Together with the Reports
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engines required great quantities of steel, metal requiring such high heat to work 
that anthracite became the fuel of choice for steel mills. In 1830, the city 
accounted for nearly a quarter of the entire nation’s steel production. While the 
availability of coal allowed the production of heavy machinery sent all over the 
world, the value of products sent up the navigation actually exceeded the value 
of those coming downstream. From 1831 to 1835, about $4,000,000 worth of 
goods made their way south and east along the Schuylkill toward Philadelphia, 
but over $6,000,000 in value traveled north and west into the hinterland, away
from the city.6 Given tha t Philadelphia County’s population in 1830 approached 
200,000 people, the Schuylkill Navigation Company alone accounted for 
approximately $50 per person in regional trade coming to and from the
metropolis.7 The company’s board suggested that “the additional work at Fair 
Mount has become so essential to the accommodation of the increasing trade on
the river, that without it the navigation will be much impeded.”8 According to 
their terms, the city’s commerce could grow only if the navigation could be 
expanded at high traffic points, especially at Fairmount.
For its part, the W atering Committee had legitimate concerns that the 
operation of a second set of locks at Fairmount might threaten the city’s flow of 
water, and for that matter, water revenue. The city’s growth, the extension of the
of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec'r 11.1832. and Feb’v 11.1833 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. 
Bailey, 1833), 14.
®Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1978), 102.
7According to the 1810 United States census, the total population of Philadelphia County was 188,797.
8Joseph S. Lewis to John Sergeant, Horace Binney, and Charles Chauncey, December 17, 1832. Opinion 
of Counsel, on the Right of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to Make Another Lock and Canal for the Use 
of the Navigation at the Fair Mount Dam (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1833), 2.
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waterworks into the suburbs, and greater per-capita water use had resulted in 
the expansion of the waterworks and its administration. The first plan for the 
waterworks had been based on an expected need of one million gallons a day, a 
figure quickly increased by half during the construction of the engines; the 
contract fo r the engines stipulated a total capacity of up to three million gallons
daily.0 By late 1811, the Watering Committee decided to build two new 
reservoirs, each with a one-million-gallon capacity.10 By 1817, peak needs 
approached two million gallons daily, but the narrow wooden mains could only 
handle half that. Complaints that summer led to the 1818 construction of wider 
iron water mains capable of delivering five million gallons in a twenty-four hour
period.11 Within a year, the Watering Committee was already planning the 
Fairmount works with its projected ability to supply up to ten million gallons daily,
and by 1825 it was supplying four million gallons on the hottest summer days.12 
By the early 1830s, demand was so high that during dry spells in the summer the 
level o f the Schuylkill dropped fa r enough that the city could not draw water from 
it without violating its contract to ensure that the navigation had enough water to 
operate, and the water used by an additional lock would cut into the volume
9March 2, 1799, Select Council Minutes, October 14,1796- April 14,1799. CNL15 (mss.), Philadelphia City 
Archives; Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 
24th of November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
I ^ Report of the Watering Committee Upon the Present State of the Works for Supplying the City with 
Water, and the Several Other Plans. Proposed for That Purpose. May 5. 1812 (Philadelphia, 1812).
I I  Report of the Watering Committee. Read in Select Council. November 12. 1818 (Philadelphia: William 
Fry, 1818).
12February 5,1819, City Council 120.42 Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia 
City Archives; Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach, Travels Through North America. During the 
Years 1825 and 1826 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Carey, 1828), 137.
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c o n s i d e r a b l y . 1 3 That increasing supply of water flowed to all d istricts within the 
city limits and to the neighboring suburbs of Spring Garden, the [Northern 
Liberties, and Southwark. It also resulted in a great deal of m oney for the city 
coffers. In 1826, for the first time, water rents exceeded direct outlays spent 
maintaining the waterworks, in 1827 the city gained a $4,800 surplus, and 
revenues had continued growing quickly14. Furthermore, The W atering 
Committee controlled water policy not only for the city, but also fo r  the 
metropolitan area, and its members perceived the building of ano ther set o f locks 
as a short-term threat to the performance of the waterworks and a long-term 
threat to the city’s public health and continued growth. As John IP. Wetherill, 
chairman of the Watering Committee, wrote to Joseph S. Lewis, “granting 
facilities to the increasing coal trade” should be matched with “corresponding 
facilities... to meet the increasing demand for water power a ris ing  from the rapid 
growth of the City and the neighbouring d is tric ts .”15  The navigation and the 
waterworks truly were at the nexus of economic activity and urba_n development.
The way that the Schuylkill Navigation Company officials w e n t about 
building the new locks demonstrated the company’s use of its fin-ancial, 
ideological, and technological leverage. After so many lean ye a rs  during
13john p. Wetherill to Joseph S. Lewis, February 13 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee 
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Water Works: Together with the 
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11. 1832. and Feb'v 11. 1833 (Philadelphia: 
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 36-40.
14 Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: From April 1. 1823 to January 1. 1828 
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1828).
1®John P. Wetherill to Joseph S. Lewis, November 15, 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee 
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Waterworks: Together with the 
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11.1832. and Feb'v 11. 11833 (Philadelphia: 
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 10.
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construction, the company had become rich. Issuing its first dividends in 1829, 
the company could afford to expand in 1832 because it was flush with cash. 
Beyond having the money to build, they had the paid manpower and the loyalty 
that came with employment: when Simpson came to evict Gotwalt, the sheriff 
was accompanied by twenty Schuylkill Navigation Company employees. The 
company also had the legal authority to build more or less whatever it wanted in 
connection with the navigation of the river as well as to invoke the power of local 
law enforcement against anyone who opposed them. Lewis wrote numerous 
letters to Gotwalt, to waterworks superintendent Frederick Graff, and to the 
W atering Committee. W hen those missives did not result in Gotwalt’s voluntary 
removal from the toll-keeper’s house, Lewis called W illiam  Simpson, a 
Philadelphia County sheriff, to evict Gotwalt. In order to do so, Lewis invoked 
the 1826 measure that various canal companies had helped push through the 
state legislature including a clause that allowed canal companies to call local 
constables to remove “refractory” toll-keepers from company premises. The title 
of the law even reflected the ways that business corporations presented their 
particular interests as those of the community: “An Act to  protect the public in the 
full benefit and enjoyment of the works constructed fo r the purposes of Inland 
Navigation.”16 They had been able to get that clause passed because it was 
only one in a list of infractions that could slow traffic along the navigation—  
impediments to the technology that the company had built. In financial terms, in 
legal terms, and in technological terms, the Schuylkill Navigation Company held
16Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia:
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a great many cards in its hand, even compared to a city corporation governing 
over eighty thousand people.
The arguments that Lewis and company lawyers put forth to defend their 
action to construct another lock further showed their sense that the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company controlled the river. Responding to a Watering Committee 
offer to negotiate a solution acceptable to both parties, Lewis denied that “the 
alterations in the use of [Schuylkill water] at Fair Mount, are such as makes it 
proper for them to communicate those alterations to the City Councils for their 
approbation.” Lewis flatly stated that the navigation company “Board do not 
suppose that the right to use the water and water power of the river fo r the 
purposes of navigation to the extent that they may deem necessary, is subject to
any question.”17 Later, company lawyers would argue that even if the company 
wanted to sell water rights to the city, the original charter did not authorize the 
alienation of those rights if they would in any way impede the navigation of the 
river as determined by the company— notwithstanding that the city’s purchase of 
water rights beyond what the company used at the time was clearly the purpose 
of the 1824 agreement costing the city $2 6 ,0 0 0 . 1 8  Before the incorporation of 
the company, the Schuylkill River, like all waterways, was legally a public 
highway. In late 1832 and early 1833, the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
successfully asserted its ownership o f the river and its right to use it in perpetuity,
Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 28.
17Joseph S. Lewis to John P. Wetherill, November 27, 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee 
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Water Works: Together with the 
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec'r 11. 1832. and Feb'v 11. 1833 (Philadelphia: 
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 10.
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and could arrest anyone who interfered with that right. The Schuylkill River had 
once been a public highway; but by the 1830s it was wholly owned by the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company.
The intimacy of the corporate community also played a part in the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company’s successful building of its new locks at 
Fairmount. When Lewis wrote to Watering Committee chairman Wetherill it was 
at first with a certain degree of familiarity despite the legalistic tone the letters 
took after a few months’ exchange. The two men typified the degree of 
interconnection between and among Philadelphia corporations. Together they 
had served on the board of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Company 
from 1807 to 1811. Separately, Wetherill had served on the boards of the 
American Fire Insurance Company, the Bank of Pennsylvania, the Schuylkill 
Bank, the second Bank of the United States, the Germantown Turnpike, and the 
Union Insurance Company— and, in 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 
Lewis had been even more active as a director o f the Bank of North America, the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, the Pennsylvania Insurance Company, 
and as the sitting president of the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and 
Granting Annuities. He, too, had not only served on the city councils, but also he 
was chairman of the Watering Committee from the late 1810s well into the 
1820s, and had negotiated the 1819 and 1824 agreements on behalf of the 
Watering Committee. If any of the Philadelphia associates understood the 
combined power of technology, finance, and ideology, it was Joseph S. Lewis.
®See Opinion of Counsel, on the Right of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to Make Another Lock and
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Through all the letter-writing, Wetherill did not take the step of filing suit to halt 
company construction. Despite his letters of protestation about the company’s 
actions, Wetherill and the rest o f the Watering Committee never actually did 
anything that would stop the Schuylkill Navigation Company from completing its 
expansion. Long after the construction was over, the city corporation sent a 
petition of protest to the legislature in April— too close to adjournment for 
legislative action— and finally filed suit in June. The associates had decided that 
continued economic growth was more important than, in one disgruntled 
pamphleteer’s words, the city’s “most cherished improvement, its most important 
security against pestilence, its only safeguard against conflagration, its best
source of revenue, [and] the object of its honest pride.” 19 The associates had 
spoken.
In asserting their control over their river, the Philadelphia associates had 
shown that they were in charge of Philadelphia’s economic development, but 
Josiah White’s defense of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company against 
coal-mining rivals and corroborating descriptions of company operations showed 
how far the corporate sphere could be extended. At the same time the Schuylkill 
Navigation Board flexed its muscles in its dispute with the Philadelphia Councils, 
W hite’s new company faced a challenge from potential competitors. O ther 
internal improvement companies were barred from entering into trade, but the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had the right to mine and ship coal as well
Canal for the Use of the Navigation at the Fair Mount Dam (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1833).
The Waterworks. The Misconduct of the Present Citv Councils in Relation to the Fair Mount Water 
Works. Illustrated and Proved from Official Documents (Philadelphia. 1833), 8.
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as to build and operate its waterway. In 1832, several groups of investors in 
various coal-mining concerns claimed that they were “aggrieved by the
oppressive monopoly of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company.”20 These 
would-be rivals argued tha t because the company did not charge itself tolls for 
the anthracite it mined, its lower overall cost to market gave it an unfair 
advantage. Some critics further campaigned against corporations entering the 
coal trade at all, noting “tha t companies have the power to glut and engross the 
markets, to sell below cost, give long credits, and in a variety of ways encounter 
sacrifices and losses that would be ruinous to individual dealers.”21 These 
groups petitioned to the legislature to force the Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company to lower its tolls beyond its current legal limits, to be on par with those 
of either the Schuylkill Navigation Company or the state-owned Delaware Branch 
that ran parallel to the Delaware River. They knew full well that doing so would 
threaten the company’s ability to turn profits. In short, they aimed to break the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company.
They would not be successful, because W hite knew how to use the 
leverage of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company to gather political support. 
In 1824, he had lobbied the state legislature fo r permission to run a steamboat 
navigation along the Delaware. The completion of such a plan would improve 
transportation along the Delaware from the end of the Lehigh navigation to 
Philadelphia’s wharves. In conjunction with a projected plan to connect the
^Circular, April 23, 1832, addendum to To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate Tin Answer to 
Charges Against the Lehiah Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 12.
21 Facts and Observations Relative to the Incorporation of Coal Companies (Philadelphia!. 1833), 1.
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Lehigh and the Susquehanna, the new navigation would offer those near the 
upper Susquehanna the option of sending their goods on a more direct route 
than possible at the time. W hite printed up petitions and sent them to friends in 
the region, asking them “to  complete them and send them on to Erskine Hazard 
in Harrisburg or to your members as you think best.” He suggested pointing out 
to potential signatories that “every settler on either of the branches of the 
Susquehanna would have an interest in this improvement to the navigation.”22 
Soon after, a number of petitions covered with signatures arrived in Harrisburg. 
Because the proposed projects would have cut into their business, Union Canal 
Company backers managed to quash that bill, but White would be better 
prepared for his 1 8 3 2  battle.
Between 1 8 2 4  and 1 8 3 2 , the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had 
become the most powerful entity in the Lehigh River valley. When challenged by 
would-be competitors, White fought back in the papers and in the legislature by 
testifying just how great an influence— in his mind, a positive influence— the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had over the economy of Mauch Chunk, 
its principal depot on the river, and the areas through which the navigation 
flowed. He countered his opponents by claiming that when the company began 
construction, the area was a “wilderness” with fewer than ten families living within 
a dozen miles of the river l a n d i n g . 2 3  Now, though, “10,000 citizens are
22 Josiah White to George Hollenback, et. al., December 4, 1824. As quoted in Norris Hansell, Josiah 
White. Quaker Entrepreneur (Easton, PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 1992), 69.
22[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate Tin Answer to Charges Against the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 6.
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interested materially”  in the continued success o f the navigation.24 Having 
access to great pools o f Philadelphia capital, the company had expended close
to $2.2 million in the area.2® Everyone in the region, White suggested, owed the 
company a great deal of thanks, and he was not shy in boasting about the 
accomplishments o f the corporation:
Our Com pany has supported a population in and near 
Mauch Chunk, for a number of years, exceeding 
1,500 souls. The regular hands exceed 500, whose 
annual savings exceed $30,000 per year, which is put 
out to interest, or invested in lands or in trade... Our 
stock is fifty dollars per share, which is possessed by 
a great number of people; a considerable portion by 
the working class—the widow and the orphan. Our 
loans are also diffused. I presume 10,000 souls are 
in this moment supported more or less by the outlays 
of this concern, or injured by the long suspension of 
dividends.2®
Even “pine forest owners,” according to White “should give us much 
commendation... fo r raising and keeping up the value of the lumber” that before 
the navigation’s construction was “not to be considered worth stealing, owing to 
the expense that would attend getting it to market.”27 White concluded that “it is 
this community that is threatened with injury and a large portion with ruin” by 
those “who have not laid out in public work, during the course of their lives,
^[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate fin Answer to Charges Against the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 8.
25Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of 
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh 
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 5.
26Josiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 1.
2^[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate rin Answer to Charges Against the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company] (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 5; Statement of the Lehigh
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perhaps, as much as this Company, which is threatened with ruin, regularly lays
out per month.”28 White’s arguments were a paean to the company’s diffusion 
o f economic benefits.
Those arguments also worked very effectively to keep the legislature in 
his corner but out of his hair. In 1835, White published extracts from an 1834 
Pennsylvania Senate Committee nominally charged with looking into the 
operation of coal industry. The committee had been formed at the behest of “a 
convention of delegates, representing several of the northern counties interested 
in the navigation of the Lehigh, asking an investigation of the grounds of
complaint against the Lehigh coal and navigation company.”29 Despite its having 
been called by the navigation company’s opponents, the committee went far to 
defend the company from its attackers, its final report reading like a draft of 
company promotional literature. The report was so complimentary to the 
company that White eventually had some of it printed in pamphlet form.
Declaring that the navigation was “admitted to be the best in the United States,” 
the committee denied any wrongdoing on the part of the company, arguing that 
“whether they have adopted a wise or erroneous policy, which, by grasping after 
large tolls, may prevent them from receiving any, is a question between them
Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock (Philadelphia: William Brown, 
1818), 6.
28Josiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 1.
28Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehiah Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh 
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 4.
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and the stockholders.”30 The committee then proceeded to suggest that the 
legislature take White up on his offer for the company to sell the navigation to 
the state for its original construction costs plus interest.31 Doing so would have 
provided an incredible boon for the company: its early years were plagued by 
dissension between those wanting to keep the company as one entity and those 
who wanted to split it in half because they saw only the coal operations as 
having potential for profit. Even in the early 1830s, the company’s board knew 
that dividends lay in the coalmines, not in the navigation. Although the full 
legislature did not approve the state’s purchase of the navigation, that the 
committee so firmly backed the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company confirmed 
the company’s political power.
Despite the impressive leverage the company could bring to bear in the 
legislature, it was small compared to the company’s power over the town of 
Mauch Chunk, a community built to become a corporate f i e f d o m . 3 2  By 1 8 2 9 ,  
the company had paid for a hotel, a mill, a pair o f iron furnaces, a store, a 
wheelwright’s shop, and a school among the over 120 business and residential 
buildings its workers had constructed. The town that White built was no less 
“benevolent’ than those constructed at Lowell, Massachusetts in the same 
period. In keeping with his Quaker heritage, W hite abolished the sale of hard 
liquor, kept a close eye on the one tavern— company-owned— and fired
^ Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of 
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh 
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 5-6.
31 Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of 
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh 
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 9-12.
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alcoholics and those accused o f abuse or neglect either toward their families or 
to animals. He even set up a medical service fo r employees at a low annual 
pay-in cost, perhaps the first company-run health maintenance organization.
One sympathetic journalist observed that “stricter obligations are here prescribed
and observed than could be enforced by the  state.”33 Although local citizens did 
send their duly elected representatives to Harrisburg and Washington and they 
were free to discuss economic, social, and political affairs at the local tavern, the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company was their true ruler: the corporate sphere 
dwarfed the public sphere in Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania.
During the American Revolution, many Philadelphians reveled in their 
rebellion, happy to reject the rule of Britain in fact and in symbol. They had 
witnessed the birth of a new republic on new principles, a conscious rejection of 
corrupt Britain with its monarch and its domination by financial interests— at least 
in the eyes of many Americans.
Some Philadelphia merchants had been Whigs, others disaffected, and a 
few Tories during the Revolution, but once the conflict was settled they all 
agreed not to throw away the infant national economy with the old imperial 
bathwater. Perhaps they still took the term “revolution” literally: that the defiance 
of Britain was a struggle for a return to an earlier, mythical political age in which
3^Mauch Chunk was since renamed Jim Thorpe in the twentieth century.
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the Crown and Parliament did not trample the political and economic dreams of 
loyal subjects. Despite its small population, its lack of natural resources 
compared to France o r Spain, and loss of its continental colonies, Britain was still 
the Atlantic world’s econom ic powerhouse, and continued to be well into the 
nineteenth century. Philadelphia merchants could not help but look to Britain for 
business examples.
British models proved especially attractive because they promised the 
order that any elite group craves, especially during and after periods of great 
upheaval. The Philadelphia mercantile community was no exception. 
Philadelphia merchants intuitively grasped that British-style corporations lent 
constancy on a variety of levels, and proceeded to establish dozens of them 
from the 1780s through the 1820s. Banks and insurance provided economic 
stability, thereby allowing individuals to alleviate cash-flow problems and 
reducing potential popular unrest. Corporations yielded steady, long-term 
dividends for the merchants and their families. And British corporate financial 
devices, including bonds, preferred shares, and sinking funds, allowed for the 
mobilization of domestic capital in the quickly developing nation.
Corporations were at the nexus of the phenomenon that historians of the 
early republic have increasingly identified as the period’s central theme, the
market revolution.^4 For the general population, Philadelphia-area corporations
33james Pierce was writing for Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania, a periodical published by the brother of 
White’s partner Erskine Hazard. As quoted in Norris Hanseli, Josiah White. Quaker Entrepreneur (Easton, 
PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 1992), 72.
34 See Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), for the first and most comprehensive synthesis; Sean Wilentz provides a good 
overview and bibliography in “Society, Politics, and the Market Revolution, 1815-1848,” in Eric Foner, ed.,
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provided services and technologies without greatly increasing taxes. Tens of 
thousands of people in Philadelphia and its growing economic hinterland took 
advantage of the water, the cash, and the cheap, efficient transportation that 
corporations and their access to capital made available. As more people 
increasingly depended upon corporate-owned technologies to pursue their own 
economic dreams, company associates learned how to manipulate that 
dependence for their own business and political ends. By creating interlocking 
directories, a small group of men were able to control the institutions that 
dominated the Philadelphia-area economy.
The creation of that corporate dependence entailed two lasting ironies.
On one level, just as the Revolution had been a fight for national independence, 
fo r many Americans it meant a more personal struggle for individual 
independence. In the Philadelphia area, many people established independence 
from their former clients, only to fall under the more enduring and more 
encompassing sway of corporate boards. The everyday evidence of client- 
patron relations had been replaced by the illusion of political and economic 
independence. On another level, the political triumph of the common man at the 
polls was coupled with the corporate dominance of a financial elite holding far 
more influence over economic matters than the imaginary cabal of speculators 
and stockjobbers whom the revolutionaries had accused of dominating 
Parliament and the Crown. W hat had happened?
The New American History. Revised and Expanded Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 
61-84.
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Scholars writing on the early republic have been divided into two camps 
regarding the spread of egalitarianism— that is, among white men— in the United 
States from the 1770s to the 1830s, what one might call the long American
Revolution.36 Both sides agree that the old eighteenth-century patterns of 
deference collapsed over that half-century, but they part in their assessment of 
the results. Bearing the flag for one camp is Gordon Wood, who, in his The 
Radicalism of the American Revolution, argued that the availability of cash and 
the leveling implications of revolutionary rhetoric combined to create a far less 
patriarchal society, one in which no white man felt obligated to doff his cap to
another.36 Alan Taylor’s William Cooper’s Town shows in a particular place 
what Wood had demonstrated more generally: in this case, a community in 
upstate New York that underwent a transformation in its social and political
leadership from “Fathers of the People” to “Friends of the People.”37 These 
scholars portrayed an America in which every white man acts and feels the equal 
o f any other. The standard for the other historiographic side, Charles Sellers’s 
The Market Revolution, relates capitalists’ increased dominance over political, 
economic, and social affairs during the thirty years following the W ar of 1812.36 
From a similar vantage point, Alfred Young asserted in The Shoemaker and the 
Tea Party that the Boston Tea Party only became a “fit” event for official public
33This controversy is limited to the relative positions of white males. None of these authors suggests in the 
least that legal or social equality extended to other Americans, nor do I.
36Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
37Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American 
Republic (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
33Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).
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celebration in the 1830s, once elite city leaders could be sure that its radical
undertones would be safely muted.39 This second group of historians pointed to 
the consolidation of power in ever fewer hands during the early republican 
period. The two interpretations seem so far apart that one may wonder whether 
these scholars were looking at the same place and time, or whether either 
analysis is accurate.
Part of the disagreement involves a difference in the outlook—and 
choice— of the authors’ particular subjects. Taylor’s W illiam Cooper bemoaned 
his former clients’ growing insolence and his son James Fenimore Cooper 
mourned his family’s lost stature, while Young’s aging George Robert Twelves 
Hughes reminisced about the exhilarating moments when an ordinary 
shoemaker rubbed shoulders with elite merchants as revolutionary equals. Even 
Harry L. Watson, whose Liberty and Power is perhaps the best political history of 
the period and somewhat bridges the gap between these two positions, 
nonetheless argued that the era’s political controversies precisely revolved 
around the diffusion of political participation and centralization of economic
power.49 The two phenomena appear to be paradoxical: equality was spreading 
at the same time that power was becoming consolidated.
The growth of Philadelphia corporations suggests that the two major 
interpretations of the period are not contradictory, but complementary. True, in 
the public sphere, in taverns, civic celebrations, political rallies, and religious
Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1999).
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revivals, by the 1830s common men demanded and received their due. To be a 
leader in the public sphere, one had to be a “friend of the people.” Common 
men had won that respect by pressing fo r and taking advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by the proliferation of cash and availability of goods that 
corporations helped bring into being. In the public sphere, at least the 
appearance of and appeal to egalitarianism was what gave Jacksonian America 
its boisterous, raucous political contests. That public-sphere egalitarianism was 
only possible because of the widespread economic opportunities created through 
the use of the new technologies and new financial methods that corporations 
administered. At the same time, business corporate elites gained 
disproportionately compared to their contemporaries on two fronts. Most 
apparently, they made a great deal o f money, but more subtly, in dominating the 
administration of the new financial and technological hubs, they controlled 
powerful institutions— corporations— without American precedent.
Historians have increasingly used Jurgen Habermas’s characterization of 
the division of eighteenth-century and subsequent Western European and 
American social activity into a public sphere and a private sphere.41 Scholars 
investigating northern cities in the early republican period have particularly noted 
the extent to which parades and other popular events in the public sphere 
expressed an increasingly strident popular will. But the level o f corporate 
influence over new activities in nineteenth-century American society, be they
^H arry L  Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang,
1990), 171.
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economic, social, or charitable, does not fit Jabermas’s model. The 
administration of corporations, essentially taking place behind closed doors, 
grew in the interstices between the public and private spheres. True, 
corporations printed pamphlets and lobbied legislatures, but most of their 
deliberations took place neither in the open spaces of the public sphere nor in 
the domestic setting of the private sphere.
Corporations formed a third area, fitting neither Jabermas’s public nor 
private spheres. On the one hand, they were at least nominally subject to state 
authority, and the Corporation of Philadelphia was an elected government. Most 
of their proceedings were technically matters of public record, though corporate 
officers tended to make little effort to publish internal proceedings unless 
involved in political disputes in which they thought public opinion might be 
important. On the other hand, corporations conducted their business in an 
environment that the close circle of corporate officers and their friends attempted 
to put beyond the realm of the public. Shareholders elected corporate 
boardmembers in meetings limited to those owning stock, and even those 
proceedings represented little more than an affirmation of incumbent 
boardmembers or their chosen successors. Once chosen, directors made 
decisions regarding the region’s economic future behind closed doors. They 
directed their many employees, from lawyers and lobbyists to lock-keepers and 
laborers, to do their bidding. In addition, they had economic leverage over those 
not in their employ and decided among themselves how to use that leverage. By
41 Habermas first set forth this model in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
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the second quarter of the nineteenth century, corporate activities formed a 
sphere of social interaction unto themselves.
The acknowledgment of the creation of a  third, corporate sphere in 
American society dissolves the apparent paradox of diffusion and consolidation. 
In the public sphere, power was diffused. No longer could a few self-styled 
grandees dominate local or even state politics, much less expect those of the 
middling or lesser sorts to step out of the way when their “betters” walked past.
If anything, Jacksonian politics demonstrated the great anti-elitist bent of 
American society, the carnival that so shocked and delighted foreigners like 
Alexis de Tocqueville. As historians like David Waldstreicher, Matthew Crocker, 
and Kimberly Smith have demonstrated, the early republic public sphere
belonged to the masses.42 The saw iest of the economic elites simply created a 
new sphere, one they could more easily control and one that would encompass 
m any of the affairs dearest to the heart of the new commercial and industrial 
princes. The corporate sphere enveloped some of the most crucial issues of 
economic policy, including money supply, credit, and regional development. In 
Mauch Chunk, because the town was small and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company dominant, the corporation also determined social policy regarding 
alcohol consumption and fam ily relations. Mauch Chunk was an extreme 
example, but company social efforts there did not differ in their motivation from
a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger, Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989).
42David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism 1776-1820 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, 1997); Matthew H. Crocker, The Magic of the Manv: Josiah Quincy and the Rise of Mass Poiitics in
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the many charitable organizations in Philadelphia, New York, or Boston that 
sought to lift the m asses out o f their moral morass while at the same time 
channeling their behavior into modes less threatening to the emerging middle- 
and upper-class corporate order. Historian Robert Dalzell has argued that the 
same men who ran the company towns of Lowell and Waltham as paternalistic 
enterprises pursued sim ilar goals through their philanthropy in Boston, often 
using the same kind o f corporate organization— boards of directors, by-laws and
charters—that they did in their business pursuits.43 In Philadelphia as in 
Boston, the corporate sphere grew to fit the associates’ economic and social 
goals.
In the following decades, Philadelphia’s corporate sphere continued to 
grow. All of Philadelphia County was incorporated into the City Corporation of 
Philadelphia in 1854, creating perhaps the largest single municipal district in the 
country at that time and serving as a model for the incorporation of other large 
cities including New York’s later absorption of Brooklyn. In 1846, Thomas P. 
Cope, who near the beginning of his long career had been on the city corporation 
committee overseeing the construction of the city’s first waterworks, helped 
establish the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. In 1857, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad purchased the state of Pennsylvania’s bankrupt Main Line system for 
the bargain price of $10,000,000, a fraction of the cost. After the Civil War, the
Boston. 1800-1830 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); Kimberly K. Smith, The Dominion 
of Voice: Riot: Reason, and Romance in Antebellum Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
4^Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 113-164.
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Pennsylvania Railroad Company become the world’s largest business 
corporation, a position it held for thirty years.
The leaders of each kind of corporation, by their use of finance, 
technology, and ideology, continued in their efforts to limit the level of public 
scrutiny and input over corporate affairs. Municipal officials at least remained 
accountable to the electorate, but beginning in the 1850s business leaders 
increasingly espoused economic liberalism as their mantra to be repeated 
whenever public officials dared to question the motives or actions of business 
corporations— notwithstanding the willingness for corporate officers and 
investors to lobby for land grants, tax abatements, subsidies, legislative barriers 
to potential competition, and other governmental favors. According to this 
philosophy, not only was the government less capable of regulating the economy 
than the “invisible hand” of the marketplace, but also it had no right to try. As the 
evolution of corporations in Philadelphia indicates, economic liberalism was a 
justification for structures already established by 1830. In the Revolutionary 
period, no one questioned the primacy of civil authorities in political and 
economic matters, because everyone understood the two to be inextricably 
connected. With the ensuing establishment o f a corporate sphere, business 
corporation boosters created the self-serving illusion that many fundamental 
economic issues lay beyond the proper bailiwick of elected officials. After the 
Civil War, corporate leaders would even make the case that the government 
existed to serve them, convincing governors and presidents to do the 
corporations’ bidding by using government troops in the corporations’ private
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battles. When corporate leaders did so, they carefully avoided making reference 
to the Spirit of ’76.
The mixed legacy o f Josiah W hite and Joseph S. Lewis still lives in the 
United States, a society unparalleled in its capacity fo r economic and 
technological developm ent but often plagued by the public’s inability to brook the 
power of corporations whose only interest is the bottom line. It did not have to 
be so. Nor does it now.
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